A PIFI wish list
CIGI's submission to the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference
Dear Readers,
A happy new year (well, one can only hope).
The Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference (PIFI) is scheduled to issue its final report later this month (exact date TBD). There will be a press conference and a media lockdown so that frantic reading of what might be a door-stopper can take place. I plan to be there and will report out.
In the meantime, those interested might want to have a look at the submission presented by my colleague, Aaron Shull, and myself on behalf of the Centre for International Governance Innovation (which had standing in the policy phase of the Inquiry). The quick read would involve the 14 recommendations advanced at the outset of the report, which you can find here:
https://www.cigionline.org/publications/final-submission-to-the-public-inquiry-into-foreign-interference-in-federal-electoral-processes-and-democratic-institutions-in-canada/
It represents our wish-list for ways that the government’s capacity to “detect, deter and counter” foreign interference might be strengthened in future.
Even before the release of the PIFI final report, attention will turn to the prospect of foreign interference meddling in the Liberal Party of Canada leadership contest (sprint).
Please stay tuned for some thoughts on that.
I like this report. It has valuable advice on a number of issues. There are, however, some related fundamental issues to be highlighted here, regrettably in outline, because a time and space are not available for more fulsome reviews.
Intelligence is not a separate or distinct capability apart from national security work. So,
"Intelligence" should be removed from the general idea/term of "national security and intelligence." National Security is the overall paramount framework and intelligence is an embedded capacity (or should be) within all components with a national security role. Every minister should have an ADM Intelligence.
National Security is a consequent circumstance. Intelligence is an enabling capacity that assists in the achievement of a state of national security by relevant authorities. So, while agreeing generally with CIGI Recommendation 6, calling for an independent expert review, it should be a review of the entire "National Security System," within which the "national security intelligence enterprise" would be a central subject, or line of investigation.
There is a similar argument to be made for removing "intelligence" from the title of the NSIA, in favour of a more appropriate title of "National Security Advisor." If NSAs don't know how important intelligence is, the problem is bigger than simply adding a word to their title.
While much has been said about the need for an overall, omnibus National Security Strategy (NSS), there must first be common understanding and acceptance of the overall policy-grand strategy-strategy framework, within which any NSS must be nested. An NSS should be derived from a higher National Security Grand Strategy (NSGS), which engages and mobilizes all elements of national power, identifies grand strategic objectives (the attainment of which are necessary to achieve policy goals (the lack of a true National Security Policy is a story for another time), identifies strategic resourcing/capacity priorities, and legislates principal responsibilities (i.e. lead ministers).
With a true NSGS in hand, a subordinate NSS can be derived providing every department with a role to play in attaining national security that should be defined in a true NSGS. Even Heritage Canada has an important national security role - whether they know it or not.
Production of the NSGS should be a principal responsibility of the National Security Council. It should be published under their logo (whatever it is) and signed by the Prime Minister. While the NSA (see above) in undoubtedly the 'principal national security staff officer of cabinet,' and should do the heavy lifting of relevant staff work, the NSA should not be 'responsible' for the NSGS. Elected leaders must bear that high responsibility.
This leads me to another general thought that there seems to be (not only in this CIGI report, but elsewhere too) a general tendency to call for independent bodies to do what Ministers and other elected officials should be doing. Principal targets here are the Ministers of Public Safety, National Defence, and Foreign Affairs. We might add the Ministers of other important departments with national security impact, like Transport Canada, ISED, Immigration etc. are also a focus. Why are they not the ones telling the public what the public needs to know? If we need a growing number of independent bodies to hold appointed elected officials to account, we've got the wrong elected officials holding positions of responsibility. Where is the responsibility of opposition parties in all this?
Finally, I wholeheartedly agree with CIGI points about educating parliamentarians and political party officials about national security matters in general. My 'average joe' view is that parties have blatantly put their own interests ahead of national interests, mainly because they don't understand the acute nature of geopolitics today and the real threats facing Canada. They have no fighting spirit. It is interesting to note that while many senior public service leaders require academic or professional credential to occupy high posts in departments like Justice, Global Affairs, National Defence, Finance, etc., there seem to be no requirements for advanced degrees or professional designations in national security organizations. While most practitioners know how to 'do' intelligence, virtually none are educated 'about' intelligence.
I could go on....
Great report. Very disappointing that NSICOP had "overreached their allegations." (CSIS had to correct some factual and contextual errors in the NSICOP assessment). Considering Juvenal's oft quoted “Who guards the guards?" we must have a higher rigour and more measured conclusions from our parliamentary review.