Forensic Examination in progress. Painful!
Pt. 2 A deep dive into the nine Globe and Mail stories on Chinese interference in Canada
I posted the conclusions derived from this examination previously as Part 1.
Here, for brave souls, is the detailed analysis of the series of nine Globe and Mail stories relying on leaked classified material regarding Chinese interference in Canada.
If you have time to read only one segment, go to the analysis of the February 17th, 2023, report. But, of course, I hope you will be hooked on the broader study.
(PS. I haven’t included links to these reports. Those with access to the Globe will be able to find them easily)
The detailed analysis:
The Globe reporting on Chinese election interference has been done by the team of Bob Fife, the Ottawa Bureau Chief, and Steve Chase, the Globe’s senior Parliamentary reporter.
The Globe was not first out of the gate in the recent spate of reporting on Chinese election interference using classified sources. The credit for this goes to Sam Cooper at Global News, who published a story on November 7, 2022, about briefings, beginning in January 2022, based on CSIS information supposedly delivered to “the Prime Minister and several Cabinet ministers” about a “vast campaign” of Chinese foreign interference in Canada which allegedly funded a “clandestine network of at least 11 federal candidates running in the 2019 election.” The Global story referred to anonymous “sources” (plural) for its story. It stated that “Sources close to this situation say they are revealing details from the 2022 briefs to give Canadians a clearer understanding of China’s attacks on Canada’s democratic system.”
The first indication that the Globe and Mail was also privy to some inside information came in reporting in late November, 2022. On November 26, the Globe reported an anticipatory story on the forthcoming Global Affairs’ (GAC) “Indo-Pacific Strategy.” The story was based on access to a chapter of the strategy provided in advance to the Globe.
Two days later, the Globe had story about a letter that the then RCMP Commissioner, Brenda Lucki, had delivered to the Procedures and House Affairs Committee (PROC) of the House of Commons, which had begun a study on foreign interference in early November, 2022, before the leak campaign began. The letter included mention of ongoing investigations into foreign election interference. A copy of the letter, which was not released by the Committee, was obtained by the Globe and Mail.
On November 29, the Globe quoted Prime Minister Trudeau in question period refuting some of the allegations contained in the November 7 Global news report. The Prime Minister stated:
“I have never gotten any information from any of our security agencies or police officers or intelligence officials or public servants any information of a federal candidate receiving money from China, as the allegations highlighted.”
Around this time (late November 2022), the Procedures and House Affairs committee (PROC) of the House of Commons received a large number of redacted documents from the Government regarding election interference issues. PROC has not posted these records to its website.
But release of this material to PROC may have served to open up other sources for the Globe and Mail, either because they came to the Globe or the Globe reporters went looking for sources. (The Globe has not been transparent about this).
The main series of stories begins just before Christmas.
Story # 1. December 21, 2022, “CSIS briefed Trudeau that China targeted federal candidates in 2019 election, but no evidence of covert funding”
The Globe’s first major story on election interference based on classified material was published on December 21, 2022. The news story concerned Chinese state election interference attempts during the 2019 federal election. It told a similar tale about a national security briefing for the Prime Minister, as reported by Global News in November. But there were important differences in details. While the Sam Cooper report for Global News had talked about a series of briefings for the PM on Chinese election interference starting in January 2022, the Globe report referenced a single national security briefing given to the PM in the Fall of 2022.
The subject matter of the alleged briefing contained information analogous to that which Global News had already reported, namely that the Prime Minister and his National Security and Intelligence Adviser was told that “China’s consulate in Toronto had targeted 11 candidates in the 2019 election.” The Globe report went on to say that “security agencies had found no evidence of covert funding by Beijing.” The Globe stated, based on its confidential access, that none the candidates in the election, a mix of Liberals and Conservatives, had been compromised.
The Prime Minister was also briefed about illicit Chinese “police stations” operating in Canada. The Globe report noted that the RCMP was investigating and that activity at these stations had “effectively stopped operating” because of joint CSIS-RCMP efforts according to its sources. GAC had also issued a protest to the Chinese ambassador to Canada.
The news story references two anonymous sources with alleged knowledge of the briefing and the intelligence collection methods on which it was based. There was no indication that the Globe reporters had been provided access to any classified documents about the briefing.
