Forensic Examination! That sounds painful

Part 1. Conclusions from a deep dive into the Globe and Mail's reporting on Chinese interference

On the late afternoon of Friday, March 17, the Globe and Mail’s online edition published an Op Ed written by the Globe’s anonymous source for leaks of classified documents regarding Chinese state interference in Canada. The online version was entitled “Why I Blew the whistle on Chinese interference in Canada’s elections.” The Op Ed was printed in the Saturday edition of the Globe on the front page of the Opinion section, with a sombre grey surround, under the title “A threat ignored.” Both versions were accompanied by a note from the Globe and Mail’s editor-in-chief, the veteran journalist David Walmsley. 

(For an analysis of the Op Ed see my previous substance column, “In from the Cold.”) 

The Walmsley cover note is intriguing on several counts. First, it describes the Op Ed author as the “backbone” of the Globe’s news stories on election interference. Not the sole source, but something close to it. That, in itself, may be disturbing as it suggests a very limited ability on the part of the Globe and Mail to fact check and corroborate the information supplied to it. There is also the sound of the Globe patting itself on the back—describing the “facts” in the Globe’s stories as “uncontroverted.” That remains to be seen; the Globe won’t have the final say. In any case it is not the “facts,” but the way in which they are contextualized and presented that is what counts. Finally, the Globe editor calls the decision to publish the anonymous Op Ed an act of balanced transparency—protecting the source’s identity while “providing readers with more insight into our work.” True so far as it goes, but there are many remaining questions about how the Globe has handled the leaks and, of course, not a single classified document on which the “truth” of the stories rely has been published. The Globe is essentially asking all readers to trust its reporting, without question.

That’s not my approach. I respect the Globe. I have written often for it and commented often for its reporters. It has real clout in the corridors of power in Ottawa. But on a story like this, it doesn’t get a pass. It should want critical scrutiny, or it isn’t the paper I thought it was.

I am going to do a forensic dive into the Globe reporting on Chinese state interference in Canada, going back to November 2022, with three purposes in mind. One is to compile a list of the nature and date of leaked documents referenced by the Globe; a second is to identify how the Globe refers to sources in individual stories; and a third to see how the use of leaked material in Globe stories has evolved between November, 2022, and March 2023.  

I will try to do a separate analysis of the reporting from the Globe’s rival, Global News, in a later column.

Nota bene: because this forensic analysis makes for a very, very long column, I have divided it into three separate pieces of writing. I appreciate that not everyone will have the time and patience, or even interest, to read through all this stuff.

First, I am going to post the conclusions. That might strike you as weird. Actually, not as weird as it might seem. Often intelligence reports will be prefaced with a “key judgements” section.  

Then I am going to post the detailed analysis of all the relevant Globe reporting (to date).

Finally, a separate post will list all the classified CSIS records leaked to the Globe and Mail and referenced in its reporting.

So here goes with my conclusions/findings/key judgements. The question is-- What does this series of reports tell us? 

First, sourcing and motive. The reporting mainly relies on a single anonymous source. It tells us that someone from among the many departments and agencies of the Canadian national security establishment (the leaker) is disgruntled. Disgruntled about what exactly? The leaker has spoken, courtesy of an Op Ed published by the Globe. The leaker is disgruntled about the lack of “serious action.” Worried about “senior public officials ignoring interference.” Yet the leaker has “no personal complaint against our political leaders.” The leaker claims not to be driven by anti-China animus. The leaker wants a “deeper conversation” among Canadians. The leaker does not call for a public inquiry or reflect on the adequacy or otherwise of the multiple reviews of foreign interference the Government has now set in motion.

The leaker’s views are fair enough and he or she is entitled to them. The calculation of the costs and benefits of leaking classified records is one made by this person and no doubt made without the possibility of any full appreciation of that equation. Through this series of leaks, and a poorly considered response, the government is being made to pay the price for persistent failures to advance national security transparency and ensure the public is properly informed about fast changing national security threats.

But.

This is a person from the national security system who wants to steer public policy, with the aid of the media. Whatever the merits of the leaker’s views, national security officials do not get to steer public policy, either from within government—that is not their job—or in the wider public, especially when the wider public has no opportunity to know much about the leaker, question his or her assertions about the intent behind the leaks, or independently read and reflect on the actual documents that this person has leaked information about.

Second. Quantity. By my count there are nine Globe and Mail stories on Chinese interference between December 2022 and March 16, 2023. The key one is that of February 17. Everything ultimately revolves around it. Globe reporting pursued an incremental news strategy after February 17, adding references to new leaks while repeating previous reporting. By my count, the Globe references only seven classified CSIS reports ranging in dates from February 2, 2022 back to “early November” 2021. The language the Globe reporters consistently use is that they “viewed” these seven reports. In addition, they had described to them, by a source or sources, the following: a CSIS Director’s briefing to the PM and National Security and Intelligence Adviser dated Fall 2022; a CSIS dossier and or briefing package regarding Michael Chan, specific dates unknown; and a briefing for PMO including Katie Telford sometime in 2019.

