The CSIS Director, David Vigneault and a deputy, Cherie Henderson, testified before a Parliamentary committee on June 13 (you know the one—PROC). When committee members were not denouncing various alleged failures, they were struggling to understand how intelligence works and how it is distributed. They share many of the concerns and confusions of ordinary Canadians, which makes watching Parl TV, live or recorded, so valuable (anyway it is better than much else on TV these days).
https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/PROC/meeting-83/notice
Mr. Vigneault is celebrating his sixth year as head of CSIS, having been appointed CSIS Director in June 2017, though celebrating might not be the right word now, and maybe not since 2020 and the onset of COVID, followed by the disastrous US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Freedom Convoy, the Russian war against Ukraine, and now Chinese interference threats. By law he can only serve a maximum of two terms, or 10 years. Scapegoating might catch up with him before then. Stay tuned.
Mr. Vigneault laid out two principles in his opening remarks that are vital, and should be self-evident. One is that intelligence isn’t collected and analysed for its own sake, it has to be shared to have an impact, and the whole point of the enterprise is impact. This means ensuring that intelligence reaches decision-makers and that decision-makers are alert to it. This led into his second proposition, which is that intelligence is a pillar of decision-making. Both issues raise questions for the Canadian intelligence community. The report of the then special rapporteur on foreign interference, David Johnston, did a huge service in calling attention to major deficiencies in the flow of intelligence.
The hood of the intelligence machine has been popped open, the engine inspected, and it isn’t pretty. There are important repairs to be made and a bill, at least in the form of honest acceptance of the problems, will have to be paid. This is not the bill of course, that opposition politicians are eager to present. Just to stretch the metaphor (possibly too far), they want a recall and a brand, spanking new car.
But recall or no, the bigger question concerns the concept of intelligence as a pillar of decision-making. This is an issue that goes beyond politics. It is one thing to say, as David Vigneault has done, that it should be a pillar; another altogether to ask whether it is. The ultimate culture of intelligence problem that the government must face and fix is building acceptance of intelligence as vital to decision-making.
If there was one point of clarification and exegesis of this problem set out during Mr. Vigneault’s and Ms. Henderson’s testimony, it concerned the controversy over a May 2021 IMU that was sent to the then-Public Safety Minister, Bill Blair, his chief of staff, (name unknown to me) and the then-Deputy Minister of Public Safety, Rob Stewart (famous for his ill-fated efforts to ‘negotiate’ with the Freedom Convoy leaders). Blair has since been shifted into a new Cabinet role on Emergency Preparedness; his DM has moved to Global Affairs.
Thanks to testimony and questions from MPs we now know what an IMU is, what it’s history is, how it is conveyed, and what it is for. All important pieces of the puzzle, first illustrated by David Johnston, over why intelligence about threats to Canadian MPs, notably Michael Chong, fell into what is now being described as a black hole.
If you fear being dragged into the weeds with what follows, just remember, the weeds are where the devil hangs out.
IMU stands for “Issues Management Note” (no one seems to know why it got the abbreviation it has).
Update: I am very reliably informed that “IMU” is a misnomer. They are not described as “IMUs” by CSIS. IMU refers to the Issues Management Unit at CSIS that produces these alerts. There are similar functions across other government departments and agencies.
These notes are a form of warning developed by CSIS several years ago (starting c. 2015 according to Ms. Henderson) to bring specific issues to the attention of Public Safety and the Privy Council Office (potential recipients have since expanded, but Public Safety and PCO remain the most important clients).
IMU alerts are distinct from individual pieces of intelligence reporting and from intelligence assessment reports. They are specific indicators of important issues for officials. They may not even include any intelligence. As the CSIS Director told the committee the purpose of an IMU notification is to signal something of “high importance.”
All good so far. The procedure makes sense. The engine looks well tuned.
How does CSIS deliver IMU alerts? Typically they are classified Top Secret and sent by the Service through secure digital means on a network to the department (Public Safety and/or PCO). They are then meant to be printed up and made available through secure means (secure video conference, or use of a secure briefing room, or a classified reading package) to designated recipients.
