More on leaks
What do we know about the motivations and psychology of leakers? Part 2 of a cautionary tale.
Justice Dennis O’Connor, who conducted the inquiry into the Arar Affair, did not look kindly on leakers (see my previous substack column, “On Intelligence Leaks, the Media, and the Law”). His take from his 2006 report should still resonate:
“While most leaks likely involve a breach of some form of confidentiality, using confidential information to manipulate public opinion…is obviously more egregious…Because it can be so difficult to counter this type of leak, one can only hope that some of the public and the media are sophisticated enough to perceive the reality of what is occurring and to reserve judgement until there is a fair and transparent disclosure of all the relevant facts.”
(Analysis and Recommendations, p. 257)
Wise advice, but difficult to follow in the heat of a high-profile set of leaks, such as has occurred with sensitive information made available to selected media outlets about Chinese election interference. Who has the patience of Job anyway? It’s not in the business model of the media, especially when you have two different media outlets chasing the same story, nor in the DNA of opposition politicians.
The leak saga has now run for five months and shows no sign of abating, with the latest revelations coming on March 8 in a story from Global News. (OK, they may not be the latest by the time you read this). The March 8 leak provided more details on a PCO Intelligence Assessment Secretariat (IAS) report from January 2022 regarding covert funding directed by Chinese officials to meddle with the election in 2019. The leaked IAS report , according to reporter Sam Cooper, was “reviewed” by Global News, who also had it explained to them, by a “national security official” granted anonymity by the paper. The March 8 leak story also referenced sections of the classified version of the 2019 study by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians—the first time classified material from a NSICOP study has ever been leaked, to my knowledge. Global News said it “examined” the unreacted copy of the NSICOP study. In neither case did Global publish the leaked documents. Nor have any of the documents leaked to Global News or the Globe and Mail been published by either media outlet during the course of the previous five months.
https://globalnews.ca/news/9534893/high-level-memos-beijing-2019-election-candidates/
The identify of the leaker(s) remains protected by the media, as do the full contents of the material made available to them.
We have no evidence about the motives of the leaker(s). The question of motivation becomes all the more important if the intent is, as Justice O’Connor warned with regard to the orchestrated Arar leaks, to “manipulate public opinion. “
We do have lots of speculation about motive, dressed up as certainty. The Conservative party leader, Pierre Poilievre, has claimed that the leaks are the product of intense frustration on the part of national security officials who, in his words, “must be very worried about how the Prime Minister is working against the interests of his own country and his own people.” The leaker(s) are so concerned “that they are actually releasing this information publicly.” But, of course, they are not. This is not anything like the Snowden affair. The public has not seen the documents, only selective portions quoted or summarized by the media.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/poilievre-trudeau-china-working-in-chinas-interests-1.6770566
The CSIS Director, in testimony before a Parliamentary committee, told a different story. David Vigneault explained to MPs that there are procedures for security officials to speak out and express their dissatisfaction, which he ascribed to the fact that CSIS operates within a democracy. But he also responded to a question from a Bloc MP, by stating that “concerning the possibility of tension about this [dealing with foreign interference threats] within the service, I have to tell you that is not an issue of concern.”
https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/PROC/meeting-56/minutes
These viewpoints cannot be reconciled. There are good reasons to approach the veracity of each with some caution. Mr. Poilievre is looking to score political points against the Prime Minister. The CSIS Director is looking to defend the integrity of the Service he leads.
A good source for understanding what drives this leak campaign could be supplied by the leakers themselves, but on that subject they have remained quiet, as have the media recipients of their leaks. Even then, there would be the need for some generous sprinkling of grains of salt.
Should there ever be an identification of the leaker(s) through investigations by CSIS and the RCMP, and should charges ultimately be laid, we would learn more in court proceedings about motives. But leak investigations are difficult, and deeply disruptive within government departments and agencies. Such investigations may never bear fruit. They didn't with regard to the Arar affair, despite their widespread nature.
Is motive, then, the ultimate secret? Maybe.
