Today (April 15) is the deadline for parties with standing before the Foreign Interference Commission to make their submissions. Those submissions must respond to the first phase of the FI Commission’s mandate.[1] This first phase is focused on interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections. The specific terms of reference for phase 1 are as follows:
“(A) examine and assess interference by China, Russia and other foreign states or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, in order to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on, the 43rd and 44th general elections at the national and electoral district levels,
(B) in relation to the issues set out in clause (A), examine and assess the flow of information to senior decision-makers, including elected officials, and between the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol panel during the election periods that led up to the 43rd and 44th general elections, and in the weeks following those periods, and actions taken in response.”
The FI Commission must submit its report on Phase 1 by May 3, so there will not be much time to incorporate party submissions into a report which, presumably, is already being cooked by Commission counsel.
There was a plan for the FI Commission to establish an open portal for general submissions from members of the public but that has not yet been created and presumably will only be available, if created, for the next phase of the Commission’s work.
I am not a party with “stranding,” just a keen observer of the proceedings to date. In the absence of the public portal, I am going to set out my recommendations for the Commission’s Phase One report here. If nothing else, it will serve as a gauge to match against the May 3 report.
Here goes.
Dear Madame Commissioner,
I hope your first phase report will address some of the following:
1. Discuss the measures adopted by the Commission to provide as much transparency as possible regarding classified information bearing on foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections. Indicate, on balance, the extent to which the Commissioner was satisfied with these transparency measures and what objectives they achieved. Discuss, in particular, the intelligence summaries.
2. Discuss the adequacy and timeliness of the GOC’s provision of intelligence records to the Commission. Identify problem areas.
3. Discuss the Commission decision-making that resulted in attention to foreign electoral interference by China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and address concerns that other foreign state actors, such as Rwanda and Turkey, may have been active but were not covered in the Inquiry.
4. Provide a substantive explanation of the nature of intelligence and the intelligence cycle, as outlined in documents and testimony received by the Commission
5. Describe the nature of intelligence products and briefings available to the PM and Ministers on election interference issues in 2019 and 2021.
6. Fact-check the CSIS Director’s testimony on April 12, that he delivered specific warnings in briefings about foreign interference as an “existential” threat, one that was “low-risk, high reward” for foreign actors, that Canada lagged behind its Five Eyes partners, and that the Government needed to shift its perspective and show “willingness to take decisive action and impose consequences on perpetrators” [cited in briefing notes for the CSIS Director for October 2022 and February 2023 briefings]. Please indicate when such language was used in specific briefings for the Prime Minister and others.
7. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the election warning mechanisms (SITE, Panel of 5) established before the 2019 election and used in both the 2019 and 2021 general elections.
8. Discuss the approach of SITE to the participation of political parties and the adequacy of the information provided to political party representatives by the SITE TF
9. Discuss the perspectives of political parties on the adequacy and value of SITE briefings
10. Analyse any bottlenecks identified in the dissemination and receipt of intelligence
11. Analyse the distinguishing features of electoral misinformation, malinformation, and disinformation and the challenges of identifying any covert foreign state role
12. Discuss the nature of GOC outreach to targeted diaspora communities in the context of the 2019 and 2021 general elections
13. Provide recommendations on increased Government of Canada transparency on foreign interference threats to democratic processes.
14. Comment, as deemed appropriate, on media reporting starting in the Fall of 2022 on foreign election interference in 2019 and 2021 and/or affirm comments made by the ISR.
15. Comment on the damages done by leaks of classified information,
With very best wishes, etc.
[1] The terms of reference for the Commission are to be found in the Order in Council, here: https://orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=44169&lang=en
Narrow focus, short timeline & an inexperienced judge overseeing it - I wonder why? After dragging his feet on the topic the PM, he is attempting to throw CSIS under the bus because he wasn’t “fully briefed”! Katie says he reads everything, but he says he mostly gets CSIS reports as oral reports, another word for “plausible deniability”, meaning thinks! It does leave one wondering - eh?
What about 350.org from the U.S. which claimed it turned 15 seats to the Liberals in the 2015 election,