In sum, this news story acknowledged that CSIS was aware of Chinese foreign interference efforts, which were regarded as having no impact, that the Prime Minister had been advised, and that action had been taken against Chinese “police stations.” In short, the national security system was operating as it was meant to, in the face of a known threat.
Story # 2, February 13, 2023, “CSIS warned Trudeau about Toronto-area politicians alleged ties to Chinese diplomats”
The second major leak story did not appear until later in the new year. On February 13, The Globe resuscitated allegations regarding former Ontario Liberal cabinet minister, Michael Chan, adding new details, again from “two sources.” Chan had been the subject of a previous Globe and Mail investigation in June 2015, alleging ties between Chan and the Chinese consulate in Toronto. Mr. Chan denied these allegations and brought a libel action against the Globe, but it appears the case has not (yet) gone to court. In a new twist, the Globe and Mail reported that “The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service has a dossier on Mr. Chan that contains information on his activities in the 2019 and 2021 federal election campaigns and meetings with suspected Chinese intelligence operatives.” A source provided the names of Chinese officials with whom Mr. Chan was observed having meetings.
The Globe’s February 13 story again referenced the Fall 2022 CSIS briefing delivered to the Prime Minister and the National Security and Intelligence Adviser on Chinese election interference, that was a first discussed in its December 21, 2002 account. This time the paper added a detail from the Fall 2022 briefing during which the CSIS Director allegedly told the PM and NSIA that MPs should be vigilant in their dealings with Mr. Chan. This was according to “two other sources.” But in the December 21, 2022, Globe story it states that the briefing provided by the CSIS Director in the Fall of 2022 “mentioned pro-Beijing activities by a former provincial Liberal cabinet minister, but said his activities were unrelated to the 2019 election.” Hard to reconcile these two accounts. It is also curious that the December 21 newspaper account did not identify the Provincial Liberal Cabinet Minister by name, whereas the February 13 report did.
The February 13 Globe and Mail story added two new referents—both further back in time than the Fall 2022 briefing. One was a “CSIS 2020 briefing package” which allegedly included material about Mr. Chan’s meetings with named Chinese diplomats in 2019. The Globe describes these meetings, based on a statement from a source, as “allegedly election-related.” This would contradict the statement attributed to the CSIS Director. It would appear that this briefing package was described to the Globe by a single source. It may be that the “briefing package” is the same as the “dossier” mentioned by the Globe, but that is not clear.
The other referent was to a 2019 briefing for the PMO, including the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, Katie Telford. According to two sources (“one of the national-security sources and a government source”) the briefing flagged Mr. Chan’s Chinese consular connections. The Globe then reverts to attributing some of the contents of the briefing to a single source, who told the Globe that the security briefing to PMO urged that Mr. Chan should be “on your radar” and warning that Mary Ng needed to be reached out to caution her about dealing with Mr. Chan in the run up to the 2019 election. Ms. Ng won the seat of former Liberal M.P., John McCallum, in a by-election in 2017, and currently serves as the Minister for International Trade. There is more on Ms. Ng and her relationship with Mr. Chan provided to the Globe by a “confidante,” but this material is not relevant to this analysis, and in any case seemed to be a narrative dead-end. No smoking gun.
There are internal contradictions in the Globe reporting at this stage about whether Mr. Chan’s alleged activities were related to the 2019 federal election or not. There are confusing references to a variety of anonymous sources. Again, as with the December 21, 2022, news story, there is no indication that the Globe reporters had access to any CSIS documents. The reporters were relying on what they had been told by a cast of anonymous sources.
To draw a line at this point in the evolution of the Globe’s reporting, it is important to note that the two Globe stories on Chinese election interference based on access to classified information (December 21, 2022 and February 13, 2023), both concerned the 2019 federal election.
Story # 3, February 17, 2023, “CSIS documents reveal Chinese strategy to influence Canada’s 2021 election”
What came next was a story published on February 17, 2023, that covered allegations of Chinese state interference in the 2021 federal election. This story certainly had a big impact, including on fellow media outlets and on Parliament. Politico Ottawa referred to it (maybe a little hyperbolically) as “the mother of all leaks.” Opposition MPs on the Procedures and Operations committee thought the report so stunning that it warranted the Committee extending its study of foreign election interference to focus specifically on the allegations it contained.
It clearly deserves lengthier analysis.
The Globe reporters described the Chinese effort as a “sophisticated strategy to disrupt Canada’s democracy in the 2021 federal election.” The first thing to note is that this was the Globe’s description, and there is no indication that it was attributable to any insider source.
