The Freedom Convoy: OPS’s terrible intelligence failure

Warnings were in plain sight. They were ignored.

Canada has experienced a number of very significant Royal commissions and judicial inquiries into the conduct of national security and intelligence agencies over the past eight decades. These date back to the Gouzenko royal commission in 1946, which investigated allegations of espionage by Canadians on behalf of the Soviet Union during World War Two. As the Rouleau Commission (Public Order Emergency Commission) increasingly comes to focus on intelligence issues in its examination of why and how the federal government used the Emergencies Act legislation, it is taking its place as the latest inquiry in this long line. Embedded in this lineage is a Commission--the McDonald Commission--which, although it conducted its work four decades ago, continues to speak to us. One key finding of the McDonald Commission, which was instrumental in stripping the RCMP of its responsibilities for security intelligence and in creating a new civilian intelligence service, CSIS, was that a paramilitary police force like the RCMP was ill-suited to conducting sensitive intelligence gathering and analysis about movements of dissent and attendant national security risks in Canada. It lacked the training, talent, and cultural perspectives for the work.

This judgement has come back to haunt us in considering the role played by the Ottawa Police Service in attempting to assess the threat posed by the so-called “Freedom Convoy” as it bore down with its flotilla of trucks on Canada’s national capital.

Striking evidence of the failure of the Ottawa Police Service’s intelligence efforts is now crystal -clear in documents and testimony provided to the Rouleau Commission.  The star witness to this debacle was the Ottawa Police Service (OPS) then Deputy Chief, Steve Bell, who was in charge of the police intelligence bureau during the events of the so-called “Freedom Convoy.” He testified to the Public Order Emergency Commission in a day-long session on October 24.  

Despite evidence presented prior to Deputy Chief Bell’s testimony, about some prescient threat intelligence on the convoy generated by the Ontario Provincial Province’s intelligence bureau, (see my earlier columns: “Project Hendon Revealed: OPP Intelligence on the ‘Freedom Convoy’ protests,” October 24; and “Project Hendon Revealed,” an addendum, also posted on October 24), the Deputy Chief doubled down in his defence of the OPS intelligence outlook, notably the idea that the best intelligence indicated that the Freedom Convoy protesters, despite travelling in considerable numbers in truck convoys from numerous points across the country, would simply stay for a weekend and then vanish out of the city. This was in line with another piece of naivete, namely that all signs were that the Freedom Convoy would be engaged in a purely lawful protest.

There are several sworn statements made by Deputy Chief Bell during his testimony, that encapsulate his view of what the intelligence said about the likely longevity of the Freedom Convoy protest:

“Predominantly the intelligence identified it [The Freedom Convoy] as a three-day event” (testimony transcript p. 30, https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/documents/Transcripts/POEC-Public-Hearings-Volume-8-October-24-2022.pdf)

“the specifics around the three day event are very clear as it moves ahead.” (transcript, p. 31, https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/documents/Transcripts/POEC-Public-Hearings-Volume-8-October-24-2022.pdf)

“based on our experience…and our assessment, there was a low risk of the convoy in large numbers staying beyond the weekend.” (transcript, p. 42, https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/documents/Transcripts/POEC-Public-Hearings-Volume-8-October-24-2022.pdf)

“our view that it was going to be a –largely a three day protest” (transcript p. 45, https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/documents/Transcripts/POEC-Public-Hearings-Volume-8-October-24-2022.pdf)

“as I read these reports my impression was that they were largely scaled to around a three day event” (transcript p. 128, https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/documents/Transcripts/POEC-Public-Hearings-Volume-8-October-24-2022.pdf)

While mainstream media has done a commendable job of summarizing key points in the testimony of individuals who have appeared before the Commission, understanding the OPS intelligence failure requires a deeper dive into the records. This is, of course, an invitation to dive down the evidentiary rabbit hole with me. I hope some of you will. The object of the dive is to determine whether there was any intelligence reporting that supported the idea that the “Freedom Convoy” protest would only last for a weekend, as Deputy Chief Bell repeatedly testified.

Let’s start with two facts. The first is that Deputy Chief Bell, who was newly arrived in his position (as of December 2021), was unaware of OPP Hendon intelligence reporting until January 27. This was a product of the fact that his team had failed to tell him about them. Once informed he did not go back to the earlier reports that he had missed. The second fact is that the OPS “Security Intelligence Section” was only able to produce one report prior to the so-called “Freedom Convoy” descending to gridlock Ottawa—an operation which it called “Bear Hug.” The date of this report was Friday, January 28, at which point protest convoy elements were already beginning to arrive in the capital.

Let’s begin with the stream of reporting from the OPP up until January 27, all unknown to Deputy Chief Bell (but available to his small intelligence unit) and what it described.

Between the start of OPP intelligence reporting on the “Freedom Convoy” and January 27, the Commission has identified seven OPP intelligence reports.  Some of these are “Project Hendon Strategic Overviews;” some are OPP Situation reports/Situation Awareness bulletins.

