The Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference (PIFI) resumed hearings on September 16. They are scheduled to run until October 16, with the finale being the appearance of Prime Minister Trudeau in the witness stand (assuming he is still standing). [1]
The first two weeks involved some pretty slow-rolling days (pity those professional journalists assigned to cover it all!). But the tempo has definitely picked up. The first big breakthrough was on Friday, September 27. This featured a very long session with witnesses from the senior cadre of CSIS, including the former director, David Vigneault.[2]
Perhaps the most interesting portion of that long day dealt with testimony about the controversial allegations contained in the special report on foreign interference, published by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) on June 3, 2024. [3] Just to remind readers of the chronology, the Inquiry did not have the advantage of reading the NSICOP report prior to publishing its initial report in May. The public version of the NSICOP report was published a month later. Its allegations were new ground and gained a lot of public attention and notoriety.
The FI Commission, in response to a House of Common’s motion, agreed to dig deeper into the allegations contained in the NSICOP report regarding the actions of Parliamentarians who were “witting” or “semi-witting” accomplices in foreign interference operations by adversary states.
To conduct this study PIFI had access to all the intelligence reports used by NSICOP (principally from CSIS), as well as additional underlying information.
Commission counsel held an in camera examination with selected CSIS senior officials on their understanding of the allegations in the NSICOP report. A public summary of that in camera session was released and was used by counsel to lead questions during the September 27 hearing. [4] Counsel’s questions were directed at the panel of senior CSIS officials, with the former director, David Vigneault, fielding many of them. The Commission also released an unclassified version of a new CSIS “Institutional Report” (IR), consisting of answers to questions posed to the Service by the Commission. [5]
Let’s start there, because the first item in the Institutional Report is CSIS’s response to a Commission request to list “all major instances of suspected foreign interference targeting Canada’s democratic processes.” That must have sent CSIS deep into their archives.
How many cases did CSIS identify? The initial list numbered 7, but one was reassessed on the basis of publicly available information, that indicated the case was of lesser magnitude and the FI activity involved “did not have the outcome intended by the foreign government.” [6]
So we are down to a grand total of six instances, described briefly and very generically in the CSIS IR. One case, in an ideal world, is one too many, but six does not strike me as a lot of cases.
So what are the six? One involves clandestine actions by Government of Pakistan officials. One involves the Government of India “leveraging proxy agents to clandestinely provide financial support to specific candidates from three political parties in a federal election.” But note the caveat—"receipt of funds cannot be confirmed, nor the candidates potential awareness of the origins.” One involves the much traversed ground of the Liberal Party of Canada nomination race in Don Valley North, won by Han Dong. For some reason the PRC is not explicitly identified as the FI perpetrator though this has been previously established.
The remaining three cases do not identify the foreign stator actor. One concerns “a former parliamentarian” suspected of “having worked to influence parliamentary business on behalf of a foreign government.” Another involves a foreign government official whose activities sparked a briefing to the security-cleared representatives of the LPC before the 2021 election and to the PM shortly after. A final case was newly disclosed—it involved FI against a specific Liberal candidate to try to prevent the candidate from being elected because of their political views. [7]
This was the template that the Commission had to work with in its deep dive into the NSICOP report. The overlay proved difficult. CSIS talked about the need to engage in “reverse engineering” be sure about the basis of some of the allegations raised in the NSICOP report—allegations which were of course based on CSIS records, but chosen and narrated by NSICOP.
Commission counsel’s line of questioning was a zig-zag, often difficult to follow, not least because it jumped from references to the redacted, public version of the NSICOP report, to the classified version, to the CSIS IR, and to the public summary of the in camera examination, and back, and forth. What emerged was much greater nuance, qualifications, and general murk around some of the more striking claims in the NSICOP report.
Let’s follow the examination trail.
The most damning-seeming charge in the NSICOP report involved what the Committee described as a “particularly concerning case” involving a then-member of Parliament who ‘maintained ‘ a relationship with a foreign intelligence officer. [8] While this sounds like a straight up case of espionage, information provided by CSIS put the case in a much more ambiguous light. It turns out that the “information” that this former Parliamentarian provided was not classified information; that no instruction had been provided regarding non-disclosure; and that the intelligence officer in question was a “declared” officer known as such to the Canadian government and possibly to the former Parliamentarian. While CSIS viewed the relationship between this former Parliamentarian and the intelligence officer as “concerning’ and a “red flag,” CSIS officers also acknowledged that MPs might have legitimate reasons for being in contact with the official representatives of a foreign government. Mr. Bo Basler, one of the CSIS witnesses and the Service’s lead on foreign interference, conceded that this case “was not identified as a significant instance of FI…” [9]
Witnesses from CSIS agreed that NSICOP “used stronger language” than the Service to describe the case. [10]
Sounds of fizzle.