What we do know is something about the diverse set of motivational factors that can unleash a leak campaign. This knowledge is derived from professional counterintelligence work against what is know in the security business as “the insider threat.” One UK government organisation defines the insider threat as follows: “a person who exploits, or has the intention to exploit, their legitimate access to an organisation’s assets for unauthorized purposes.”
https://www.cpni.gov.uk/resources/insider-data-collection-study-report-main-findings
Both the UK and the United States have dedicated government resources to examining the insider threat and establishing best practices in response to it. There is no real counterpart to these organized efforts within the Canadian government.
In the US, there is something called the “National Insider Threat Task Force,” co-led by the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) in the Director of National Intelligence’s office, and the FBI. The Task Force serves as a centre of expertise to advise the government on the evolving nature of the insider threat and best practices in response. It is also public facing in providing guidance to private sector firms.
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-what-we-do/ncsc-insider-threat
As part of the public effort, the FBI has produced a basic guide, “The Insider Threat: An introduction to detecting and deterring the insider spy.”
The guide lists seven personal factors that motivate leakers. They include:
greed or financial need
anger/revenge
problems at work
ideology/identification
divided loyalties
adventure/thrill
vulnerability to blackmail
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/products/Insider_Threat_Brochure.pdf
The list is really an expansion of an older Cold War model developed to understand moles and traitors—the famous “MICE” formula (money/ideology/corruption/ego).
Let’s assume we can cross at least three of these factors (greed/divided loyalties/blackmail) off the list with regard to the anonymous leakers of material regarding Chinese election interference. What does that leave us to ponder? That the leaker(s) might be driven by some combination of extreme disgruntlement with an organization (“anger/revenge”); more personal disappointments at work around such things as promotions, relationships with management, tensions with co-workers, or even the prospect of being fired (“problems at work:”); a desire to support a political cause, in this case a tougher approach to China (“ideology”); or the excitement of engaging in something clandestine and personally dangerous (“adventure/thrill”).
Someone(s) genuinely perturbed by what they perceived as the failure of government policy towards China, especially if such a stance seemed to put him/her at odds with the people and organisation he/she worked for, might well tick most or all of these boxes. Equally, you could just have someone who wanted to bloody the nose of the government, or who enjoyed the thrill of a clandestine expose, or just wanted to strike back against an organization that failed to value his/her service.
Its complicated. Thank you, FBI.
A little more detailed insight is provided by research undertaken by a UK agency called the “Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)” housed within the security service, MI5. CPNI was created in 2007 as the UK government authority on personnel and physical security, especially with regard to critical infrastructure (both government and private sector). A decade ago it published the results of an insider threat research project “CPNI Insider Data Collection Study”). Its 2013 study built on a previous report done in 2009. It explored over 120 UK-based insider threat cases drawn from both government and the private sector.
No similar research findings have been published since 2013, but even taking into account the passage of time, the results have some fascination.
See:
https://www.cpni.gov.uk/resources/insider-data-collection-study-report-main-findings
In general they showed that men greatly outnumbered women when it came to insider threat activity (82% vs 18%)
The demographic most likely to engage in insider threats involved individuals aged 31-45 (nearly 50% of cases)
Insider threat actors can come from the executive ranks or from the non-executive work force—the distribution of classes in the UK study was evenly split
Over half those engaged in insider threat activity had worked for their agency for less than five years.
In terms of motivation, when it involved unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information, the two leading factors were ideology and “desire for recognition.” The UK data does not paint a pretty picture of professionalism, moral rectitude or ethical behaviour on the part of insider threat actors. The CPNI study lists 10 personality traits, from “immaturity” to “evidence of psychological or personality disorders,” none of which you would welcome in a neighbour or colleague.
National security leakers on horseback, if we follow the UK data, are mostly likely angry middle-aged males, who are permanent employees of a security agency, but relatively new to it, driven by an ideological agenda, and whose activity may last last less than six months. Their motives are often complex. Their morality may be dubious.
Whether this profile fits that of the anonymous leakers of classified intelligence about Chinese foreign interference cannot be known at this stage, and may never be known.
There is nothing in the UK study to discount the possibility of a “white knight” leaker. The data just suggests they are rare.
Scott, An excellent question. Whistleblowers operate in a restricted regime and naturally fear retaliation. I am not aware of any research on the outcomes of whistleblowing in security agencies
Once again the author is more concerned about why the leaks instead of Trudeau's ignoring the intervention by foreign governments or his MPs accepting foreign money for re-election. Thank god for leakers and the public press for bringing this matter to light/1