The Elephant's NSC

Thoughts on the US experience of a National Security Council

The United States created a statutory National Security Council in July 1947 in response to the emergence of the Cold War with the Soviet Union and to manage relations between the heavy weight Departments of Defence and State as they geared up for this new geopolitical contest. Among Canada’s Five Eyes intelligence partners, the US experience of a National Security Council is by far the longest and deepest.

A recent Op Ed from the Centre for International Governance Innovation, written by Aaron Shull and Michael den Tandy, referenced the US NSC as a potential model for Canada, especially in terms of policy decision-making. The CIGI essay argued that the new Canadian NSC should have a “foundational first job” of producing a national security strategy.

https://www.cigionline.org/articles/canada-needs-a-national-security-council-but-the-devils-in-the-details/

Music to my hears and hopefully to the ears of officials and Ministers in Ottawa.

While it has to be recognized that the US exercise of national security far exceeds that of Canada in scale and scope, and that the US system of government is significantly different from our Westminster model, nevertheless there are lessons to be learned from the US experience. Given the importance of our security partnership with the United States and our role in the Five Eyes, understanding the US model, and drawing from it where appropriate, will help in “docking” a new Cabinet Cabinet committee with its allied partners at the highest levels of government.

One prime lesson to be drawn from the history of the US NSC concerns its malleable nature. Like its more recent UK counterpart, the US NSC has always been shaped by the preferences of successive Presidents. Its founding terms of reference made its role as a high-level advisory group to the President clear:

“The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”

A history produced by the US State Department on the fiftieth anniversary of the NSC in 1997 charted individual Presidential uses of the NSC.

https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/history.html

One story line that emerges from that history is the way in which the NSC came to be seen as serving the President alone, and was used to control and manage competing departments, rather than the softer approach of coordination, as originally intended in 1947. Each President brought an individual style to use of the NSC. Truman (see the brilliant cameo performance by Gary Oldman in Oppenheimer) wanted to use it to force the State Department and the military to work together. Eisenhower favoured a military staff approach; Kennedy and Johnson preferred more informal structures and ad hoc groups of advisers. The NSC “atrophied” during their administrations. Things changed again under Nixon, especially reflecting Henry Kissinger’s desire to expand the analytical capacity of the NSC and use it to put policy options before the President for decision. Carter boosted the capacity and role of the National Security Adviser; Reagan rolled this back and relied more on his Chief of Staff.

Major changes were instituted by President Bush (1989-1992) (not George W, but his daddy) that were continued under Clinton. Bush created a more elaborate governance system for the NSC organization; Clinton expanded the membership of the NSC even further.

All these variations during the first fifty years! Should a Canadian NSC last so long no doubt it will experience the same changes at the hands of different PMs. The key polarities are dedicated use of the NSC and structured approaches, versus reliance on more ad hoc arrangements and a favoured set of advisers. The same polarities are witnessed in the UK experience, with the approach of PM Tony Blair referred to as a “sofa” NSC (e.g. an intimate group of advisers sitting around on one).

While Congress appropriates funds for the NSC, it does not routinely receive testimony about its activities nor is Congressional confirmation of the appointment of a National Security Adviser required. This would not be a good transparency model for Canada.

See the Congressional Research Service report of October 2022, “The National Security Council: Background and Issues for Congress,”

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44828

The current structure of the US NSC was set out in a Presidential memo in February 2021.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/04/memorandum-renewing-the-national-security-council-system/

The National Security Council includes statutory members: The President; VP; Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence; Secretary of Energy; and Secretary of the Treasury. The Director of National Intelligence (no equivalent in the Canadian system); and the Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff (the equivalent of the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, or CDS) are statutory advisers. The NSC has a staff headed by the National Security Adviser, often a significant position in terms of policy-making. It contains a descending set of committees from the National Security Council chaired by the President; to a “Principals” committee chaired by the National Security Adviser and consisting of key Cabinet ministers; a “Deputies” committee focused on interagency coordination, chaired by the Deputy National Secret Adviser with senior officials as members; and a number of “Interagency Policy Committees.”

Some of this structure could be adapted to a Canadian system at both the Cabinet and officials levels. But in many respects the US system is anchored in the work of the National Security Adviser and the NSC staff. A Canadian model will never be able to draw on the resources available in Washington, but the US analogue is a clear pointer to the need for a strong role to be played by the National Security and Intelligence Adviser and the paramount importance of having sufficient supporting staff at the Privy Council Office. An increase in centralized power and authority for national security and intelligence policy may not be seen as welcome in departments and agencies of the Canadian national security and intelligence community.

A second lesson clearly revealed in the current structure of the NSC is the attention that the system pays to what is called in the Presidential memo, “the cross-cutting nature of a number of critical national security issues.” Among those issues it lists homeland security, global public health, international economics, climate, science and technology, cyber security, migration and others.”

Canada, while not a power on the scale of the United States, faces the very same range of cross-cutting issues and it will require its NSC to deal with them. This in turn will require enhanced intelligence support on a broader range of issues than the Canadian intelligence community is currently equipped to deal with.

Two dynamics drove the creation and evolution of the US National Security Council since 1947: the complexity of national security issues and the challenges of coordinated and effective policy-making to meet national security threats.

Both dynamics will drive the Canadian NSC as life is breathed into it.

Over to you, Prime Minister.