Over the next five days of public hearings by the Foreign Interference Commission, we will hear from a parade of witnesses from the national security and intelligence community, as well as Ministers, culminating in testimony from the Prime Minister. Thirty-three witnesses in all.
Today (April 4) we heard from GAC, RCMP, CSE and CSIS officials (in that order).
The weight of protecting secrets was ever present, but still there were some notable moments where some light was case, often leaving an inevitable desire to learn more.
Cindy Termorshuizen, the Associate DM at GAC, confirmed that prior to general elections it circulates a memo to the diplomatic corps in Ottawa reminding them of their obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to abide by the laws of Canada and refrain from interfering in Canadian domestic politics. When asked what happens should foreign diplomats go offside from their Vienna convention obligations, the answer was, perhaps unsurprisingly, that it would depend on the circumstances.
The RCMP Commissioner, Michael Duheme, confirmed that the RCMP launched nocriminal investigations on foreign interference during either the 2019 and 2021 elections, but subsequent to the 2021 election have instituted some file investigations. Number not permitted to be disclosed.
Commissioner Duheme was asked about the RCMP’s definition of foreign interference and the RCMP’s mandate. A primary focus for the Mounties during the 2019 and 2021 elections, we were told, was criminal code and Security of Information Act (SOIA) violations, but its outlook has broadened over time on what might constitute election-related offences with greater concern about public safety issues. That strategic shift deserved more elaboration than it received.
Deputy Commissioner Mark Flynn, responsible for Federal Policing National Security, touched on the RCMP efforts to engage with diaspora communities. He indicated that the outreach was having some success in terms of an increased number of tips to the RCMP’s national security tipline. More details on the outreach effort would have been helpful.
Next up was Dan Rogers, currently the Deputy National Security and Intelligence Adviser, but appearing in his prior function as a senior official of CSE in regards to the 2019 and 2021 elections. Rogers indicated that while CSE was ready to use its cyber security tools to defend the government in the face of cyber attacks, it did not have to use those capabilities during either the 2019 or 2021 elections. He wasn’t asked whether that was surprising or not.
After the lunch break, we heard from a panel of three CSIS officials, the Director, David Vigneault, and two former senior colleagues Michelle Tessier (retired), and Cherie Henderson (retired).
When asked by Commission Counsel about CSIS efforts to provide more information to the public about national security threats, David Vigneault gave a long answer about the evolving threat environment, but circled back to some specific efforts, including his own public speeches, which began in 2018, CSIS annual public reports, and the efforts of the internal AOSE branch, (Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement), which he noted was increasingly reaching out to diaspora groups targeted by foreign interference. This small and under-resourced branch began life in the post 9/11 period with a focus on academic outreach, narrowly defined, and moved recently to more stakeholder engagement with the private sector, especially during the COVID 19 pandemic. But it is probably time for a name change--how about simply “Public Engagement.” It could be a focal point within CSIS for all aspects of a public outreach strategy including to diaspora communities at risk.
One specific document referenced by the CSIS Director and produced by AOSE in multiple languages, is called, “Foreign Interference and You.” [1] This is a brief and very high-level document that describes some key terms and discusses the nature of the FI threat, but will leave readers in the dark about the work of CSIS in confronting such threats or the nature of the legal safety net designed to protect Canadians. It contains some broad suggestions for individuals and organizations, including an encouragement to individuals to report suspicious activities and to educate themselves about the nature of the threat. Good ideas, but unlikely to really move diaspora communities closer in a relationship to CSIS.
At one point, we seemed on the verge of a truly intriguing discussion when Director Vigneault was asked about the recall of an October 2019 report on potential foreign interference in the Don Valley North riding (the riding of Han Dong). In popular culture parlance this is referred to as a “burn notice,” a term used by the CIA. Mr. Vigneault could not remember the reason for recalling this document, nor could his then Chief of Staff, but stressed that he had never in his entire career been asked to censor the delivery of any intelligence report.
The recall episode was linked, in subsequent testimony, to an acerbic October 2019 email from the chair of SITE (Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force) to CSIS referencing a particular CSIS National Security Brief, calling attention to the fact that SITE had never received the striking details contained in that CSIS brief. Acerbic emails are not the norm in polite official Ottawa. CSIS reviewed the document and determined it was too strong and misleading in its assessment, recalled it, and revised the brief.
Other highlights in the testimony over CSIS’s role were often derived from cross-examination on a series of public summaries of CSIS classified intelligence holdings on specific topics. The CSIS Director cautioned against over-reading of them.
I plan to dive into these documents but will have to wait for them to be released on the Commission website (they are first made available to the parties with standing). There are 14 summaries to date, some collating intelligence on country threat actors, others on specific issues of foreign interference. I am looking forward to having the chance to read them in full and reflect on them as a collectivity.
The final witness was Bo Basler, who appeared as a representative of CSIS regional offices. Basler currently serves as Director General of CSIS’s counter foreign interference office, which is a new bureau created in 2023. Interestingly, there were no questions to the witness about this new office, why it was created, how it links to a similar office at Public Safety, what resources it has etc., etc.
One common theme that popped up during the day was the close working relationship of all the elements of the national security and intelligence community. All was rosy, so the official line went. We may hear other testimony to challenge some aspects of that notion.
In that vein, we will learn more tomorrow (Friday, April 5), about the working of SITE, an intelligence fusion centre, which would serve as a good test case for cooperative working among elements of the national security and intelligence community.
Let’s see.
[1] Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Foreign Interference and You,” February 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/foreign-interference-and-you/foreign-interference-and-you.html