Dear Readers,
I asked a long-time colleague, Dr. David Charters, to put his thoughts to paper on the new Defence Policy Update and how it needs to be seen in both a historical and future context. The guest column he writes is sobering and I hope you will find it as instructive as I did.
David’s bio is here:
Dr. David A. Charters is Professor (ret.) of military history and Senior Fellow at the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick. He was director of the UNB Centre for Conflict Studies from 1986 to 2005. He is the author of many books and articles mostly on intelligence studies, including Canadian Military Intelligence: Operations and Evolution From the October Crisis to the War in Afghanistan(Georgetown University Press, 2022). He has served as president of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies and was a member of the federal government's Advisory Committee on National Security.
In March 1964 then Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer released the White Paper on Defence that presaged a dramatic transformation of the Canadian military. Sixty years later, almost to the day, the government has released its Defence Policy Update which, like its 1964 counterpart, promises an equally striking “renewal” of the Canadian Armed Forces.
White papers and similar statements (such as this update) are “aspirational” documents. “They reveal how the government of the day wants to see the strategic environment, how it wants its defence efforts to reflect that vision, and what it is (or is not) prepared to do and spend on it.” These three things are not easy to synchronize. The strategic environment can change – as it did in 1989-91, when the collapse of the Soviet empire brought an end to the first Cold War. That, in turn, undermined the major rationale for the 1987 defence white paper. That unique example apart, government priorities change over time, so the importance of defence often waxes and wanes. And, as a large costly institution, defence is always an easy target for spending cuts. So, how does the 2024 Defence Policy Update measure up?
First, how does this government view the strategic environment? The title is a giveaway: Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence. But if the reader requires more specificity, it comes in the Introduction. Of the three strategic challenges facing Canada, climate change is primus inter pares. This government’s most important strategic environment is Canada’s Arctic and North, and the threats Canada faces there are viewed through the lens of climate change. This is not surprising; the Trudeau government has made climate change the touchstone of its political priorities. Nor is it necessarily inappropriate. The update lays out a detailed case for its preferred focus. Climate change is having destabilizing impacts in the Arctic and the north: natural disasters; foreign actors exploring, probing, and collecting intelligence. Russia’s naval and air power is expanding. China, while not an Arctic power geographically, is nonetheless increasing its presence there. In the face of all of this, the update says that Canada needs to do more to assert its sovereignty in the region: increase the Canadian military’s presence, reach, mobility, and responsiveness to deal with disasters, and with threats and challenges to our sovereignty. Also to ensure that those areas don’t pose threats to our allies.
If any of this sounds familiar, you’re not wrong. Defending the north has been a recurring theme in Canadian defence policy since the start of the Cold War. In the latter half of the 1940s, the Canadian Army was being re-shaped as an air-transportable force that could air-drop into the Arctic to counter any Soviet incursions there. But, this update contains distinct echoes of the 1971 white paper: Defence in the 70s, which featured on its cover Canadian troops in winter gear who have just landed at an airfield, presumably for an exercise up there. The strategic context then was one of strategic parity and stability between the two superpowers, emerging détente, and decreasing likelihood of a major war. As Canada moved further from the last time its forces had engaged in combat, there was growing skepticism about the traditional roles of the armed forces. And as social and economic needs gained salience, there was, in words of then Defence Minister Donald Macdonald, “substantial pressure to cut defence expenditures.”
Like the current update, the 1971 white paper focused Canadian defence policy and military resources on the Arctic and north. It explained that “Defence responsibilities required re-examination as a result of Government decisions to regulate development of the north in a manner compatible with environmental preservation…” In fact, one of the listed policy themes was ensuring “a harmonious natural environment.” Under the theme Sovereignty and Independence the paper discussed at length the external (largely commercial and environmental) challenges to the unique character of the Canadian Arctic and north. The Canadian Forces had responsibility (shared with other departments and authorities) to exercise surveillance and control over the area. The paper stated explicitly that the armed forces “will be called upon” to assist development of the civil sector in the region. They “will make a major contribution” to preserving an unspoiled environment and “will play an important part” in dealing with natural disasters, such as cleaning up oil spills or fighting forest fires. More emphasis was being placed on training the armed forces to operate in the north, and a northern region headquarters had been established at Yellowknife, and a liaison staff at Whitehorse.
