Intelligence Priorities, secret no more!

(after 60 years)

The Canadian Government, for the very first time, has today published its intelligence priorities.  The Privy Council Office slipped these out the door at dinner (Ottawa) time on Thursday, September 19. ^[1]

There have been voices calling for publication of the intelligence priorities for some time, both within the intelligence community and from outside experts. The purpose: to better inform Canadians and increase the transparency of national security policy. The trio of Ministers who announced the release explained it as in keeping with the government’s national security transparency commitment from 2017. They also acknowledged a “trust gap” between national security and intelligence organizations and Canadians, “particularly racialized Canadians.”   That’s one way to put it, and comes with a more progressive tone than the scolding note, often heard, that Canadians lack sufficient national security “literacy.”

But if we are asking—why now?—and looking for the exact prompt for publication of the intelligence priorities, it was undoubtedly the foreign interference inquiry (PIFI) and related attention to questions about how effectively the government has responded to national security threats. The Government already stole some thunder from PIFI by introducing legislation, Bill C-70,  to counter foreign interference in May 2024, immediately following the publication of the Inquiry’s Initial report. The legislation progressed at lightspeed through Parliament and received royal assent on June 20. Publishing intelligence priorities and pushing foreign interference to the top of the list, is another instance of trying to get ahead of the Inquiry.

But if there are some political games being played around timing, the longer-term implications are significant. It will be difficult for any future government to backtrack from this initiative, without laying itself open to the charge of undue secrecy.  Publishing intelligence priorities puts any government on the hook to demonstrate responsive policies and actions. It also puts a government on notice for things missing from the priorities list and for an ability to adapt and change to keep pace with the threat environment.  It makes intelligence priorities an accountability piece and opens up future political debate—all to the good.

Among our Five Eyes intelligence partners, only New Zealand publishes its intelligence priorities and has done so since 2021. ^[2]  Its striking that Canada is second up to bat on this (usually we come further down the line-up).  Strangely, both New Zealand and Canada list 14 priorities. The two country’s lists are broadly comparable, despite considerable differences in size, power, and geopolitical environment. That probably tells us something about the threat environment.

Canada’s list starts off with “Foreign Interference and Malign Influence.” The priorities are not explicitly ranked, but this sends a signal, especially to a domestic audience. The  message—hello Public Inquiry; hello political opponents; hello media—the government is talking the threat seriously.

The rest of the list contains the usual suspects:

Espionage

Cyber threats

Technological change

Health security

Climate change

Arctic security

Defence operations

Violent extremism

Global security

Serious Crime

Financial threats

Immigration and border security.

Implicit in every one of these priorities is the need for the Canadian intelligence community to know more about threats and to respond to a more complex threat landscape than ever before. As Dorothy, in the Wizard of Oz, reminds her dog, ‘we’re not in Kansas anymore.’ Like Dorothy, Canada has been caught up in the global whirlwind of security threats.

Its good to see the traditional conceptual boundaries of the security and intelligence community being stretched, not least to cover transnational threats such as global health and climate change and to have the importance of understanding trends in technological change recognized as an imperative.

The appearance of Arctic security on the list is in lock-step with the government’s new Defence strategy, so no surprise there.

What’s missing? Arguably three things.  The biggest missing priority has to do with space and security. Space is critical infrastructure for Canada and a realm of growing international competition, private sector engagement, dual-use proliferation and adversarial action. It will need to be built into the next iteration. Space security even features in New Zealand’s intelligence priorities.

Also missing, a broader focus on economic security, beyond threats to finances or critical infrastructure. Without an explicit priority for economic security our economic intelligence capacity will not grow.

And strangely, no priority given to disinformation, in an era when authoritarian state- backed information operations are a persistent de-stabilizer targeting democracies worldwide.

Its good to have our Intelligence priorities list public, but the list, to be made real, needs two things, a governance framework and a process of translating lists into action.  Both suffer in comparison to some of our more secretive allies.

The UK, US, and Australia don’t publish their priorities but have substantial mechanisms and governance procedures to generate them.

