One of the great challenges facing the Foreign Interference Commission is the effort to achieve some transparency with regard to the classified intelligence held by the government and made available to the Commission. Transparency matters for both public education about foreign interference threats and as a foundation for public trust in the Commission’s work and recommendations. David Johnston, the government’s appointed and ill-fated independent special rapporteur, was doubtful that real transparency could be achieved and for that reason argued against holding a public inquiry.
Two things are clear at this relatively early stage in the Inquiry’s work. One is that a great deal of the records made available to the Commission will never see the light of day. The other is that the Commission and the government have established some work-arounds with regard to the secrecy problem. These include publishing some heavily redacted documents (probably the least satisfying method); producing unclassified summaries of in camera hearings with intelligence officials and others; having intelligence officials testify while protecting their identities in public hearings, as occurred with two CSIS officials on Friday, April 5; and publishing unclassified “summaries” of the government’s accumulated intelligence holdings on particular issues of relevance to the Inquiry.
Some of these methods have been employed in previous public inquiries relating to national security and intelligence. The one that stands out as genuinely new is the idea of publishing the summaries of intelligence holdings.
I want to explore these summaries to reach some tentative conclusions about how valuable they are in achieving the twin objectives of enhancing public understanding and shoring up trust in the Commission’s work. I also want to advance some cautionary notes about being too satisfied with them.
There are 14 intelligence summaries that have been released to date. They are all very brief, ranging from a paragraph to a little more than two pages. [1]
They all come with a one-page cover note (the “caveat”) that tells us that these are unclassified summaries of intelligence held by the government’s national security and intelligence system. They were prepared at the request of the Commission. The summaries are partial—we are told they do not necessarily contain all the intelligence information available, only that which could be conveyed in public. The time frame for intelligence knowledge (what was known, when) is not indicated. Sourcing is not indicated (single source, multiple sources, types of intelligence collection utilised). Reliability is not attested. Corroboration is not affirmed.
Perhaps most important is the final caveat item:
“Summary does not analyze information: This document is a summary of intelligence; it is not an analysis of the overall import, meaning, or strength of intelligence.”
What is the meaning of the final caveat? This one beggars me. Surely a conscious summary of intelligence is precisely a product of analysing the totality of intelligence reporting and arriving at a synthesis of what represents the best and most significant intelligence judgements arrived at.
Five of the summaries relate to foreign interference activities conducted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Two additional ones (and there is obvious overlap here) relate to the controversy over MP Han Dong’s 2019 nomination campaign and his contacts with Chinese consular officials. Two summaries relate to Indian government activities; two relate to Pakistani government interference. One each for Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia.
What’s missing? There is nothing related to Turkey, whose government has pursued a global campaign targeting its critics and seeking to undermine support for the Gulen movement. Sure, Turkey is a NATO ally, but that, in and of itself, need not have placed it beyond the bounds of the Commission’s study. Questions have also been raised about Rwandan interference activities in Canada.
Clearly China is the main subject of interest. But let’s first examine what surprises (or non-surprises, or surprise non-surprises) are in store outside of the PRC topic. One non-surprise is that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not a significant foreign interference threat actor in terms of Canadian elections, whatever nasty transnational repression it may get involved in. [2] I am not sure why the FI Commission asked the question about Saudi Arabia.
The story is somewhat the same for Iran. There is no intelligence suggesting electoral interference, but reporting does indicate an Iranian government interest in monitoring the Iranian diaspora community to prevent criticism and in some cases efforts to suppress the activities of Canadian families of victims of the downing of flight PS572 (the Ukrainian airlines plane that was shot down by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps shortly after takeoff from Tehran on January 8, 2020). Fifty-five Canadian citizens and 30 permanent residents were among the victims. The Iranian-Canadian Congress filed a late application for standing in the first phase of the FI Commission—standing was granted. [3]
Then there is Russia. I think we have to mark this intelligence summary a surprise for what it doesn’t conclude. Russia is not deemed a current threat actor with regard to Canadian elections. Remember it was the case of Russian interference in the US presidential election of 2016 that sparked attention to foreign state actor interference in democratic processes in the first place. The intelligence summary acknowledges that Russia has plenty of interference capabilities, it just hasn’t demonstrated an intent to put Canada high on its target list for disinformation or other interference activities. [4]
Both Pakistan and India are treated to overall “country” summaries as well as specific reports on election interference attempts.