The February 17 story refers to “secret and top-secret Canadian Security and Intelligence Service documents viewed by the Globe and Mail.” This is the first time that the Globe reporters indicate they had actual access in some form to leaked documents. What exactly “viewed” means—whether the Globe had access to the full documentation, and whether the Globe retained any of these documents for study, is not made clear in the report or elsewhere in the series of news stories that followed.
The Globe’s claim that “the full extent of the Chinese interference operation is laid bare” in CSIS documents it “viewed” cannot be independently verified or assumed, on the basis of what the Globe does report.
The Globe report states that the CSIS documents were shared by the Service with “senior government officials” [positions unnamed] and with Canada’s intelligence allies.
The February 17 story cited three documents, all CSIS reports, and quoted snippets from them, or offered summaries of key points. The dates given for these reports are December 2021, early November 2021 and mid-November 2021. Only one “national security source” is referenced in the entirety of the Globe story. The source is used to identify former MP Kenny Chiu as a target of Chinese officials’ displeasure. It is not clear if the “national security source” cited is the source for the CSIS documents leak as well, but one would naturally assume so.
According to the Globe narration of the contents of the CSIS documents, they illustrate Beijing’s desire to see an election outcome in 2021 that would return the Liberals to power, but only in a minority setting. The interference work was being done by what the Globe referred to as an “orchestrated machine” under pressure from Beijing.
Some of the documents, which are clearly drawn from sensitive intelligence gathering targeting Chinese consulates in Canada, indicate Chinese rationales that are hardly earth-shattering. An example is a statement made by a Chinese consular official in early July 2021 and quoted by the Globe that “Beijing likes it when the parties in Parliament are fighting with each other, whereas if there is a majority, the party in power can easily implement policies that do not favour the PRC [People’s Republic of Canada].”
That Beijing might prefer, clearly somewhat reluctantly, a Liberal minority government to a Conservative government, also cannot be considered surprising. Such a view simply registered a Chinese concern that a Conservative government might push harder policies towards China at a time of growing confrontation between China and the West.
The leaked CSIS records indicate that the Service was aware of instructions given to Chinese diplomats in Canada (and their “proxies”) to foster the message that the Conservative party was too critical of China. The message was to include information raising concerns about the banning of Chinese students from universities and education programs in Canada. The Globe summarizes the content of the “intelligence reports” as showing “that Beijing was determined that the Conservatives did not win. China employed disinformation campaigns and proxies connected to Chinese-Canadian organizations in Vancouver and the GTA, which have large mainland Chinese immigrant communities, to voice opposition to the Conservatives and favour the Trudeau Liberals.” What we don’t know from the Globe account of the CSIS reports, is any assessment the Service made of the details of such campaigns, their sophistication, and their impact, if any. All we can reasonably say is that the CSIS reports indicate one tool—disinformation—employed by Chinese officials.
Let’s look more specifically at the three leaked CSIS reports referenced in the Globe story (in the order in which they appear in the narrative).
First is a CSIS report from December 20, 2021, about Chinese election interference tactics, including cash kickbacks to sympathetic donors to political campaigns and the hiring of international Chinese students who would “volunteer” for electoral campaigns. The Globe report does not provide any details about whether and how such interference tactics were actually deployed during the 2021 federal election campaign. The Globe summary of the CSIS document says that sympathetic donors were “encouraged” to take part in the scheme. The CSIS report appears to describe knowledge of general Chinese tactics.
Next up was a CSIS report dated in “early November 2021” [a month after the September 2021 vote]. This November 2021 report, according to the Globe, contains a statement that Chinese diplomats in Beijing’s consulate in Vancouver made “discreet and subtle efforts” to “encourage” members of Chinese-Canadian organizations to favour Liberal candidates and defeat their Conservative opponents in the 2021 election.
A target of this effort, according to a “national security source” was Kenny Chiu. Mr. Chiu, a Conservative MP who represented Steveston-Richmond East in B.C., lost his re-election bid to a Liberal candidate, Pamela Bains. According to the Globe’s “national security source,” Mr. Chiu was targeted by Chinese officials in Canada because of his criticism of Beijing’s crackdown in Hong Kong and his advocacy of a foreign influence registry. The Globe report states that Mr. Chiu “is widely believed to be a victim of a Beijing-led online disinformation campaign.” The Globe does not make it clear whether this belief was shared by CSIS in the leaked reports or by its source. The statement just floats there. It does replicate claims made in the immediate aftermath of the 2021 election loss by the then- Conservative party leader, Erin O’Toole. Perhaps fairer to say widely believed by the Conservative party?