Then there was what the NSICOP identified in its report as “Case Study #3,” involving a proxy agent for the Government of India. The details of the case are redacted in the public version of the report. The summary indicates that the Government of India likely reimbursed a proxy “who had provided funds to candidates of two federal parties.” [11] CSIS’s assessment was that none of the candidates were aware that the funds were from India, but that meetings between newly elected members of Parliament and Indian officials were to take place. On this one, we learned several things. One was that the CSIS intelligence about the matter was limited; another was that the proxy agent was “well known to the Service.” A third was that an MP who the proxy agent believed would support Government of India positions was briefed on the issue by CSIS using its threat reduction powers (TRM). [12] If that CSIS intervention was successful, it likely diminished any impact of this Indian government effort.
This case is (thankfully) easily identified in the list of significant incidents of suspected foreign interference provided by CSIS to the Commission, But the details are slightly rearranged and the caveats made clear:
“The Government of India is suspected of leveraging proxy agents [plural] to clandestinely provide financial support to specific candidates from three political parties [not two] in a federal election. The receipt of funds cannot be confirmed, nor the candidates’ potential awareness of the origins.” [13]
The Inquiry has already dwelt at length on allegations regarding foreign interference by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Liberal Party nomination contest for the Don Valley North riding prior to the 2019 election. The nomination contest was won by Han Dong, who went on to win the seat in the 2019 federal election, and again in 2021. It features as “Case Study #4” in the NSICOP report, which provides a more explicit picture of the elements of foreign interference than had emerged previously. These details include the number of international Chinese students who were bused to the nomination contest (175-200); the alleged activities of Chinese consular officials, including making threats to these students and providing them with fraudulent residency paper work; and the fact that the Chinese students “sought to physically intimidate voters and distribute pro-Dong materials.” [14]
What more did we learn? Nada. The NSICOP depiction of the case was not addressed nor challenged. It does turn up as one of the six significant instances of foreign interference listed by CSIS for the Commission, but in the public version of the list it merely states:
“Reporting indicates that a foreign government actively supported an individual’s federal nomination race in Don Valley North, including through the use of a proxy agent.” [15]
The reason for this silence on the part of PIFI likely relates to a CSIS document provided to the inquiry, which essentially stated that any additional intelligence regarding the 2019 Don Valley North Liberal nomination processes “could not be disclosed publicly as it would be injurious to national security, potentially revealing information on intelligence operations, sources, targets, methods and/or intelligence gaps.” [16]
End of story, at least for now.
Then there was the unpicking of statements in the NSICOP report regarding multiple members of Parliament who “wittingly” assisted foreign state actors soon after their election.[17] This assertion again focused on Government of India foreign interference, and described efforts by these unnamed MPs to “influence colleagues on India’s behalf.” The NSICOP report also indicated that they “provided confidential information to Indian officials.” [18]
Testimony and evidence at PIFI produced a divergent, if confusing at times, picture. CSIS testimony and evidence unpacked (or “reverse engineered”) the NSICOP statement as involving three distinct allegations. Allegation 1, from a CSIS perspective, did not involve a determination that that the MP involved was “witting.” It was not included in the list of six significant incidents of FI that the Service provided to the Commission. Allegation 2 is listed among the six incidents (though where exactly cannot be determined). CSIS testimony was that the particular threat is no longer a matter of concern. Allegation 3 involved the provision of confidential information to an Indian official—this may have been the same allegation as that described as a “particularly concerning case” by NSICOP and discussed earlier. This was not made clear, though the similarities are striking. CSIS testimony was that the information provided was not confidential and that the episode was not considered a significant instance of FI and was not listed as such in the document submitted to the Commission. As Mr. Basler told the Commission, there were “limitations regarding the intelligence on this allegation.” [19]
That pretty well punctures this set of concerns.
