Game’s up for the RCMP

The NSICOP report on RCMP Federal policing and national security

In 1984 the RCMP lost its responsibility (which dated back to 1920) for the conduct of security intelligence to the newly-created civilian Canadian Security Intelligence Service.  It did not, however, lose its responsibility for national security criminal investigations, even if that role flew under most radar screens until the 9/11 attacks forced a crash approach to counter-terrorism in Canada, for which the RCMP proved ill-suited at the time. RCMP problems in managing counter-terrorism investigations led to the O’Connor Inquiry regarding the role of Canadian government officials in the treatment of Canadian Maher Arar (who was sent by the US government in a practice known as ‘extraordinary rendition’ to Syria where he spent a year in a Syrian military prison and was tortured, before being released and returned to Canada). Justice O’Connor’s report in 2006 recommended significant governance changes to the conduct of RCMP CT investigations, which were subsequently incorporated into RCMP practice in the years following. This was followed by the Air India Inquiry, which called attention to serious problems in intelligence sharing between the RCMP and CSIS.

The years following also saw mounting problems for the RCMP as a whole in terms of internal culture, sexual harassment, and systemic racism as well as operational failures, highlighted in the Mass Casualty Commission report on the shootings in Nova Scotia in April 2020

All clearly was not well, but outside the walls of the RCMP it was difficult to gauge the extent of contemporary problems with its Federal policing functions, which include criminal investigations into national security threats.

Now, along comes the first external, systemic study of the RCMP’s federal policing mandate and the performance of its national security functions. The hard-hitting study is courtesy of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) and it was delivered to Parliament on November 7.

https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2023-11-fp/RCMP_FP_report_EN.pdf

The 91-page NSICOP report describes a litany of problems, whose extent begs the question of whether the RCMP in its present form can be functional when divided between contract policing functions across Canada (except for Ontario and Quebec), which eat up most of its resources and attention, and a smaller FBI-like role as a national investigative service focusing on security threats (primarily terrorism of various motivational stripes, and foreign interference), serious organized crime, financial crime and cyber crime.

To meet those security threats, the RCMP relies on its “Federal policing” force, led by a Deputy Commissioner.  Federal policing accounts for just 18% of the RCMP’s total budget and personnel, yet it faces increasingly complex and diverse threats.  The problems are well known within the RCMP but resolving them has proved extremely difficult. The function is foundering.

In fact it is foundering badly. Here is the conclusion from the NSICOP report:

“The government has a responsibility to ensure that the various components of its security and intelligence community function effectively to protect Canadians and Canadian interests. On the basis of its review, the Committee does not believe that Federal policing is as effective, efficient, flexible or accountable as it needs to be to protect Canada and Canadian from the most significant national security and criminal threats. The government must act to ensure it is.” (p. 84)

This conclusion is built on the identification of a series of problems with the conduct of Federal Policing, starting with the fact that it is vastly overshadowed by the RCMP’s contract policing function. Among other things not only does Federal policing receive only a small slice of the RCMP budget pie, but it also finds it resources drained away to more urgent requirements for contract policing.

On top of this the Federal policing mandate suffers from weak governance and problems associated with the decentralized model of the RCMP and the power held by RCMP divisions across the country.

The workforce of Federal policing is depleted, with high vacancy rates for positions (the NSICOP reports puts the figure at 13%).  Efforts to attract much-needed specialised talent to deal with the range of threats that fall within the Federal policing mandate are impeded by cultural tensions between unformed RCMP officers and civilians. Training is sub-par and out of date.

Information management appears to be another significant problem for Federal Policing. The NSICOP report dives into the weeds here to relay the workings of multiple and siloed information reporting streams including one, strangely, under the control of the B.C. government.

But if there is one assessment that really makes my hair stand on end it is the committee’s conclusion about the role of intelligence in Federal Policing, set against a RCMP commitment to engage in “intelligence-led policing.”

“The Committee is not confident that Federal Policing is receiving or assessing the intelligence it needs to set priorities and conduct operations.” (p. 78)

In other words, it is flying blind (or at best, one-eyed).

But even if the flow of intelligence was better managed, even if there was a central repository for intelligence reporting (which there isn’t!), NSICOP also records a statement from senior RCMP officials which is blunt and self-damning:

“The RCMP does not have a culture of intelligence, meaning that it [intelligence] is often not seen as a tool to assist decision makers, but rather meant to directly assist investigators and other frontline enforcement.” (p. 72) In the current culture of the RCMP intelligence is seemingly restricted to a purely tactical use.

In the face of this mountain of problems, the Committee points its finger at the Minister of Public Safety (currently Dominic LeBlanc). It finds that:

“There is no engagement between the Minister and Federal Policing on issues such as governance, priorities and organizational direction.” (p. 48).

NSICOP believes that the RCMP cannot change from within. It pins its hopes on the Minister of Public Safety taking a “greater role” to enforce change and ensure that Federal policing has the directives and resources it needs. NSICOP is clear that this will include new money—something unlikely to go down well in the current climate of federal budget cutting.

The NSICOP report is a terrific study and further proof of the Committee’s value for Parliament and Canadians. But it also operates within  certain limits when it comes to recommendations. It doesn’t put itself forward as a policy advice committee, to do so would strain its consensus-based model and its political neutrality.  But this approach has the unfortunate effect of blunting one of its key messages, which is:

“It may be time for Canada to consider a stand-alone federal policing organization.” (p. 81)

This message is toned down in the Committees recommendations to read:

“The Government ensure that Federal Policing has the sufficient level of autonomy to fulfil its mandate and implement any organizational changes necessary to do so.” (R3, p.87).

The federal government doesn’t have much of a track record of paying attention to NSICOP reports. It needs to pay attention to this one. The evidence contained in the report points in one direction only—that Federal policing is broken and that the protection of Canada’s national security has suffered.

It is hard to see a fix other than the separating out of Federal policing into a Canadian version of the FBI.  That’s the issue that Minister LeBlanc (and his successors, for it will be a long haul) must face and act on.