The 2024 update explicitly lays out many of the same themes. In its Vision for Defence, defence of Canada is the top priority, with “particular focus on defending the Arctic and North and its approaches against new and accelerating threats through credible deterrence.” The CF will increase its presence, reach, mobility and response in the region. But to do what, exactly? Primarily to monitor what is going on, and do disaster response and search and rescue. When the update turns to Delivering on the Vision in terms of building capabilities, it states that, “Following a detailed analysis of our military needs, Canada is choosing to invest in the right capabilities for our current and future needs. These capabilities are focused first and foremost on ensuring that Canada has the ability to protect its Arctic and North and assert our sovereignty.” [emphasis added]. The Canadian Forces need “increased capacity to monitor our vast land mass, airspace and maritime areas, defend against threats to Canada as they arise, and be able to deploy quickly and efficiently across the country, especially in … our Arctic and North, or to assist Canadians facing wildfires, floods, or other climate-related disasters.”[emphasis added] The military “will prioritize detecting and understanding threats across all military domains, increasing our military's presence, mobility and responsiveness in the Arctic, and robustly responding to threats when and where they materialize.” And to give visual impact of this agenda, the update includes a photo of personnel working a fire-break somewhere, though it is not clear if these are military personnel or civilian firefighters.
The update goes on to present an impressive ‘shopping list’ of new capabilities to be developed and acquired. First among these is the intention to “explore options for renewing and expanding our submarine fleet to enable the Royal Canadian Navy to project a persistent deterrent on all three coasts, with under-ice capable, conventionally powered submarines.” The list also includes: specialised maritime sensors; a satellite ground station; new tactical helicopter capabilities (including UAVs); new tactical vehicles for the Army; exploring options for enabling our Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels to embark and operate our maritime helicopters at sea; and increasing the CFs' presence and responsiveness across the Arctic and the North, we will establish northern operational support hubs, consisting of airstrips, logistics facilities, and equipment and stockpiles of spare parts. There is more, but these are the items most closely associated with the government’s – and DND’s – focus on the north. For defence of Canada and of North America, the list goes on to include: Airborne Early Warning aircraft, air and missile defence on our ships, ground-based air defence for critical infrastructure, and long-range missile capability for the Army. All of this is in addition to NORAD modernization announced in 2022, This is a tall order.
If the only challenge Canada faces is climate change and a consequent region open to foreign incursions, challenges to our sovereignty there, and risks of environmental degradation, then this policy update would be largely immune from criticism. Unfortunately, the paper’s own strategic assessment calls the government’s focus into serious question. It acknowledges that we are in a time of profound global uncertainty. The war in Ukraine, the conflicts in the Middle East, and rising concern over a possible China/Taiwan clash are major de-stabilising factors. The world seems to be a more perilous place than it was in 1971. Canadian troops are currently deployed in Latvia, not far from the borders of Russia and Belarus. There is legitimate concern that a Russian victory in Ukraine could prompt a deliberate Russian attempt to reconquer the Baltic states, or that the current conflict could spill over inadvertently and lead to a major war.