The May 2021 IMU notice was an alert about election interference targeting MPs and about operational steps CSIS intended to take, specifically in terms of planned “defensive” briefings to MPs. We don’t know the IMU’s exact contents. The details have not been leaked (surprise) and remain protected because of the high security classification. Mr. Vigneault did tell the committee towards the end of his two-hour session that the IMU did not include specific names of MPs targeted or names of Chinese officials involved in interference plots. This contradicts the description of the contents of the IMU provided by Mr. Johnston when he states in his report that the IMU alert noted that:
“There was intelligence that the PRC intended to target Mr. Chong, another MP, and their family (in China) if any.”
This needs to get sorted out.
Whatever it said exactly, what we know from the testimony of officials and Mr. Blair is that the IMU notice was never read by its intended recipients. It went into the proverbial black hole and no light has been emitted, as yet, about why it was not read.
Does it matter that it wasn’t read? Absolutely. Why, because alerts are meant to alert. Because they are based on a pretty strict need-to- know principle, and if those who were supposed to know are not alerted, then the whole principle of Ministerial accountability goes out the window. Most importantly, an IMU notice is not simply an alert, it is meant to start designated readers thinking about the wider implications of an issue. I believe that Mr. Johnston’s statement that:
“the IMU did not recommend any particular action or ask for any direction from the Minister—it was simply provided for his information”
is potentially misleading, as it downplays the significance of an alert or the possibilities of Ministerial reaction had it been read. CSIS doesn’t send alerts every day. Mr. Vigneault testified that on average, per week, between 0 and 2-3 max would be circulated. They are not run of the mill.
In the case of the May 2021 IMU note, while it appears not to have provided specific intelligence about the targeting of MP Michael Chong, the underlying intelligence on that matter was held by CSIS. It was up to the Minister and his staff and the Deputy Minister to take the alert and start asking questions. This is what intelligence as a pillar of decision-making is meant to mean in practice.
In this case, no questions could be asked because the IMU alerted no one. No action was taken to alert MP Chong (and the other unnamed MP, probably Erin O’Toole) about the specifics of the intelligence available to CSIS in 2021. A two year delay instead occurred, a delay that also meant that no action was taken in that two year period against the Chinese consular official known to have been involved in these interference plans. Unknown individuals within the nationals security community got pissed off and started to leak selective classified documents to selected media outlets. Let’s hope pissed off wasn’t their only motive.
The dissemination of the IMU note is where scapegoating raises its ugly, and unmentionable, head. Statements made by the then-Pubic Safety Minister, Bill Blair, essentially cast blame on CSIS for this failure of intelligence flow. This version is also replicated in Mr. Johnston’s report where he states that Mr. Blair believed that “the Ministerial Direction in place at the time means that CSIS should have briefed him (in person) about this…” Mr. Blair went further in his own testimony on June 1, to conclude that: "The director determined this was not information the minister needed to know."
https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/PROC/meeting-79/evidence
Here is a transcript of what Mr. Blair said in response to the ever-prosecutorial Conservative MP, Michael Cooper:
“My responsibility is to deal with information that our national security and intelligence agencies bring to my attention. In this case, the national security and intelligence agency made a determination that this was not information that needed to be shared with the minister, and they did not share it with me…
With the greatest respect, Minister, I take it from your answer that ministerial responsibility means to you that you just don't take responsibility.
I would submit that that is completely incorrect. I take a great deal of responsibility for every matter under my mandate and my responsibilities.
This is a situation where it's an operational decision of CSIS as to what information needs to be passed along to government. In this case, they made an operational decision that this was not required…
CSIS, quite appropriately, made a determination that they didn't believe it was necessary to pass that information along.”
David Vigneault was pretty clear that this was wrong. That was never a determination that CSIS made. The IMU alert, had it been received properly at the Ministerial end, could have lead the Minister or the DM to probe the underlying intelligence details.
Whether CSIS should have briefed the Minister in person is an open question. Mr. Blair may well be right, and Mr. Vigneault did not respond to questions at committee about why he (or a senior official) did not brief the Minister directly about the IMU. He simply accepted his lumps and said he agreed with the Johnston report about significant failures in the flow of intelligence and the need to rectify these.