In the UK case, the work is done by the Joint Intelligence Committee, on an annual basis. The JIC reviews intelligence community requirements and priorities, and submits these to Cabinet for approval. The UK system involves three tiers, ranked according to the significance and immediacy of the priority. ^[3]

In the US, intelligence priorities are set according to a process laid out in a Presidential Intelligence Community Directive, on “National Intelligence Priorities Framework.” ^[4] Authority for determining intelligence priorities is ultimately in the hands of the President and the National Security Adviser, but the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) plays a key role in their determination, management and in the tasking of elements of the US intelligence system. The DNI reports annually to the President, via the National Security Adviser, on the implementation of the priorities for collection and analysis. In this work, the DNI is assisted by a “Deputy Director for Mission Integration”

Both the UK JIC and the US DNI have authority to share intelligence priority frameworks (in the U.S. case a “matrix”) with other Five Eyes countries.

In the Australian case, the Office of National Intelligence, created by legislation in 2018, is the responsible body:

“to provide advice to the Prime Minister, from a whole-of-national intelligence community perspective, on national intelligence priorities, requirements and capabilities.” ^[5]

Comparing Five Eyes practice to Canada, two common features stand out. One is that across the Five Eyes, heads of government are the ultimate authority on intelligence priorities but act on advice from the intelligence community. The other is that each Five Eyes country has a mechanism and process to generate intelligence priorities involving a senior coordination and management function in the hands of officials.

There is also a general practice of sharing intelligence priorities among  Five Eyes partners.

Where Canada may stand apart from its Five Eyes partners is in the absence of a tiered list, as per the UK system; and the relative lack of resources available to manage the intelligence priorities process, compared, for example, to the US. Any resource comparison with the gargantuan US system is, of course, unfair, but what is noticeable in the US case is the role of a dedicated senior official, the “Deputy Director of Mission Integration,” to ensure that intelligence priorities are managed effectively within a clear chain of command. Perhaps this is yet one more argument for establishing a clear role in the Canadian process for the National Security and Intelligence Adviser and even setting out such responsibilities in legislation. The perennial “who’s in charge” question must be satisfied in the Canadian government, and it cannot be achieved through reliance on committees.

There is also the need to ensure that high-level strategic lists of intelligence priorities get anchored in specific intelligence requirements that the Canadian intelligence and security community, with its finite resources and lack of all-source capabilities, can work to in a realistic manner. This is immensely challenging. The only time that the tracking of intelligence priorities down into the weeds of intelligence requirements was studied was back in 2018, when the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians produced its first annual report. ^[6]

Its findings, while somewhat muted (the Committee, after all, was a new kid on the block and inclined to be deferential) were still alarming. It found that the Cabinet was not necessarily getting all the information it required to set the strategic priorities, that the National Security and Intelligence Adviser needed to play a stronger role in the process, that there were far too many “stranding intelligence requirements” to give meaning to the intelligence priorities (impolitely put the intelligence community was drowning in them) and that there was an absence of any performance measurement framework.

Maybe things are better six years on?  Maybe its time for a follow-on study by NSICOP?

And while the need for changes are contemplated, here are some thoughts on governance. A two-year cycle for Intelligence priority setting is one year too long.  The Intelligence priorities should be announced by the Prime Minister.  They are ultimately his (or her’s).  Make mention of the all-important role of the Cabinet National Security Council, created in 2023. It is the top table, allowing Ministers, aided by their senior officials, to debate and set intelligence priorities.  Consider creating, as per UK practice, a tiered list, despite the bureaucratic blood that may have to be shed.  

The next iteration of the intelligence priorities should also talk about the significance of the Five Eyes partnership and how mutual contemplation of intelligence priorities strengthens all.

Or, the Wizard of Oz could be your friend.

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^[1] Government of Canada, “Canada’s Intelligence Priorities,” September 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/services/publications/canada-intelligence-priorities.html

^[2] New Zealand, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, “National Security Intelligence Priorities,”(2023), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/national-security-intelligence-priorities

^[3] UK Joint Intelligence Committee, https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/joint-intelligence-committee; UK, “National Intelligence Machinery “(2000), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7ce67ce5274a724f0be32d/0114301808.pdf

^[4] U.S., Intelligence Community Directive 204, “National Intelligence Priorities Framework,” (2021), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD_204_National_Intelligence_Priorities_Framework_U_FINAL-SIGNED.pdf

^[5] Australia, Office of National Intelligence Act, 2018, https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2018A00155/2022-04-02/downloads

^[6] National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, Annual Report 2018, chapter 3, “Review of the Process for Setting Intelligence Priorities,” https://nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2019-04-09/2019-04-09_annual_report_2018_public_en.pdf