In the Pakistan country summary the intelligence community notes that it played only a limited foreign interference role during elections in 2019 and 20212 but undertakes general measures to support political actors, or proxies, in Canada favourable to its position or with anti-government of India views. [5] The big reveal about Pakistan is that CSIS used its powers granted first in 2015 to conduct what is known as a “Threat Reduction Measure” in 2019. The target of this TRM appears to have been Pakistani diplomats in Canada who “attempted to clandestinely influence Canadian federal politics with the aim of furthering the Government of Pakistan’s interests in Canada.” [6] TRMs are not commonly used by the Service and were originally designed as an anti-terrorism measure. What actions might have been involved in this TRM are not known but this is the first and only time that such measures have been declared to be used to counter foreign influence targeting Canada’s elections. There is no known indication that Pakistani diplomats were declared persona non grata and expelled from Canada so the measure might have been meant as a warning, or might have included proxy actors.
The India country summary. The content of reporting from the intelligence community should come as no surprise. India is deemed a country that uses foreign interference tools to counter pro-Khalistani political activism (advocating for a separate Sikh state in the Punjab) in Canada. As the intelligence summary notes, the Government of India “perceives anyone engaged in Khalistani separatism, as a seditious threat to India.” A second, and somewhat contradictory, objective underlying Indian government interference is an effort to “advance a positive image of India.” [7]
The warning note is that covert funding to Canadian politicians may have taken place, although the intelligence report notes candidates receiving funds may be unaware of their provenance. A separate report on Indian foreign interference in the 2021 election indicates the intelligence community assessed that India had an intent to engage and “likely” conducted clandestine activities in the context of the general election in 2021. This illicit activity was centred on a “small number of electoral districts” and some intelligence reporting (a “body of intelligence reporting) indicated it may have included clandestine financial support. Unlike the case of its south Asian rival and neighbour, there is no indication in the summary of any action taken to counter suspected Indian foreign interference. [8]
This brings us to Chinese foreign interference, the headline of the intelligence summaries.
There is a country summary for China, the longest of the set at two plus pages of text.[9] The first thing that stands out is the note that the PRC expends more resources on foreign interference than any other adversary actor. The intelligence community finds a wide range of activities undertaken by the PRC including by security agencies, diplomats, the United Front Work department, whose activities are directed at Chinese diaspora communities, and local proxies, but also notes that it believes that China is “agnostic in terms of political parties they direct these FI activities against.” The intelligence summary indicates that the PRC attempts to draw diaspora communities into its political embrace and has passed a suite of national security laws to compel its citizens and business entities to cooperate with the state even in overseas activities.
The PRC is depicted as a foreign interference actor that uses a combination of carrots and sticks. The carrots include fancy invitations and trips, preferential business opportunities, expedited visas, political and financial support. Sticks can include denial of travel visas and harassment and intimidation, including of family members based in the PRC.
PRC influence operations include the use of government controlled or manipulated media assets in the Chinese language to steer debate in ways favourable to the PRC position.
A final note concerns the ways that the PRC sets its sights especially on overseas advocacy on issues it considers threatening—including the Falun Gong movement, supporters of Tibetan independence, Uyghurs, Taiwanese independence actors, and pro-democracy movements.
The China intelligence summary is a generalised picture of a state that has intent and considerable capacity to conduct foreign interference in Canada, targeting both the political process and the diaspora community. It doesn’t translate the intent and capabilities into specific actions—for that we have to turn to some of the other PRC-related summaries.
Two relate to MP Han Dong and cast light on media reporting based on leaked classified documents.
One concerns Han Don’s nomination contest for his seat in Don Valley North (GTA), which he first won that year. This intelligence summary leans in to ensure readers’ understand its heavily qualified basis. It says that information was learned about irregularities in the nomination contest that “may have” included activities of individuals “close to PRC officials.” It further notes that there were a variety of sources for this intelligence, which was collected over time “with various levels of corroboration.” Intelligence available before the 2019 election was “not firmly substantiated” and was partial in nature. Two reporting themes include concerns about “buses” used to bring international students to the nomination, in support of Han Dong. (MP Dong testified before the Commission that there was one bus, perhaps holding about 20 students). “Some” intelligence reporting also referred to a “known proxy agent” involved in providing these students with falsified documents to allow them to vote. After the election, some intelligence indicated “veiled” threats issued by the PRC consulate to these students reinforcing their need to vote to Han Dong.[10]
What should we make of this intelligence? The summary tells us that it is a warning, based on pieces of intelligence of a variable credibility, difficult to corroborate. It indicates monitoring of the PRC consulate in Toronto and identification of “proxy agents.” The intelligence summary steers well away from claiming full knowledge of the situation. It makes no effort to establish the significance of the available intelligence.