Given this, it is appropriate to ask whether the government and DND have got their focus right. Moreover, the paper also acknowledges that the nature of conflict is changing. It now includes Artificial Intelligence, quantum technologies, cyber attacks, hypersonic missiles, and drones. It states boldly that the war in Ukraine has confirmed “the need for large forces and combat power, well-supplied by standing inventories of ammunition and spare parts, backed by a strong industrial base to re-arm over time.” [emphasis added] To be fair, the update commits the government and DND to modernize the CF’s core combat capabilities, including: artillery; sustainment of the naval fleet (including life-extension of the frigates) and replenishment capability; exploring options to upgrade or replace our tank and light armoured vehicle fleets; exploring the creation of a LAV production capability; exploring options for acquiring surveillance and attack drones; and creating a world-wide SATCOM capability. The update also promises to speed acquisition and procurement reform (the government has launched a multi-department review of procurement; to shift from transactional approaches to strategic partnerships in the defence industrial base; to establish a new artillery ammunition production capacity, and create a strategic reserve of battlefield-decisive munitions; and to pilot a Continuous Capability Sustainment approach to upgrading equipment. Instead of waiting years to do “minor upgrades to major equipment to align them with major mid-life overhauls, a continuous approach will give Defence the flexibility to rapidly integrate the latest technology and innovations in more regular, incremental maintenance cycles.”
All well and good. But the problem here is timing. The update is long-term future oriented, with long delivery timelines. Many items will not appear until the 2030s. But the CF has immediate needs that those timelines can’t address, especially if the balloon goes up in Europe. That includes human side of the defence equation. The CF is desperately short of people. Yet the CF intends to build back to authorized strength of 71,500 only by 2032 – eight years from now! And 71,500 is hardly enough, given what the update commits the CF to do. These problems, of course, precedes this update by at least a decade. The CF are paying the price for a decade of governments postponing investments in defence. In effect, they have been kicking the ball down the road. Now the ball is much bigger. And it has all come due at once.
Which brings me to my final point.: costs and delivery. The new federal budget, which followed closely on the heels of the defence update, allocates $262 billion over the next six years to be spent on defence. It sounds like a lot and it is. Is it enough? I am not qualified to say. But one should bear in mind that personnel, operations and training costs consume the major part of any defence budget. The government says it is allocating 20% of the budget for capital purchases. This target has been promised often since the 1964 white paper, but has proven hard to achieve. I’m not going to go through every line-item by line item, but the government seems to be putting its money where its mouth is. A few of the noteworthy items funded in this budget or already previously funded on a now-ongoing basis include: new maritime patrol aircraft, replenishing ammunition stocks, more people and anti-tank and air defence weapons for the battle group in Latvia, military support for Ukraine, modernization of our NORAD contribution (details not explained), armed UAVs, new and upgraded infrastructure for air operations in the north (including at Yellowknife again), and the inevitable life-extension for the frigate fleet, just to mention a few. Clearly, vision rhetoric not withstanding, the government does not see the future of the CF as being simply a fire brigade for the north.
But how much of this will see light of day? Nothing in the update is written in stone. Budgets, like governments and their priorities, come and go. They can be changed over time. Commitments can be scaled back. Contracts can be broken, then revised and re-instated later. Those who have spent their careers – whether inside or outside DND and the CAF – have every reason to be skeptical, if not cynical. So much has been promised in the past, only to be dropped or drastically reduced when defence needs met harsh fiscal realities. If a new government comes to power in the next election, yet another defence review is likely to follow. Their vision might be drastically different. And so will the priorities, plans and funding allocations. More of this, less of that. The past, as historians say, is a different country; they do things differently there. But when it comes to Canadian defence policy and spending, the past is a remarkably reliable guide. Don’t expect to be surprised; we have been here before, and we will be here again.
Great article, and much more tactfully phrased than my own reaction to the policy paper. I fervently believe that the most important acquisition for the CAF would be a sense of urgency in the PMO, and I don't see any sign of that in this defence paper or elsewhere. I was also irked by the way the paper links military needs with social objectives and procurement with regional economic development. When everything is important, nothing is getting done. There are other departments that should be dealing with social & economic goals. I also think the mundane (but vital) issues of logistics are underrepresented relative to the neat new weaponry. More people yes, but the right people - very disturbing to hear from the RCN recently that some of the skilled trades needed to keep our ancient vessels operable are understrength by 50+%.
This is an excellent, insightful analysis. It is perhaps too polite where there is ample evidence as it notes that the Liberal government is merely "kicking the issues down the road" - the Liberals have never in recent years reckoned adequately with the evolving threat from Moscow.