Third. The topical range of documents leaked by the national security source is actually quite narrow. This is hardly surprising and reflects the generally siloed nature of the Canadian intelligence system. National security and intelligence departments and agencies have specific, lawful mandates that narrow the focus of their collection, analysis and reporting work, and individuals working within the system will have a similarly narrow view and access.

Fourth.  What we get is a view from the secret periscope. The leaks provide a periscope depth lens on a particular target. The target is Chinese state interference in Canada, most specifically indications of election interference at all levels of government.  We don’t get a picture from this leaker of the broader and arguably more serious range of Chinese state interference threats—those posed by espionage, IP theft, cyber attacks, and efforts to intimidate and silence dissent among diaspora communities.  We certainly don’t get a picture of national security threats writ large, beyond those posed by China.  Nothing on geopolitical threats by other state actors, on threats posed by fast advancing technology, on climate change security impacts, on pandemic threats, on weapons of mass destruction, on economic security threats, on threats to critical infrastructure, threats to borders, wider threats to our democracy from within and without.

The leaks are, in that sense, very parochial. On their own they don’t provide anything like the substance for the leaker’s desired “deeper conversation” about national security and governance.

Fifth. The leaks inevitably create broad-brush concerns about the loyalties of Chinese-Canadians. That Chinese officials think they can play on such loyalties, as reported through intercepted communications by CSIS, does not mean that they actually can. At times the Globe reporting infers such loyalty concerns. An example, drawn from outside the range of reporting from leaked records, is provided in the Globe’s story of March 17, 2023, “Vancouver mayor irate over CSIS election-meddling reports.” The Globe takes pains to quote a member of a right-wing civic party, which was a no-show among voters, about the significance of Chinese election interference in online fora. The Globe article ends with a stand-alone paragraph that reads, “in 2018, no person of Asian descent won a Vancouver city council seat.” I don’t think I can be alone in thinking that there is a very ugly inference here. Put baldly--persons of Asian descent on city council = Chinese election interference.

Sixth. The leaks do not speak to policy-making. They do not provide any view on decision-making in response to intelligence reports. That is also to be expected. Those in the national security and intelligence system work to provide assessments of threats to senior-decision-makers, both public servants and political officials. Intelligence doesn’t dictate policy. It is an input to policy. Intelligence needs to be taken seriously, but that is the extent of its scope. We saw this unveiled during the Rouleau commission—perhaps the clearest contemporary picture Canadians are likely to have of the role of intelligence in decision-making, warts and all.

Seventh. The leaks clearly indicate that it was the view of CSIS that Chinese interference efforts in the 2019 election did not affect the outcome of that election.

Eighth. With regard to CSIS documents on the 2021 federal election, the leaks and the way they are reported by the Globe make it impossible to distinguish between knowledge of declared Chinese intentions to engage in interference, and actual capacity to do so, much less have effect. You can paint an enemy as ten feet tall if you like, using language like “sophisticated strategy” and “orchestrated machine” offered by the Globe reporters (not by its sources as best we can tell). That doesn’t mean they are. The independent report by Morris Rosenberg on the Government’s 2021 election warning mechanism, found that the election was not impacted by foreign interference, a finding that was not analysed in depth by the Globe reporters and had little discernible impact on their reporting.

Foreign state actor election interference is a subset of a broader range of concerns about foreign interference. The Canadian security and intelligence system has been alive to this threat since the experiences of Russian interference in the US presidential election in 2016 that brought Donald Trump to the White House. Various policy measures have been taken in response, including the establishment of an election interference warning mechanism prior to the 2019 federal election, the tightening of election legislation, efforts to counter Chinese interference operations, notably to shut down Chinese “police stations,” attention to foreign state disinformation campaigns, and some attempts by organisations like CSIS and CSE to provide public reporting on the threat. With the leaks, we are given a glimpse into Chinese thinking about its objectives in engaging in interference, and treated to some intercepted boasts about success, but that is about all.

The Globe’s news stories are not a “nothing burger. ” They are certainly not a full-course meal. Perhaps they are a mini-burger—what do you come them?—a “slider”-- a tasty morsel for a hungry public and hungry politicians who have little capacity, or even desire, to see a bigger picture of national security threats posed by interference yes, but by many, and arguably more concerning, threat vectors.

Let’s have a “deeper conversation” about those. Surely it would be preferable if, for that conversation, the table was not set by a leaker and the conversation not curated by the media at the head of the table.

While we are at it, we need to have a higher level of public trust, alongside higher expectations, about the capacity of the independent review bodies established between  2017 and 2019, to deliver impactful and revealing reporting. Let the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians investigate and report. Same for the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency. The ‘special rapporteur” is an eminent person third wheel created to appease suspicious minds.

If you think that going further -to establish a public inquiry--is warranted, you are welcome to that view.  I do not agree. My view is that public inquiries should be used sparingly and in response to major developments that warrant them. The Globe reporting based on leaked documents does not, in my estimation fit that bill. Whatever your position on that score, I hope this forensic analysis might be helpful and might even occasion a rethink.

(PS. The detailed analysis is in the next post).