We can compare this with the findings in the Johnston report, which confirms the intelligence community’s awareness of potential nomination irregularities. Here is what Mr. Johnston concluded:
Irregularities were observed with Mr. Dong’s nomination in 2019, and there is well-grounded suspicion that the irregularities were tied to the PRC Consulate in Toronto, with whom Mr. Dong maintains relationships. In reviewing the intelligence, I did not find evidence that Mr. Dong was aware of the irregularities or the PRC Consulate’s potential involvement in his nomination.”[11]
This closely tracks, as one would expect, with the intelligence summary.
What about the media reporting, based on leaks of classified intelligence? The Dong stories were published by Global News and its then investigative reporter, Sam Cooper. Global/Cooper was in a competitive race for “reveals” on the story of Chinese foreign interference with the Globe and Mail, and the Han Dong stories were its shot at headline attention.
Mr. Cooper’s first story relating to MP Han Dong was published on February 25, 2023. Its title was “Liberals Ignored CSIS warning on 2019 candidate accused in Chinese interference probe: sources.” [12] Relying on information from anonymous sources, particularly about a classified briefing provided to the Prime Minister’s office before the election in 2019, Han Dong is described, according to a supposed CSIS understanding, as a “witting affiliate” in China’s election interference networks. Cooper’s sources also described Han Dong as a “close friend” of the PRC consulate in Toronto. Reference is made to CSIS intelligence about irregularities in Han Dong’s nomination contest in 2019. Cooper states in his piece that “Global News has not confirmed the CSIS allegations in this story.” Clearly, that did not stop it from reporting on them or being used as a conduit for anonymous sources. Cooper’s report aligns with the intelligence summary and indeed with the Johnston report in discussing nomination irregularities. Where it does not the align is in describing Han Dong as “witting affiliate” in China’s election interference—Global News’ most sensational claim to that point—or in describing him as a “close friend” of the PRC consulate.
A second intelligence summary concerns a conversation between Han Dong and the PRC Consulate in Toronto in early 2021. The context makes clear that the conversation was intercepted by CSIS. [13]
The intelligence summary makes several points about intelligence reporting on the conversation, including that it involved a range of topics, that Han Dong stressed he was speaking in a personal capacity not on behalf of the Government, and that he was concerned about “hardline” approaches by Canada to the PRC which he believed opposition parties favoured. Part of the conversation involved comments by Han Dong on the Uyghur genocide motion before the House of Commons.
According to the intel summary, the topic of the “two Michaels” was raised in the broader context of its impact on Sino-Canadian relations. Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor had at this stage been imprisoned by the PRC for over two years, in clear retaliation for the Canadian arrest of Meng Wanzhou, the Huawei CFO, in fulfilment of a US extradition request. According to the intel summary Han Dong told his interlocutor that the Canadian public believed the Chinese approach to the case was wrong and lacked legal justification. Han Dong was concerned about positions hardening on the matter and commented that even if the two Michael were released this would support an opposition political view on the effectiveness of a hardline approach by Canada. Dong further told the official at the PRC consulate that more transparency from China about its intentions for the two detainees “would help placate Canadian public opinion and provide some valuable talking points to his own political party against the opposition.”
Media reporting by Sam Cooper/Global News turned this conversation into something much more conspiratorial. On March 22, 2023, Mr. Cooper published an article entitled, “Liberal MP Han Dong secretly advised Chinese diplomat in 2021 to delay freeing two Michaels: sources.” [14] In the first paragraph of his news report, Cooper states that two national security sources had informed him that Han Dong had advised a senior Chinese diplomat in February 2021 that the PRC should “hold off freeing Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor.” He also reported that Han Dong, in this conversation, “allegedly suggested…that if Beijing released the “two Michaels” whom China accused of espionage, the Opposition Conservatives would benefit” and that Beijing should show some progress in the cases.
In comparing the Cooper allegations with the intelligence summary on this issue, a mixed picture emerges. The most important allegation, that Han Dong advocated holding off freeing the two Michaels, is not corroborated. Other allegations track more closely with the intelligence summary. But the full picture of the conversation as contained in the intelligence summary is not replicated in the Cooper story.
David Johnston, the independent special rapporteur, reviewed the available intelligence on the Han Dong conversation with the PRC consulate and came to the following conclusion:
“The allegation is false. Mr. Dong discussed the “two Michaels” with a PRC official, but did not suggest to the official that the PRC extend their detention.” [15]
The takeaway here is that the intelligence summaries can serve a useful counterpoint to media reporting in forming public views. They allow the public an opportunity to judge what they are reading in the media, especially in the context where media organisations have not published the classified intelligence reports they have had access to and only selectively quote from sources and documents. Whether Commissioner Hogue will also choose to comment on media reporting remains to be seen.
