*Dear Readers: I plan to provide extensive coverage of the Foreign Interference (FI) Commission, now that it has got rolling. Because the Centre for International Governance Innovation, where I am a senior fellow, has been granted standing for the second, “Policy,” phase of the Inquiry I want to make clear that the views offered in this substack newsletter are mine alone and do not represent any official policy of CIGI.
The third day of the opening week of public hearings by the Foreign Interference Commission featured a panel of three former practitioners from the world of Canadian intelligence. Two of the panelists were advertised in advance: Alan Jones, a former assistance director of Operations at CSIS, who retired in 2013, and, better known to the public, Richard Fadden, a former director of CSIS (2009-2013), a former Deputy Minister of DND and, in his last office in government, the National Security and Intelligence Adviser to the Prime Minister (2015-2016) (where he served first PM Harper and then, PM Trudeau). The third panelist, John Forster, is a former chief of the Communications Security Establishment, CSE (2012-2015), who also subsequently served as Deputy Minister of National Defence. Three practitioner experts. Its good that the Commission reached out to them.
What was learned?
If there was a common thread between the three former spy bureaucrats it was a belief that more transparency on the part of the Canadian intelligence system is needed, while paying due heed to the risks. Canada, the Commission was told, is much less open about its national security and intelligence activities, compared to its close allies. That’s a good message for the Canadian public to hear, something John Forster emphasized, but may not move the needle for the Commission as it wrestles with the issue of how it can use and communicate highly classified information on foreign interference.
A second common point partly answered the first, and it involved transparency about what. Here Dick Fadden was particularly cogent in telling the Commission about the significance it should attach to intelligence assessments, as opposed to raw data and single source intelligence reports. At times this was referred to in conversation as “aggregate” intelligence, but the term of art is intelligence “assessments.” Fadden called attention to the work of the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat (IAS) at PCO, who delivers to the PM and other senior decision- makers not raw intelligence, but strategic assessments on a range of issues, mostly global. Panelists were also candid in saying that it is widely recognised in the intelligence community that to provide Ministers and senior decision-makers with raw intelligence is a bad mistake, except in very unusual circumstances (usually warning of some imminent attack or threat). While I think Dick Fadden exaggerated in suggesting that there was a voluminous and noisy Canadian public demand for access to all classified intelligence in the context of the Commission’s work, his point that the Commission should be interested in what the Prime Minister sees, not in every data point, was well taken. Exaggeration permissible—it got the point across.
Here, incidentally, it is important that the FI Commission, which includes many counsel held over from the Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC), not make the mistake of POEC in misunderstanding the nature and significance of strategic intelligence (or its absence). Even the term “aggregate” intelligence is a hang-over from POEC. Dick Fadden, who also appeared before the Public Order Emergency Commission, may have had that (unspoken) lesson in mind.
Mr. Fadden also had his own experience, while CSIS Director, of the challenges of transparency, particularly where transparency is delivered in a sudden burst, without context. He told the Commission that in his view, the law needs to be respected and then “you move on.” He suggested transparency needs to be the “default” position, but that wasn’t the case when he was Director back in the day. I heard echoes, perhaps unfairly, of an episode back in 2010, when Fadden tried to bring CSIS more into the public eye through inviting the CBC in to CSIS HQ for some interviews and filming. Mr. Fadden also, as part of this same initiative, gave a speech at the Royal Canadian Military Institute in Toronto, the substance of which was provided to the press (not by CSIS). In that speech he made some startling remarks about foreign “agents of influence,” operating on behalf of China, in provincial cabinets and in B.C. municipal governments. (See, foreign interference concerns are hardly new).
This effort at transparency, otherwise to be welcomed, backfired badly, as it created a firestorm in the media and resulted in Fadden being hauled before a Parliamentary committee to try to explain himself. The committee, controlled by the majority Conservative party in government, was highly critical of his actions and Fadden had to issue a mea culpa saying that he had not had any authority from the Privy Council Office to divulge the cases he mentioned and had not brought them to the attention of the provincial authorities , because the cases were not deemed of “sufficient concern.”
The real problem was not that Fadden wanted to bring the attention of the Canadian public to foreign interference threats, but rather the manner in which it was done, absent any context, absent any published threat assessment that would place the remarks in some broader strategic picture, and innocent of the domestic political ramifications of such remarks. Dick Fadden in 2010, showed some teflon, and I still recall his pointed rejoinder to a particularly heated question from a Bloc MP in Committee about his having engaged in “treason,” …”Madam, I think your idea of treason is very different from mine.” Touche. He went on to become DM at DND and National Security and Intelligence Adviser. All forgiven.
Fortunately, things are different today—transparency is no longer a “one burst” effort.
John Forster, when serving as Chief of CSE, had his own parallel experience of what I would call “forced” transparency. He had to deal with the Snowden leaks of highly classified intelligence from the National Security Agency (NSA), CSE’s very much bigger big brother. Some of the Snowden leaks (not many) divulged CSE operations and planning, including a SIGINT collection exercise targeting Brazil and an experiment involving collection at Pearson airport. Forster not only had to keep his own staff updated about the significance of these leaks and how they were being handled but also found himself called before Parliamentary committees and before the press to explain Canadian actions. It was a rare moment of forced transparency. CSE learned from it, I think, and now practices more voluntary transparency—but, like current CSIS practice, its only a start.
Of the three panelists, Dick Fadden had the most practical suggestions for how the Commission could better approach the issue of ensuring the right degree of transparency for classified intelligence. Again, there was the emphasis on having the Commission look into strategic assessments as the most valuable intelligence products providing insights into the nature of intelligence on foreign interference, its dissemination, and its reception by decision-makers. He talked about creating an “openness advocate,” to try to push the intelligence community out of its comfort zone. He pointed the Commission to the importance of engaging with the Clerk of the Privy Council, who is the ultimate (statutory) guardian of the government’s classified information. He also suggested that the Commission needs someone on its staff (other than lawyers) who would come from the former practitioner community and really provide insights into the culture of the Canadian intelligence system and how it treats classified information and transparency issues.
I take Dick Fadden’s point on this, but the problem with former insiders is that they are, well, former insiders. They come from the culture and have imbibed its practices deeply. They don’t change their stripes in retirement. They may not be learners. They have valuable insights certainly, but maybe not sufficiently critical ones. Insider, outsider? I would suggest you need both for a balanced view. My two-cents for the Commission.
Day Three ended early—at 12:20. Is the Commission really making the best use of its limited time for public hearings? I would suggest not. No criticism of the line-up it has created, but much more should have been packed into this first week. Again, the limited time available to the Commission to plan and organize may have been the deciding factor. POEC, by contrast, often laboured deep into the evening during its public hearings.
Day Four next—current practitioners. The CSIS Director; the CSE Deputy chief; and the Deputy National Security and Intelligence Adviser. I hope we can get beyond Intelligence 101.
No shorts, cheap or otherwise, taken at Dick Fadden. I think the column underscores the importance of some of the things he had to say to the Commission.
Interesting analysis, Wesley, but I think you have taken some unnecessary cheap shots at Dick Fadden. There is no other single person in this country who has more knowledge and very senior experience on this matter. He also has a ton of common sense and is a very effective communicator. You also forgot that in addition to the most senior positions you listed, he was also a Deputy Minister of Immigration. Good luck finding anyone else who can top his expertise.