PIFI also drew attention to a statement in the public NSICIOP report, as the summary of redacted text has it, about a “textbook example of foreign interference that saw a foreign state support a witting politician.” [20]
In testimony, the CSIS lead on countering foreign interference, Mr. Basler, informed the Commission that a CSIS “product” used the words “textbook example” but did not describe the MP in question as witting. There was an “intelligence gap” on the issue, he said. [21]
OK, on to the next case. This one was drawn from the classified version of the NSICOP report and we don’t have even a summary of the allegation, but it had something to do with the use by an MP of “specific inculpatory language…” Plain speak, an MP had been heard using self-incriminating language. What we learned was that the language used involved a different foreign country than the one identified by NSICOP and that the intelligence on this matter was not generated by CSIS, but through a report from a “third party” that had been viewed by NSICOP. [22]
Finally, there is the summarized information in the public version of the NSICOP report about India’s alleged interference in a Conservative Party leadership race.[23] Through the Commission we learned that CSIS document do not indicate the candidate would have been aware of the alleged support, but that CSIS had briefed the chief of staff to the Leader of the Opposition on the matter in June 2024. Why the chief of staff? Because Mr. Poilievre has, as the interim director of CSIS, Vanessa Lloyd, noted “declined to receive a security clearance.” [24]
There were other instances raised in the NSICOP report that were not canvassed by the Commission, at least not directly, adding to the difficulty of following it all. These included references to FI conducted by the PRC targeting a provincial politician; PRC support to some MPs through mobilizing of “clandestine” networks among ethnic Chinese voters; the use by the Government of India of networks to conduct FI; efforts by the Government of Pakistan in a similar vein; and alleged efforts by the PRC to interfere in the leadership races of the Conservative party of Canada.
Notably, the Commission did not dive into one of the highlighted cases raised by NSICIOP regarding the activities of a PRC proxy, a case which CSIS clearly took very seriously as posing a risk to Canadian national security. [25]
If the FI Commission’s engagement with the NSICOP report represented a skewering of its findings, it was at best, a partial skewering. Certainly it highlights the challenges involved in tracking foreign interference and understanding ways in which it might impact on elected officials.
When asked during the in camera examination for their overall “perspectives” on the NSICOP report, every single CSIS witness sang to the same hymn book. They declined to criticize the NSICOP report, indicating they believed the NSICOP report was of value in bringing to the attention of the Canadian public the serious threat posed by foreign interference.
But public attention and a possible exaggeration or miscasting of the threat are an uneasy combination. (I note in passing that NSICOP will not have its day in court to defend its report)
What are we left with? Well, now we have yet another discordant reading of the NSICOP report, to place alongside the public remarks made by Elizabeth May and Jagmeet Singh, both of whom received security clearances to read the classified version (No word from Yves Blanchet of the Bloc as yet).
If there is to be any greater clarity, we will have to wait for whatever Justice Hogue might have to say in her final report, due at the end of December.
For now, we are left with lots of questions:
1. First and foremost, CSIS says that it is happened only a “very few times” in the Service’s history that it has collected sufficient intelligence to determine than an MP has been suspected of posing a threat to national security. [26] Does this help us understand that the intentions underlying FI campaigns by foreign state adversaries are distinct from their impacts?
2. Just how significant has foreign interference targeting federal politicians actually been?
3. How much of a role has actually been played by witting or semi-witting parliamentarians as accomplices in foreign interference schemes? What is the meaning of “semi-witting” anyway?
4. What draws federal politicians close to or over the line in assisting foreign interference schemes?
5. What are the trend lines in FI schemes targeting federal politicians? What do we make of the rise of India as a state actor perpetrating foreign interference in Canada?
6. To what extent, if any, have methods of FI changed over time?
7. How significant is digitally enabled FI, compared to so-called traditional, human-to-human FI?
8. CSIS says it collects intelligence primarily on foreign actors, not on the responsive actions of their targets. Why is that?
Over to you, Madam Justice.
PS. More to come on the PIFI hearings…Things are getting interesting.