We can traverse the country from interference concerns regarding a Toronto area riding and MP, and now move to Vancouver. There has been a lot of discussion at the FI Commission about interference targeting an unsuccessful Conservative candidate, Kenny Chiu, and a NDP MP, Jennie Kwan, who was re-elected in 2021. The intelligence summary on this issue is very brief (three bullet points) and provides no detail on intelligence holdings with regard to either candidate. The summary simply indicates intelligence knowledge that the PRC “likely” favoured particular political candidates, but were “party agnostic and opportunistic,” and that PRC officials, using proxy agents, coordinated efforts to block unfavoured candidates from attending community events. This intelligence summary is, frankly, disappointing in its high -level generality and lack of substance.[16]
There is a separate intelligence summary that addresses PRC interference activity during the 2019 election. [17] This summary, again very brief, but a little more substantive than that regarding activities in the Vancouver region, addresses three forms of PRC election interference: efforts by PRC officials to engage with political staffers, where grey areas of influence might operate; direction by “some” PRC threat actors to Chinese media outlets to support specific candidates; and, most importantly, the movement of funds. The intelligence summary is very qualified about what has been referred to as a “slush fund” at the FI Commission hearings. There is a note about the “likely” transfer of two funds, with an approximate figure of $250,000. But the intelligence summary also qualifies this by referring to this money being “possibly” for “FI-related” purposes, though “most likely not in an attempt to covertly fund the 11 candidates.” The money allegedly flowed through multiple individuals including an “influential community leader, a staff member of a 2019 federal election candidate and then to an Ontario MPP (party not identified).
The intelligence on this matter seems pretty loosie-goosy, including in its degree of validity. If the money was not designed to fund candidates, how was it FI-related? What is its significance?
Here is what David Johnston had to say about this matter:
“It appears from limited intelligence that the PRC intended for funds to be sent to seven Liberal and four Conservative federal candidates through a community organization, political staff and (possibly unwittingly) a Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario MPP.
There is uncertainty about whether there was money, if it actually went to staff or the provincial MPP, and there is no intelligence suggesting any federal candidates received these funds.
The media reporting later stated that there was no evidence of covert funding, although this was largely overlooked, so the public narrative persisted that candidates (sometimes identified as only Liberal candidates) received these funds.”[18]
Given what Mr. Johnston reported publicly it is surprising to me that the summary presented to the Commission nearly two years later did not manage to better convey the ambiguities of intelligence knowledge about the matter.
My disappointment extends to yet another PRC-related summary, this one on “Comments by PRC officials on expressed partisan preferences in the 2019 and 2021 general election.” This summary repeats a point from other summaries that the PRC approach was party-agnostic and “tended” to focus on boosting pro-China narratives. Most of the summary asserts that expressions of partisan preferences by PRC officials do not constitute FI. [19]
What this summary misses altogether, material which has been leaked to the media, concerns not just expressions of preferences, but intercepted communications where PRC officials suggested they felt they had been successful in their FI attempts. An intelligence summary focused on such matters would have been important, not least concerning comments we saw made by Katie Telford, the PM’s Chief of Staff, in the margins of briefing notes, that “bragging is not action.”[20] What is at stake here is the intelligence community’s ability to distinguish between intentions and the delivery on these intentions, between rhetoric and, as Ms. Telford indicates, capabilities and delivery. This is a distinction that both the Commission and the public need to be very clear about and for which a proper intelligence summary would have been welcome.
This brings me, finally, to an intel summary on PRC misinformation and disinformation.[21] The intel summary dives right in to discuss two specific examples during the 2021 general election—involving media and social media information regarding Erin O’Toole and the Conservative Party, and Conservative Party candidate Kenny Chiu. On the topic of the circulation of misinformation about the CPC, the intel summary cites a number of examples but concludes that “No PRC state direction of the incident was detected or reported.” This seems an odd conclusion in the context of other information in the summary that PRC state media in the form of Global Times, published an article attacking the CPC policy towards China and that this report was widely circulated in the Chinese language information ecosystem in Canada without attribution. What needed to be said about this matter is that PRC seeding of news in a Canadian media system is not foreign interference per se, but a grey area of legitimate foreign influence.
Similarly with respect to news circulating on social media about Kenny Chiu, and in particular his private members bill to create a foreign agents registry, the intelligence summary notes that “experts (presumably a reference to the GAC RRM—Rapid Response Mechanism) did not observe direct PRC state media participation in spreading the narratives about Mr. Chiu.” To underline this, the summary states that it remained unclear whether information circulating constituted misinformation (simply erroneous information) or deliberate disinformation (covert and deceptive engagement in spreading false information).