What the CSIS document does report is a boast by the then-Chinese consul general in Vancouver, Tong Xiaoling, that Mr. Chiu’s loss “proved their strategy and tactics were good, and contributed to achieving their goals while still adhering to the local political customs in a clever way.” This intercepted communication is a nice piece of self-congratulation and self-promotion by Ms Tong. But a boast may be some distance from the truth. It sounds like diplomatic ‘flannel’ to me.
A third specific CSIS report cited by the Globe was dated “mid-November” 2022. It referenced an unnamed Chinese consular official who said that the electoral losses of Mr. Chiu and conservative MP Alice Wong, “substantiated the growing electoral influence of mainland Chinese-Canadians.” Whether this analysis is correct or not, it does not illuminate the impact of any Chinese interference efforts. Unless, that is, you simply want to assume that all “mainland Chinese-Canadians” are willing dupes and pawns. I wouldn’t go there.
The Globe’s February 17 story contains a penultimate paragraph that repeated, once more, its December 21 account of a CSIS briefing in the Fall of 2022, regarding the 2019 election. It again reminded readers that the CSIS Director had told the PM that there was no indication that China’s interference had helped elect any candidates, including two favoured Conservative candidates (?). Maybe someone in the orchestrated Chinese machine got their wires crossed?
February 17 marks a significant turning point in the Globe’s reporting, bringing its attention closer to the present, and painting a picture of Chinese election interference that fails to distinguish broad intentions from capabilities and action; boasts from real impacts. The Globe hyped this as a “sophisticated strategy.” There was only one real nugget—the suggestion that Chinese consulates tried to mount a disinformation campaign to influence some voters. Readers were left guessing whether some of the general election interference tactics mentioned in the CSIS documents were actually deployed (donation kickbacks and mobilization of Chinese student “volunteers”).
The pace of Globe reporting based on leaked intelligence picked up after February 17. Eyeballs were pinned.
Story #4, February 18, 2023, “CSIS documents show China warned ‘Canadian friends’ of foreign interference investigations”
The day following the “mother of all leaks” story the Globe reporting cut in a different direction. This time the Globe cited a single, January15, 2022 CSIS report on how Chinese officials were responding to increased efforts by CSIS to counter foreign interference. The general tenor of the story was that the CSIS efforts were having an impact. The Globe story quoted directly from the CSIS report, as follows:
“[People’s Republic of China'] officials believe that CIS is conducting investigations into Chinese foreign interference in Canada, resulting in officials considering that it is more prudent for ‘Canadian friends’ to cease contacts with MPs for the time being…PRC officials will simply need to provide an ambiguous warning to the ‘Canadian friends’ in order for the latter to grasp the situation.”
‘Canadian friends’ were defined by CSIS, according to the Globe, as non-ethnic-Chinese individuals who maintain relations with PRC officials in Canada and have close ties with federal politicians in the Liberal, Conservative and New Democratic parties.
Here I have to insert a bit of intelligence history 101. Spy services, especially those of authoritarian states, have a bad habit of describing “friends” even when individuals described as living in such a smelly basket are not “friends" at all. It makes spy service personnel look really effective and powerful in their recruitment and influence operations to their masters back home. This is not to say that such “friends” don’t exist, only to caution against swallowing whole foreign officials’ assertions in that regard.
The January 15, 2022 report also suggested that Chinese officials were concerned about CSIS efforts targeting “PRC-focused academics” and wanted to send warnings to such academics.
The Globe story then pivoted to the paper’s own investigations into Canadian universities collaborating with Chinese military researchers, see: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-ottawa-bans-research-funding-chinese-military/
The implication was that these were the self-same “PRC-focused academics.”
There was no mention in the February 18 story of the source of the leaked report and no comments attributed to any source about it. It was just another “viewed” report.
Story #5, February 20, 2023, “CSIS reports outline how China targets Canadian politicians, business leaders”
The Globe continued with its post-November 17, incremental reporting strategy, including repeat references to past leaks and stories, while adding new details.
