
Dear Mr. Johnston,
It’s a bit like the Leafs playing the Bruins isn’t it? You have that sinking feeling that you probably can’t win no matter how hard you try. There will even be some boos in your home arena. I know you are a hockey fan (maybe even a Leafs’ supporter) so you get what I am saying!
But you now have your mandate for this task you took on (goodness, why?). The clock is ticking loudly. Big Ben booming at your ear. Six months! Two months so that you can tell people what the Prime Minister didn’t want to say (…public inquiry).
Can I offer you some (free) advice as you set about your investigation?
When people think about intelligence and its uses they often make the mistake of focusing on intelligence collection and raw data. Justice Rouleau made this error, not really understanding the intelligence function. Please avoid. Give lots of attention to a key part of the intelligence cycle—assessment. There are a plethora of intelligence assessment units in the federal government, some of which sprang up after 9/11. But for the purposes of your study, you will find that the key ones are at PCO (the IAS), CSIS (the IAB) and GAC (intelligence bureau). Maybe the RCMP (hard to tell with that lot). Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the assessments of Chinese interference they produced will be critical to your task. Ask questions about intelligence failure. Government officials won’t like it, but tough cheese.
A critical part of our national security and intelligence machinery involves the work of the National Security Intelligence Adviser, situated at PCO. The current office holder is Jody Thomas, who came into the post just before the Freedom Convoys rolled into town. She did an admirable job in testifying before the Rouleau Commission, even though she got about the same amount of time on the stand as the mayor of Coutts. By all accounts she was cool, calm and collected during the crisis decision-making (Or maybe I am just attracted to “M”s). A key part of your study should be an examination of how the NSIA functions as a coordinator of the intelligence community and a conveyor of briefings to the Cabinet and PM. So much (too much) depends on personal relationships and on the extent to which Ministers and the PM trust and listen to the intelligence brought to them by the NSIA.
The Cabinet structure, as you probably know, does not include a committee dedicated to national security. The government had to rely on a crisis committee, the ad hoc “Incident Response Group,” during the Freedom Convoy. Ask some hard questions about how the lack of a Cabinet committee focused on national security inhibits government decision-making, especially on persistent and long -term national security threats like foreign interference. (PS. Canada has been facing this since 1918 and the feared beginnings of the westward spread of the Bolshevik revolution)
An early piece of homework should be the 2019 report on foreign interference prepared by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. You will get to see the un-redacted version—lucky guy (you and selected media, to whom it was leaked). Two of the current members of NSICOP and many members of its professional secretariat were part of that study and might be a helpful brains trust for you. The NSICOP report will assist you in identifying some deep systems issues, including challenges facing the RCMP, the problem posed in the CSIS-RCMP relationship by transforming intelligence into evidence, and the risk aversion of GAC when it comes to taking hard decisions on responding to foreign interference.
Make sure you hear from CSE about capabilities to monitor and respond to cyber threats. This will be a big part of the picture in dealing with foreign interference going forward. GAC’s RRM (Rapid Response Mechanism)—make sure someone gives you a glossary of spook abbreviations—will be worth a look as well concerning capabilities to monitor foreign state disinformation.
A key issue in dealing with foreign interference is intelligence sharing and coordination between levels of government—fed-prov-municipalities. By all accounts it is pretty non-existent at the moment. Suggest some fixes (ahem, this might includes changes to the CSIS Act, which the civil liberties folks will not like)
Don’t forget the victims. Diaspora communities are targets of foreign influence and their name can also be dragged through the mud by intemperate reporting. Dig into the question of the status and capabilities of outreach programs to Chinese-Canadians in particular, by both the RCMP and CSIS. One important lesson learned from the long decade of counter-terrorism after 9/11 was that diaspora communities are not the targets for security agencies; they are partners in addressing threats. Diaspora communities need to be able to trust the Canadian intelligence system, understand it, and be prepared to work with it to address threats. That can be hard for newly arrived immigrants from authoritarian states. It can also be hard for agencies like the RCMP and CSIS.
Remind the government that, after 19 years, it’s time they got around to crafting and publishing a national security strategy. It’s a key government roadmap for action against the entire spectrum of national security threats and a vital tool of public education. Have a walk in the woods with Marco. Maybe they will listen to you.
Tell your staff—No leaks to the media!
Go Leafs!
There is so much sensible advice here. However, in the current climate the CPC will never let go of even the smallest opportunity to turn things into a partisan mud slinging exercise.
There is so much sensible advice here. However, in the current climate the CPC will never let go of even the smallest opportunity to turn things into a partisan mud slinging exercise.