Collateral damage on the national security front

Or, what suffers from the current Government turmoil

We know that when Parliament is prorogued, legislative bills are frozen, possibly never to be resurrected. With the current prorogation that means that bills on cyber security (C-26) and the proposed Online Harms Act (C-26) are in the deep freeze. Efforts to move forward regulations to strengthen the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing provisions, monitored by FINTRAC, will also be on hold.

But otherwise, we might assume that even in the midst of the turmoil of a sudden Liberal Party leadership contest, the business of government continues. It does, but not without some significant collateral damage.

One damaging impact will be further delay in the appointment of a Commissioner to oversee the creation of the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry. The registry was one measure in sweeping national security legislation (Bill C-70) approved at lightning speed by Parliament in June 2024. ^[1] But without a Commissioner the registry remains a paper plan only. Appointment of a Commissioner under the legislation requires an Order in Council and approval by both the House and Senate. That is something unlikely to happen before a new session of Parliament under a new government. Think 2026.

Another fallout victim, whose fortunes will bear watching, is the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. The Committee, established in 2017 as a premier vehicle for independent strategic review of national security and intelligence issues, has already lost its chair. David McGuinty, who has served as Chair since his appointment by the Prime Minister in 2017, is now the Public Safety Minister, named in the recent Cabinet shuffle. Once an election is called, which is bound to happen in the coming months, the committee is dissolved and its work put on hold.

The statute that created the NSICOP requires that the Committee be reconstituted within 60 days after Parliament resumes following a general election. ^[2] In reality, that likely means NSICOP will not do its phoenix act before the late Fall of 2025 at the earliest. If the Conservative party wins with a majority in the next federal election, that might spell the end of NSICOP altogether, as the Conservatives opposed the original legislation, have never taken to the Committee’s work and even, in the days of Erin O’Toole’s leadership, withdrew its members from the Committee. Maybe their attitude has matured, maybe not.

Even if it does have a future, the current review studies undertaken by NSICOP may never see the light of day. These include a review of the “going dark” phenomenon—the impact of encryption on the ability of law enforcement and national security agencies to pursue their investigations. This important study was put temporarily on hold to allow NSICOP to conduct its review of foreign interference; now it really is on hold. There is also the recently announced and first-ever study of the role of the National Security and Intelligence Adviser to the PM, a critical leadership position for the intelligence community. This review had just begun.

Another victim of the PM’s resignation and an imminent federal election may well be the promise to issue a new national security strategy—the first in 20 years. Not only might this promise lose its salience for the current government, but officials within PCO might reasonably decide it would be best to wait to take the temperature of a new government.

A lengthy delay to the production of a new national security strategy would be a shame. The original one, from 2004, was drawn up with a view to offering Canadians and our allies, especially the United States, an independent and distinctive vision of Canada’s approach to national security, amidst all the pressures of the US-led war on terror and all the US concerns about Canada’s ability to secure its borders and be a strong partner. I can’t imagine a better time to produce a new one, with similar intent.

Its hard to be strategic about national security in the midst of political chaos and when the game is tactics. We are currently playing checkers not chess. Work in progress ceases to progress, even when there is some urgency (as with the foreign influence transparency registry). It’s also easy to forget about some bedrock institutions to ensure the security and intelligence community is scrutinized and encouraged to strengthen its abilities in defence of the national interest.

Such is the nature of collateral damage.

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^[1] Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, June 2024, https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/en/bill/44-1/c-70

^[2] https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-16.6/FullText.html