This Globe story cited two CSIS reports—one from February 2, 2022, which had not been previously discussed; and the December 2021 CSIS report which had been covered in the February 17 news story. As before, the Globe reporters referred to “highly classified” documents that it had “viewed.”
The February 2, 2022, CSIS report focused on known activities of the Chinese consulate in Montreal and its efforts to keep tabs, using visa applications, on Canadian VIPs travelling to China. It was marked Top Secret, according to the Globe, and shared with senior officials at GAC, Public Safety and PCO. One key message from this CSIS report highlighted by the Globe, was that the Chinese consul in Montreal considered some of the Canadians travelling to China as “work targets.” The Globe didn’t explain what a “work target” might be, but it is generally considered intelligence terminology for the effort to identify possible informants in advance of making a “pitch” to them. The Consul-General complained that he hadn’t received any advance information about Canadians travelling to an international trade fair in November 2021 held in Shanghai. The Globe did note that the Canada-China Business Council encouraged its members to attend the 2021 and 2022 versions of this event.
There was a rehash of a December 2021 CSIS report, covered on February 17, but now including a CSIS explainer about how the Chinese Communist party uses a colour-coded schematic for describing interference tactics. Blue for cyber attacks to elicit information and build profiles on individuals; Gold for bribes (makes sense!); yellow for so-called honey pots—efforts at sexual compromise. Shades of the KGB and STASI.
The rest of the Globe story replayed previous reporting including its original December 21, 2022 account about 2019 election interference, but this time minus the note that the CSIS Director had told the Prime Minister that Chinese interference operations in that election had not affected the outcome. Why fail to mention this among all the repeat stories, I wonder?
The Globe story ended with an account of the views of B.C.-based Victor Ho, an influential former editor of the Sing Tao Chinese-language newspaper and a person active in supporting the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. Mr. Ho was critical of Canadian government inaction on Chinese interference, and was quoted as saying that “the damage has been done and our democratic system has been harmed.” According to the Globe he also told its reporters that the results of the 2021 election, in the words of the Globe, “did not reflect voters’ free will.” Eight days later, the independent report into the election warning mechanism created by the government, written by Morris Rosenberg, determined otherwise.
Story #6, February 28, 2023, “CSIS uncovered Chinese plan to donate to Pierre Elliot Trudeau Foundation.”
On the same day that the government released the study by Morris Rosenberg on the election warning mechanism and its work during the 2021 federal election, the Globe ran with this story.
The story appeared just prior to the release of Mr. Rosenberg’s report, which the Globe reported on later the same day. The timing itself raises questions about the intentions of the Globe’s “national security source” and the Globe itself with regard to undercutting the message of the Rosenberg report.
The Globe story appears to have been single-sourced to a “national security source” who described a 2014 communication intercepted by CSIS between a Chinese commercial attache and a “billionaire” named Zhang Bin, who is described by the paper as a “political adviser to the government in Beijing and a senior officials in China’s network of state promoters around the world.” There is no indication that the Globe was provided with any leaked documents to support the story.
According to the Globe’s source, the attache “instructed” Mr. Zhang to donate $1 million to the Trudeau foundation and promised that the Chinese government would reimburse him. Fast forward to mid-2015 and news that Mr. Zhang and a second wealthy Chinese businessman, named Nic Ginseng would donate $1 million to the Trudeau foundation in memory of former Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau, who opened up diplomatic relations with China in 1970. Three quarters of the donation went to the University of Montreal’s Faculty of Law to fund scholarships, including grants to support student travel to China.
PMO duly released a statement saying that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was unaware of the donation and had withdrawn his involvement in the affairs of the Foundation after his election in 2015. The Trudeau foundation subsequently announced that it had returned the portion of the donation that had come to it to support scholarships.
The Conservative party jumped on the news story to discredit the Rosenberg report even before it was released, owing to the fact that Morris Rosenberg, a former senior public servant in both Conservative and Liberal governments, was head of the Trudeau Foundation at the time of the donation. What one thing had to do with the other was not clear. How exactly such a donation could be considered an influence operation in terms of how the funding was utilised was also not addressed in the reporting.
Knowing something of the operations of the Trudeau Foundation in supporting scholarly work I have to scratch my head at the idea that this was a calculated interference operation.
Story #7, March 8, 2023 “Canada Rejected a visa for Chinese diplomat on foreign-interference grounds”
This story goes back to the Fall of 2022, to report that the Foreign Affairs Minister rejected a visa for a Chinese diplomat because of suspicions about the diplomat’s intended activities.
