Recovering from a terrible intelligence failure

The demands now faced by Israeli intelligence

The Israeli intelligence community has suffered its worst failure since the days of the Yom Kippur war in 1973. It knows full well that it will be under the microscope for that failure when the current conflict with Hamas ends. The intelligence community must shoulder the blame as a whole, including military intelligence, Aman, the signals intelligence organisation known as Unit 8200, the Mossad, Israeli’s foreign intelligence service, Shin Bet (or Shabak), responsible for internal security and, to a lesser extent, the intelligence arms of the Israeli police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

But what Israeli intelligence faces going forward is an enormous task. The list of demands placed on Israeli intelligence agencies, still reeling from the shock of the Saturday morning Hamas attack, is massive and will only grow.  It must support the clearing of the border areas with Gaza. It has to keep a close watch on the possibility of other attacks breaking out in the West Bank or launched by Hezbollah from Lebanon. Hamas is broadcasting encouragement to other militant organizations to join its fight against Israel. Israeli intelligence cannot afford to fall prey to another surprise attack from the north or east.  There have already been small scale clashes with Hezbollah and Israel has closed the major access routes to the West Bank, including border crossings to Jordan.

Its role in supporting offensive operations against Hamas will be a crucial test.  It must provide the Israeli air force with precise intelligence on targets in Gaza. It needs to be able to deliver a fine-grained picture of Hamas military strength, armaments and bases in preparation for a ground invasion. It needs to monitor Hamas rocket attacks and try to destroy launch sites.

The Hamas military command still remaining in Gaza will be one of its key intelligence objectives, so as to allow for “decapitation” missions. Those elements of the Hamas regime living abroad, such as the Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, reportedly based in Qatar and watching the war unfold from his office in the Gulf, may be the target for assassination attempts.

One of the most challenging missions for Israeli intelligence will be efforts to pinpoint the location of hostages, reportedly numbering some 150, taken back into Gaza by militants.  They will have been dispersed throughout the Gaza strip and embedded with civilian elements to provide greater protection. Families of those taken hostage are putting great pressure on the Netanyahu government to somehow come to their rescue.

Because of the challenges of engaging in urban combat with a well-armed and determined foe, fighting on home territory and buoyed by the success of their initial assault against Israel, what the Israeli military needs from its intelligence services is a decisive edge.  Blanket coverage of Hamas’ military wing of course, but above all, intelligence that can help the Israeli military achieve its own surprise against Hamas, and not play out previous indecisive campaigns.  That surprise can only be achieved through determination of the weak points of Hamas’ defences and knowledge of Hamas’ military planning in response to an Israeli invasion.  What Israel will need is something on the order of the allied intelligence superiority which made possible the D-Day landings in Normandy in 1944. It may not be able to achieve that degree of intelligence mastery.

Intelligence rarely wins wars.  But Intelligence can help lose them.  Israeli intelligence will have to bring its full panoply of intelligence sources and its best assessment capabilities to bear on the conflict with Hamas if Israel is going to secure anything it can call a victory. What Israeli’s intelligence community may have going for it is a determination to overcome a humiliating failure.