But Mr. Vigneault also said two things of importance. He tried to recall for Committee members the circumstance at the time (May 2021)—COVID!-- and the shuttering of many government offices and restrictions on in-person meetings. CSIS was among a handful of government departments and agencies that soldiered on through COVID without the ability to generate a hybrid workplace. Mr. Vigneault himself came down with COVID in April 2021 (something he did not remind the committee about). Maybe not the best idea to breathe on the Minister if you have the virus yourself.
The Chief Public Health Officer, Teresa Tam, (where have you gone, Dr. Tam?) released a statement on May 15, 2021. We may not relish being reminded of this recent and gruesome past, but she indicated that by May 2021, 24,869 deaths had been reported in Canada, COVID-19 “activity” remained elevated, variants of the virus were flourishing (B.1.1.7), that the latest weekly count indicated 6,724 cases of COVID were being reported daily, with an average of 3,860 people per day being hospitalized with the virus.
These were not normal times for any function of government and society, including the functioning of the intelligence system. Maybe good to remember that, Minister, before casting blame.
Mr. Vigneault also said something, the significance of which was missed at committee. That there should have been more regular meetings with the Minister. That’s a red flag. Why weren’t there? COVID? CSIS didn’t try hard enough? Ministerial preferences for receiving intelligence (all Minister’s have personal preferences)? Over-zealous gatekeepers? Or is there a suggestion here of lack of interest on the part of the Minister? That would be the most worrying possibility.
The episode of the IMU notice that fell into a black hole raises an over-arching question for me. Probably not the question you suspect.
The question is: Who loves intelligence?
The easy answer is intelligence services, of course, and you can bet they will put their backs into fixing a dysfunctional system of intelligence dissemination because it is in their interest to do so. But what about the senior-most consumers of intelligence, public servants and Ministers and the ultimo Minister, the PM. Do they love intelligence? Do they love it more because of all the revelations that have emerged about the role of intelligence during the events of the Freedom Convoy and the feverish debate over Chinese election interference? (They should). Do they actually love it less? (They might). Do they love having to put other business aside, surrender their cell phones and other electronic devices, and get ushered into SCIFS to be briefed on intelligence (probably not).
This is the culture of intelligence problem. It’s all about love (and its sacrifices)—channeling John Lennon.
Here is a heartfelt suggestion. It’s time to forgot the hunt for scandal, time to dial back the partisanship, time to park silly references to missing email log-ins and “Yes Minister,” time to stop waving your arms (here’s looking at you, Bloc MPs), time to put conspiracy theories back in their cage. Time for the government side to refrain from efforts to pat yourself on the back, time to avoid the defensive impulse to scapegoat--it should be beneath those who rise to Ministerial appointments. Time to read the Johnston report and reflect (reflect, not accept wholesale).
Sorry to take away the toys.
But really, it is time to get to work fixing a long-standing culture of intelligence problem that makes us a lesser Five Eyes partner and makes us less capable of advancing our interests and defending our national security. There are lots of smart people in the Canadian intelligence community who would willingly lend a hand to such a mission. They already love intelligence. Now it is time for the consumers of intelligence to get on board the love train.
Time for a comprehensive intelligence review (not a public inquiry) to ensure Canada can produce good intelligence and that it can be a “pillar” for decision-making.
Time for a national security strategy.
Thank you for this. Lovely to hear a thoughtful and constructive voice of reason instead of the constant partisan negativity which seems to have become an end in itself!
So, now it’s time to be over with truth seeking (which is conveniently called partisanship by the left)? I still want to know who knew what when. This Trudeau government is unnecessarily secretive compared to all other Five eyes partners. Why is that? Zero trust or faith has been restored in anything this government does; ergo, I have zero trust or faith that they will do anything to improve the situation. If they were truly interested, why has it taken nearly eight years (Covid excuses be damned) and a CSIS leak to get them even pretending to care? They are still lying, denying, and obfuscating.