On Models for a National Security Council: Does Australia offer a better Perspective for Canada?
A guest expert column by John Blaxland
Dear Readers,
I am delighted to be able to publish this guest expert column by Dr. John Blaxland on the Australian governance system for intelligence and national security.
John is one of Australia’s leading experts on intelligence and security issues. He is Professor of International Security and Intelligence Studies at the Australian National University (ANU).His most recent book is Revealing Secrets: An Unofficial History of Australian Signals Intelligence and the Advent of Cyber (Sydney, UNSWP, 2023). Among his many publications are two volumes of the official history of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization.
A fuller biography is here:
https://researchprofiles.anu.edu.au/en/persons/john-blaxland
From September he is being appointed Director of the ANU’s North America Liaison Office in Washington DC., with responsibilities for engaging in collaborative endeavours with US and Canadian Universities and think tanks.
Over to John, with thanks.
Canadian political scientists gravitate to the United States for inspiration, not least with regard to national security issues. With talk of a new National Security Council for Canada, commentators have, naturally enough, looked to the Washington model for their point of reference. Perhaps, though, they would be better placed looking at their federal, bicameral, “Wash-minster” counterparts Down Under in Australia.
Canada and Australia have been described as ‘strategic cousins’. While Canada has a larger population and larger economy, its multicultural immigrant-dependent demographic mix, first nations reconciliation concerns, and geographic distribution reveals uncanny parallels. They both have a long history of grappling with similar domestic and external security issues ranging from the defection of Igor Gouzenko in Canada in 1945 and the defection of Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov in Australia in 1954, to the FLQ and Air India bombers in Canada in the 1970s and 1980s, along with Ananda Marga hotel bombers in Sydney (1978). Both countries, have committed forces to a wide range of UN mandated missions including in Afghanistan, and faced uncannily similar domestic security challenges in recent years related to political and ideologically motivated extremists.
Their defence organisations are broadly similar in size and function often enough with common experiences working alongside in shared operations and exercises. Similarly, their police, security and intelligence apparatus has a range of similarities which makes them more akin to each other than either the UK or USA. Yet they are both part of security ties with not just the USA and UK, but also Australia and New Zealand, including the Five Eyes intelligence sharing arrangements, the ABCANZ Armies standardisation agreement, the Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group, and other ties between security and intelligence agencies that are spoken about in hushed tones.
The diagram below maps out Australia’s National Intelligence Community structure and accountability arrangements. Much of this will be faintly familiar to Canadians, even if the titles are slightly different.
(Diagram by author)
The National Security Committee of Cabinet, or NSC, is a sub-committee of Federal Cabinet. It makes final policy decisions on all major national security and foreign policy matters. These matters range from slower moving questions of statecraft and strategy, Defence equipment acquisitions, intelligence collection and operation priorities for the national intelligence agencies, to fast moving matters in the midst of crises. That means the NSC is Australia's highest decision-making body on national security and important foreign policy issues. It is identified in the diagram as partly falling under parliamentary accountability (with ministers of state as members of parliament being members of the committee) while at the same time being a component of the executive (with policy making functions). The NSC has responsibility for overseeing, designing and implementing the nation’s national security strategy while also being responsible for supervising the nation's intelligence and security services.
The agencies which feature prominently in NSC deliberations include the Australian Defence Force (ADF), Australian Border Force (ABF), Australian Federal Police (AFP) and a range of intelligence and security bodies including the following organisations:
· The Office of National Intelligence, or ONI (formerly Office of National Assessments), the nation’s peak intelligence assessment body, with coordination and management responsibilities for the other intelligence agencies.
· The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), a foreign human intelligence collection service, like the UK’s SIS – a function evidently absent in Canada.
· The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) focused on domestic security and intelligence – akin to CSIS in Canada.
· The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), - akin to Canada’s CSE, and incorporating the national Cyber Security Centre, with regional outlets in the capital cities of the states (Canadian province equivalents)
· The Australian Geospatial Intelligence Organisation – a function also performed within the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM)
· Australia’s Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) – a function matched by a component of CFINTCOM
· Australian Federal Police Intelligence Staff - reflecting similar functions performed within the RCMP
· Home Affairs Department Intelligence – reflecting the requirement for intelligence support for immigration, customs and border force elements
· Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) – with a Canadian counterpart organisation
· Australian Transactions and Reporting Centre (AUSTRAC) – also with a Canadian counterpart
In addition to these collection and assessment agencies, the Australian National Intelligence Community has a range of oversight mechanisms featured including independent statutory authorities, parliamentary and executive oversight mechanisms.
The independent mechanism report to the Attorney general and include the following:
· The Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), with enduring powers of a royal commissioner.
· The National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) – a recently introduced body that absorbed the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity.
· The Independent National Security legislation Monitor (INSLM), tasked with reviewing incoming and extent national security related legislation.
· The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which incorporates what was previously the Security Appeals Tribunal, intended for administrative procedural grievances.
The reports from these bodies address a range of challenges internally and much of their work can be, and often is, discussed in the NSC. With the Prime Minister as NSC Chair, other members include the Minister for Defence, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Treasurer, the Minister for Climate Change and Energy, the Attorney-General and the Minister for Home Affairs.
The NSC considers border protection policies and the formulation of national responses to evolving security situations and foreign policy challenges. The NSC operates without needing the Cabinet's formal endorsement. The NSC reviews and assesses intelligence and security related cabinet submissions. These submissions outline strategies for achieving national security goals, with the full Cabinet relying on advice from ministers and departments in making informed decisions. The NSC regularly meets to address concerns raised by the relevant agencies listed but does not convene on a full-time basis.
The NSC is supported by the Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS), which is usually chaired by the Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. It includes the leading bureaucrats from the relevant national security departments and agencies (including those listed above) and conducts regular meetings, supported by a subordinate Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG) including deputy heads of agencies and departments.
PM&C has a national security division and the deputy secretary there has a role that resembles that of a national security adviser. This is an appointment that was downplayed after a couple of iterations a decade ago because it was seen to clash with the extant roles of some departmental secretaries and agency heads, notably Secretary PM&C & DGNI.
While the titles are not the same, the functions closely echo those undertaken by Canadian counterparts in Ottawa. As legislators and policy makers consider their options, they should continue to closely scrutinize what happens south of the border, but for parallels with closer and more scalable comparison, it pays to consider the ‘cousins’ Down Under.
X / Twitter: @JohnBlaxland1
https://researchprofiles.anu.edu.au/en/persons/john-blaxland