[1] For the witness list and schedule, see FIFI, “Public Hearings,” https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/public-hearings
[2] PIFI, Public Hearings, September 27, 2024, webcast at: https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/public-hearings/day-24-september-27
[3] National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, “Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions,” redacted version published June 3, 2024, https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2024-06-03/special-report-foreign-interference.pdf
[4] PIFI, “In Camera Examination Summary re: NSICOP Report,” WIT0000136, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/WIT0000136.pdf
[5] PIFI, CSIS Stage 2 Institutional Report, CAN.DOC.000044, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/CAN.DOC.000044.pdf
[6] PIFI, CSIS Stage 2 Institutional Report, CAN.DOC.000044, pp. 1-2 https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/CAN.DOC.000044.pdf
[7] PIFI, CSIS Stage 2 Institutional Report, CAN.DOC.000044, p.2 https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/CAN.DOC.000044.pdf
[8] National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, “Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions,” redacted version published June 3, 2024, text box, top p. 26, https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2024-06-03/special-report-foreign-interference.pdf
[9] PIFI, “In Camera Examination Summary re: NSICOP Report,” WIT0000136; the case is discussed at pp. 18-20 (paras 70-80),
https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/WIT0000136.pdf
[10] ibid, para 79, p. 20
[11] National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, “Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions,” redacted version published June 3, 2024, text box, p. 29, https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2024-06-03/special-report-foreign-interference.pdf
[12] PIFI, “In Camera Examination Summary re: NSICOP Report,” WIT0000136; the case is discussed at pp. 21-22 (paras 88-92),
https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/WIT0000136.pdf
[13] PIFI, “Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Stage 2 Institutional Report,” CAN.DOC.000044, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/CAN.DOC.000044.pdf
[14] National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, “Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions,” redacted version published June 3, 2024, “Case Study #4,” text box, p. 31, https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2024-06-03/special-report-foreign-interference.pdf
[15] PIFI, “Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Stage 2 Institutional Report,” CAN.DOC.000044, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/CAN.DOC.000044.pdf
[16] PIFI, “Further Han Dong Intelligence,” CAN.SUM.000019, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/CAN.SUM.000019.pdf
[17] National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, “Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions,” redacted version published June 3, 2024, para. 55, https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2024-06-03/special-report-foreign-interference.pdf
[18] ibid
[19] PIFI, “In Camera Examination Summary re: NSICOP Report,” WIT0000136; the case is discussed at pp. 17-18 (para 67), https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/WIT0000136.pdf
[20] National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, “Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions,” redacted version published June 3, 2024, para. 56, https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2024-06-03/special-report-foreign-interference.pdf
[21] PIFI, “In Camera Examination Summary re: NSICOP Report,” WIT0000136; the case is discussed at pp. 11-17 (paras 39--66), https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/WIT0000136.pdf
[22] PIFI, “In Camera Examination Summary re: NSICOP Report,” WIT0000136; the case is discussed at p. 20, (paras 81-83), https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/WIT0000136.pdf
[23] National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, “Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions,” redacted version published June 3, 2024, para. 73, https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2024-06-03/special-report-foreign-interference.pdf
[24] PIFI, “In Camera Examination Summary re: NSICOP Report,” WIT0000136; the case is discussed at pp. 22-23, (paras 93-100), https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/WIT0000136.pdf
[25] National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, “Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions,” redacted version published June 3, 2024, Case Study #2, p. 28, https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2024-06-03/special-report-foreign-interference.pdf
[26] PIFI, “Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Stage 2 Institutional Report,” CAN.DOC.000044, para. 14, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Exhibits/CAN.DOC.000044.pdf
No doubt I am unduly influenced by having worked, for years, in a legal milieu, where there is a distinction between fears, speculation or allegations, on the one hand, and actual proof of wrongdoing, on the other.
Which is to say: between what you worry about, or fear MIGHT be true, and the actual evidence establishing whether or not it IS, in fact, true - and if so, to what extent. Because things are seldom black or white.
All of which is complicated, in this case, by lots of media hype and the shenanigans of politicians, who are keen to either find, or to cover up, possible scandal or mismanagement.
However, it seems to me, (as a rank outsider) that, so far, there has been a significant institutional effort and monetary expenditure, and lots of political and media posturing and public angst, but, in the end, it has produced some fairly thin evidentiary gruel.
Lots of suspicion and speculation and hand-wringing.
But far less hard evidence of actual interference or wrongdoing on any significant scale - let alone evidence of any significant deleterious impact on the polity. That the hobnobbing with foreigners has had a seriously corrosive effect.
Moreover, India remains a “special case”, in this milieu, because it is a nominal ally of Canada, while Canada has chosen to provide a safe haven for politically well-situated Sikh separatists, some of whom were involved in the Air India bombing. Which readers will recall, killed 268 Canadian citizens, 27 British citizens, and 24 Indian citizens.
Yet only one, low-level minion was prosecuted, and he is now free.
In other words: the alleged Indian involvement in Canadian affairs is happening in the context of Canadian institutional ineptitude, and remains complicated by the trolling for votes in a Canadian ethnic diaspora.
So, it is probably no surprise that India may doubt Canada’s willingness or capacity to keep an eye on things that might harm India’s interests. Like the murder of the Indians mentioned above Even though projecting that interest might intrude on Canadian “sovereignty”?
Be that as it may, I look forward to the Report of the Enquiry Commission and I thank you for your periodic updates and summaries.
Although I must confess that I am beginning to doubt whether the Enquiry will provide much real and instrumental enlightenment, or will fairly illuminate whether existing prophylactic measures are up to the task.
Although I hope that I am wrong.
Is this going to be finished before Trudeau prorogues Parliament? I hope so. I don't think anyone will let this Commission go further if we end up having an election.