The (former) Ottawa Police chief on intelligence

Where be Gaps

The Ottawa Police chief, Peter Sloly, resigned from his post on February 15, the day after the federal government involved the Emergencies Act. He cited declining trust in his leadership for the decision. Sloly had presided over the first 19 days of the “Freedom Convoy” occupation of Ottawa. He had been roundly criticized in the media for the OPS response to the convoy protests, something that stung. He called it massive misinformation and disinformation.

Mr. Sloly, now a fellow at the prestigious Massey College in Toronto, endured two days of testimony before the Public Order Emergency Commission—a stint of record length that he is likely to hold. His testimony revealed a proud man with an impressive resume, intellectual clout, and a mountain of challenges in bringing about a significant change management agenda to the Ottawa Police after his appointment in 2019.

That change management agenda did not reach into OPS intelligence. The poor quality of OPS intelligence, which I have commented on in earlier newsletter columns, was a factor in his downfall.

For that reason, it is worthwhile doing a deep dive into former Chief Sloly’s testimony, both on his thinking about intelligence at the time of the Freedom Convoy events, and his subsequent reflections.

One of the oldest forms of intelligence is individual reconnaissance of a conflict zone (an insight I owe to David Kahn). This is intelligence gathering up close and personal. The former Police chief had two epiphany moments during the Freedom Convoy. The first came on the initial Saturday (January 29) of the Freedom Convoy arrival in Ottawa. Sloly went for himself to see what was taking place on Wellington Street, the street that adjoins Parliament Hill and contains many Government offices. He clocked his arrival at 10:45. By 11:00, according to his testimony, he realized that the Ottawa Police Service plan for dealing with the protest had failed completely and any semblance of control had been lost. (October 28 testimony transcript, pp. 53-54). The notion of staging incoming convoy vehicles to designated parking zones and busing protesters downtown had collapsed. Freedom convoy trucks had instead raced into the downtown core and an occupation had begun. Sloly described the scene as “hyper volatile, hyper complex.” That must have been a stunning realization.

The second epiphany was also personal, a reconnaissance of his own headquarters building. It took place on the following weekend. Chief Sloly woke up in the early hours of Saturday February 5. He couldn’t sleep. So he read the overnight situation report and things looked alarming. He dressed and went down to headquarters. There he found more reason for concern, no manpower to spare and a badly over-stretched police force to deal with what he called “an escalated level of threat at multiple different sites.” (October 28 testimony transcript, pp. 86-88). He described Ottawa as a “tinderbox waiting to explode.” (October 28 testimony transcript, p. 225) Things never got better and 10 days later he would resign, under pressure. He became emotional in describing the police experience of trying to deal with the Freedom Convoy during his 19 days. It was, for his police officers, “too cold and it was too much.” (October 28 testimony transcript p. 59)

Fast moving events and a sense that Ottawa was dealing with a unprecedented situation masked a reality for Chief Sloly that he only partially came to terms with, even in retrospect. The reality was intelligence failure, and to a degree he owned the problem.

When Peter Sloly became chief of police in Ottawa in 2019 his change agenda did not include the conduct of intelligence, although he was a confirmed supporter of the doctrine of intelligence-led policing. (October 28 testimony transcript, p.18). His main priorities were crime, traffic issues and order management. ( He mentioned that he was aware that a small section meant to be devoted to open source intelligence was not resourced. (October 28 testimony transcript, p. 41) In essence he left the functioning of the intelligence section to his deputy chief. That deputy chief, during the early weeks of the Freedom Convoy, was Steve Bell, who himself was newly appointed (as of December 2021) as Deputy Chief responsible for the intelligence section and had no background in intelligence.