What public readers will make of this is very unclear to me. It is just too bare bones. It will certainly not satisfy CPC concerns.
Conclusion
OK, time to circle back and conclude about the value of these intelligence summaries. They are an innovation. They provide some value for public education. I am not sure they will contribute much to public trust in the Commission’s work. That will depend much more on the Commission’s report and its reception.
Are the intelligence summaries, as difficult as they might be to pull together and ensure their unclassified nature, as good as they could be? My own view of that is a decided NO.
They are a product of an intelligence community unused to trying to present its best material in public, perhaps lacking in confidence in its ability to do so, and wanting to have an exit strategy in case of criticism.
I think the intelligence community missed an important opportunity for public ‘show and tell’—at being appropriately transparent about what they know and do not know. Objections could be raised that being more substantive in the intelligence summaries would risk betraying sources and methods. I just don’t think so.
It also needs to be said that intelligence summaries are a stop-gap, a work around, for the specific needs of the Foreign Interference Commission. They don’t contribute much to achieving the longer-term objective of greater transparency for our national security and intelligence community.
Finally, intelligence summaries are no substitute for a real process of declassification of intelligence records. I noted in testimony on April 9 before the FI Commission that PMO senior staffer, Brian Clow, had raised the issue of declassifying aspects of the intelligence leaked to the media about foreign interference, but was told it couldn’t be done. [22]
That needs to be re-thought.
[1] The Intelligence summaries can all be found on the FI Commission website, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/documents/exhibits-and-presentations
[2] CAN.SUM. 000009, “Country Summary: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”
[3] CAN.SUM.000014, “Country Summary: Iran”
[4] CAN.SUM.000006, “Country Summary: Russia”
[5] CAN.SUM.000008, “Country Summary: Pakistan”
[6] CAN.SUM.000011, “Threat reduction measure conducted in 2019”
[7] CAN.SUM.000007, “Country Summary: India”
[8] CAN.SUM.000012, “Government of India Foreign Interference Activities in the 2021 General Election”
[9] CAN.SUM.000005, “Country Summary: People’s Republic of China”
[10] CAN.SUM.00001, “Don Valley North Liberal Party Nomination Race in 2019”
[11] First report of the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, May 2023, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/di-id/documents/rpt/rapporteur/Independent-Special-Rapporteur%20-Report-eng.pdf
[12] https://globalnews.ca/news/9504291/liberals-csis-warning-2019-election-candidate-chinese-interference/
[13] CAN.SUM.000002, “Intelligence relating to Han Dong and Communication with People’s Republic of China Officials regarding the ‘Two Michaels’”
[14] https://globalnews.ca/news/9570437/liberal-mp-han-dong-secretly-advised-chinese-diplomat-in-2021-to-delay-freeing-two-michaels-sources/#:~:text=Liberal%20MP%20Han%20Dong%2C%20who,two%20separate%20national%20security%20sources.
[15] First report of the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, May 2023, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/di-id/documents/rpt/rapporteur/Independent-Special-Rapporteur%20-Report-eng.pdf
[16] CAN.SUM.000003, “People’s Republic of China Officials—Foreign Interference Activities in Greater Vancouver in the 2019 General Election”
[17] CAN.SUM.000010, “People’s Republic of China—Threat Actors, Contact with Candidates and Staff, and Funding of Threat Actors”
[18] First report of the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, May 2023, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/di-id/documents/rpt/rapporteur/Independent-Special-Rapporteur%20-Report-eng.pdf
[19] CAN.Sum.000013, “Comments by Individual People’s Republic of China Officials on Expressed Partisan Preferences in the 2019 and 2021 General Election”
[20] Testimony of Katie Telford and other senior PMO staff, April 9, 2024, transcript at: https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_13_-April_9__2024-Floor_transcript.pdf
[21] CAN.SUM.00004, “Possible People’s Republic of China Foreign Interference-Related Mis or Disinformation”
[22] Testimony of Brian Clow, PMO, April 9, 2024, transcript at: https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/PIFI_-_Public_Hearings_-_Volume_13_-April_9__2024-Floor_transcript.pdf
An opportunity to be transparent was indeed missed. Conspiracy theories will emerge from this undertaking much as they have always haunted secret work.
If we can take these summaries as basically honest, they seem to me to be useful. Presumably they cover the situations CSIS assesses as most important to be known. The list of countries covered should surprise no one who reads the news and editorials. They demonstrate that CSIS has thresholds and will take action with careful boundaries (TRM).