The story was based on a single source with information about the denied visa, who also provided the Globe with details about the recent visit of a delegation of Chinese officials to Ottawa. These were clearly routine official talks between Chinese and Canadian officials. No classified records were referenced by the Globe. None, seemingly, were provided by the source. The source was most likely an official at GAC, but whether this source is the same person who leaked classified CSIS records cannot be determined.
There wasn’t much to the story, but it allowed the Globe to cite Conservative critics who argued that Canadian Senator Peter Boehm, a long-serving member of Global Affairs who was appointed to the Senate after his retirement, should not have met with the Chinese delegation because of concerns over election interference. The Globe rehashed some of its previous accounts of Chinese election interference.
The story seemed, essentially, a place holder to keep the news pot boiling.
Story #8, March 13, 2023, “China diverts some researchers to Canada after U.S. visa denials, CSIS says.”
This Globe story references a CSIS report from December 21, 2021, marked “secret,” which was (one again) “viewed” by the reporters. The CSIS report described efforts by China to utilize Chinese scholarship students studying in Canada to gain access to various critical technology sectors. The CSIS report noted that in response to increased US concerns about protecting sensitive technology sectors, Chinese students were being advised to seek study fields involving less-sensitive topics; the CSIS report also suggested that Chinese scholarship students were given some training in China on how to keep a low profile once in Canada.
Some of the remainder of the story was given over to a repeat of previous Globe accounts of efforts on the part of CSIS to warn about research partnerships with China and steps that the Canadian government had taken to place restrictions on such partnerships.
An interlude before another big-bang story of election interference
Story # 9, March 16, 2023, “China’s Vancouver Consulate interfered in 2022 municipal election, according to CSIS”
With this story, the Globe moved from federal and provincial, to municipal political interference. The Globe story referenced a CSIS report, dated January 10, 2022, marked secret, and “viewed” by the Globe. The CSIS report discussed “efforts” and aspirations (not achievements) on the part of China’s consul general in Vancouver, Tong Xiaoling, to cultivate relationships with municipal level politicians, orchestrate the Chinese diaspora to help elect a new mayor and a favoured city councillor, and to have more ethnic Chinese persons enter politics, supposedly because Chinese officials believed ethnic Chinese were more easy to influence. The Globe story quoted from the CSIS report that:
“With regard to the 2022 City of Vancouver mayoral election, CG [Consul General] Tong stated that they need to do all they could to increase the ethnic voting percentage. They needed to get all eligible voters to come out and elect a specific Chinese-Canadian candidate…CG Tony emphasized this work was necessary, as the candidate will rely on those votes…In parallel CG Tong indicated they needed someone within the Vancouver City Council.”
The CSIS report also related that the Chinese consul was interested in the possibility of “grooming” an [unnamed] individual who might have a future political career.
The Globe interviewed the former Vancouver mayor, Kennedy Stewart, who lost in October 2022 to Ken Sim, by a large margin of votes. Mr. Sim is the first Chinese-Canadian to be elected mayor of Vancouver. Stewart was the subject of some public statements by the Chinese consulate condemning his views on Taiwan. The Globe quoted Mr. Kennedy to the effect that he would not assert that he lost the election because of any Chinese state interference.
The Globe repeated elements of its account contained in its February 17 report in which a CSIS document cited the Chinese consul general boasting about success in efforts against candidates in the 2021 federal election. This time they gave the date of the CSIS report as November 30, 2021 (instead of mid-November 2021) and added a new detail about the Consul General’s hopes to be able to elect a mayor of Chinese descent.
The Globe story also, as it had many times before, repeated its account from February 17, of a Chinese strategy based on a desire to see the re-election of a Liberal minority government in the 2021 federal election.
What is it with this repetition? It is a trope in propaganda.
That’s all, folks (as Bugs Bunny used to say).
Part 3, to follow, lists the identified CSIS documents leaked to the Globe.
Excellent analysis. I’m struck by this conclusion: Globe reporting “of Chinese election interference … fails to distinguish broad intentions from capabilities and action; boasts from real impacts.” There appears to be a failure of critical perspective at the Globe on this issue, with reporting bordering on propaganda. Looking forward to reading part 3.
Again, thank you for doing this deep dive. Excellent analysis.