Then Chief Sloly was in receipt of the OPP Hendon intelligence reports on the “Freedom Convoy” starting with its very first report on January 13. (See my earlier columns on the Hendon intelligence reports). But his testimony revealed that he paid little attention to them and trusted that his executive leadership team would do the eyes-on work. He continued to stress that the intelligence he was receiving prior to the arrival of the Freedom Convoy in strength in Ottawa painted a picture of a protest movement that would last for a weekend before dispersing and possibly leaving a small remnant behind, that could be easily dealt with. No such intelligence picture was ever presented in the OPP Hendon reports which crossed his desk or in the one OPS intelligence report prepared on the eve of the arrival of the truck convoys in downtown Ottawa. If he ever received briefings to that effect, we have no documentary record of them. Despite all this, Sloly stuck to his view:

“In the totality…I do not recall, and to this day, even with the benefit of hindsight, I do not have any clear impression or saw any clear conclusion that we were going to have anything more than what I was being briefed on by my team—mainly Saturday-Sunday event with the potential for a smaller group to remain behind.” (October 28 testimony transcript, pp. 32-33)

In testimony, and in his witness statement for the Public Order Emergency Commission, Sloly clear felt that no blame attached to his own intelligence section. He said at one point “we had excellent intelligence.” He called the intelligence support received from the OPP (Hendon) “particularly excellent.” (October 28 testimony transcript. p. 39) For Sloly the problem existed at a higher, national level.

Forgive an editorial interdiction at this point—I think it is fair to say that whatever one thinks of Sloly’s unwillingness to see the intelligence problems rooted in his own organization, and they are deeply problematic—his view of what he called a “structural deficit” in national intelligence is worth paying heed to. My own view is that this was not just an effort to deflect blame, but a genuine concern.

That concern was based on his experience during the Freedom Convoy where he claimed that he never received intelligence assessments on a regular basis from the federal national security and intelligence community. (October 28 testimony transcript, p. 39) He thought that while the OPP had done an excellent job, it was really a federal responsibility. He wanted to see what he described as an:

“investment in our national intelligence threat risk assessment structure organizationally, institutionally, through integrated organizations and institutions.” (October 28 testimony transcript, p. 40)

He called this a necessary piece of work to bring Canada “truly into the 21st century.” His witness interview summary talked about his view that “something has changed in our democratic fabric and we do not have the legislation or the resources to manage such situations.” He also described what he regarded as an “excessive focus on Islamist extremism at the expense of other threats in Canada’s national security.”

In his specific recommendations for the Commission former Chief Sloly included three areas directly bearing on national security reform. Sloly believed there needed to be a new “nationals security framework (specifically for CSIS)” in conjunction with a new framework for intelligence-led policing. He wanted to see investment in national security agencies and all police services and we wanted to government to step up to address “the increasing risks/harms associated to misinformation/disinformation campaigns, online radicalization to violence and societal polarization.”

https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/WTS.00000040.pdf?t=1668014606

Former Chief Sloly did not attempt to provide a more granular picture of what this would all mean. But he draws important attention to intelligence governance issues, including a better alignment between federal agencies and police forces, the need for a new mandate for CSIS, the importance of improving the Canadian capacity for threat assessment, the need for new resources. In sum, he was suggesting that the national security and intelligence system needed a major overhaul to respond to a altered political reality within Canada.

During former Chief Sloly’s two days on the stand he was defending his reputation, sometimes under brutal assault during cross-examination by counsel for his former employer, the Ottawa police service. If that effort sometimes clouded his view of intelligence deficiencies in his own service, that might be understandable. But Peter Sloly also gave the Commission important food for thought that ranged beyond the personal. That is to his credit and should not be wasted.

(For readers who want to explore from Chief;’s Sloly’s witness interview summary and his testimony, you can find it on the Public Order Emergency Commission website as follows:

Chief Sloly’s witness interview summary, WTS.00000040

https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/WTS.00000040.pdf?t=1668014606

Sloly testimony October 28, 2022, video and transcript:

https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/public-hearings/day-12-october-28/

Sloly testimony October 31, 2022, video and transcript:

https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/public-hearings/day-13-october-31/