The very first was a Project Hendon Strategic Intelligence Overview, produced on January 13 https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/OPP00001600.pdf?t=1667183562 This report identified a new plan to stage a “mass convoy” to Ottawa with the objective of “putting the fear of god in politicians” and bringing about an end to all COVID-19 health measures. The OPP report indicated that while there was no specific credible threat regarding the use of violence by the protest movement, “monitoring remains attuned to where ideologically motivated extremism may manifest among some supporters.” The report suggested that additional intelligence methods may need to be applied to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of the “Patriot Movement” at the heart of the convoy plan and other protest activities. This was a very non-specific intelligence report, reflecting the fact that the actual “Freedom Convoy” had not yet taken concrete shape and begun to roll.  What it did provide was a degree of early warning.

One week later, on January 20, a second Hendon report was issued, this time with a singular focus on the “Freedom Convoy.” https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/OPP00001028.pdf?t=1667183670

 It noted that the Freedom Convoy truck protest was scheduled to arrive in Ottawa on January 29—which was largely accurate.  The Hendon report further noted a division in approach among convoy actors over a lawful and peaceful protest versus the adoption of “more aggressive tactics.” Open-source intelligence identified some social media posts indicating that the Freedom Convoy when it arrived in Ottawa will “surround and block access to the City of Ottawa and to Parliament.” It further noted, in a partially redacted passage, that “there does not appear to be an exit strategy for departing Ottawa: the intent appears to remain in Ottawa until all COVID-19 related mandates and restrictions are lifted.”

The January 20 Hendon report made clear that it couldn’t  predict the number of vehicles or individuals supporting the Freedom Convoy, but did draw attention to the success of the convoy fund-raising effort and the possibility that this would translate into greater than expected “real-life support.” The report concluded with a telling passage:

“Although the stated intent of some convoy organizers is to remain at Parliament Hill until the government rescinds all COVID-19 related restrictions and mandates, this goal is likely to prove unrealistic in the long term. However, even a small number of tractor trailers parked at Parliament Hill will almost certainly be disruptive in the short term.” There was no attempt here to predict the time frame of the Ottawa protest; equally there was no suggestion whatsoever that it would last only a weekend.

A string of five additional OPP Hendon intelligence reports (Situation reports/Situational Awareness Bulletin)  were generated between Sunday, January 23 and Thursday, January 27. These were largely tactical reports but each included a more strategic assessment section.  The assessment portion of the January 23rd report again noted a possible divide between truckers supportive of a lawful protest and what it called “ideologically driven opportunists.” https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/OPP00001476.pdf?t=1667183788  It now indicated that a part of the convoy was scheduled to arrive in Ottawa on Friday, January 28. It noted that “national organizer from Alberta will be travelling with a command post, media and security detail,” a clear reference to the degree of organization involved. Many intelligence gaps were listed, including with respect to participant numbers, specific plans for Ottawa and, notably, “plans for any further action should demands not be met; and plans for departing Ottawa.”

Deputy Chief Bell tripped over himself during cross-examination by both Commission counsel and counsel for the OPP in testifying that there was the possibility of a “subjective interpretation” of the meaning of these intelligence gaps and that a clear, common understanding was somehow missing. (testimony transcript, p. 128, https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/documents/Transcripts/POEC-Public-Hearings-Volume-8-October-24-2022.pdf)  But an intelligence gap is just that—a gap in knowledge, not an affirmation that the protest movement’s stay in Ottawa would be for one weekend. The Deputy Chief, despite being pressed by OPP counsel, was unable to identify any intelligence report that indicated that the Freedom Convoy protest would last only one weekend. He fudged this by reference to a general experience with protest movements, while at the same time insisting that the Freedom Convoy was unique and something that OPS had no experience with (testimony transcript, p. 181, https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/documents/Transcripts/POEC-Public-Hearings-Volume-8-October-24-2022.pdf)

OPP intelligence reports continued during the week leading up to the arrival of truck convoys in Ottawa. As each day passed, more information was available about the size of the various convoys coming from the West, elsewhere in Ontario, and from Quebec. Information in the January 25 situation report from Regina police indicated that the eastbound convoy consisted of approximately 1200 trucks. https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/OPP00000805.pdf?t=1667184192 The Surete du Quebec passed on information from a convoy organizer that some 1000 to 1500 trucks would cross into Ontario on their way to Ottawa. A portion of the convoy travelling from Kingston, Ontario was predicted to be the first to arrive in Ottawa, with an ETA on Friday, January 28. The estimated fund-raising for the convoy through the online platform GoFundMe now totalled $4.4 million.

As before, OPP intelligence continued to suggest the presence of elements in the protest movement that could pose threats to public safety, alongside convoy organizer’s repeated statements that the protest would be lawful.  It also stressed again the absence of information about the protest plans for Ottawa, something it again identified as a serious intelligence gap. The report blamed that gap on the unwillingness of convoy organizers to share this information with the OPP. That was a hint that should have awoken concern in the ranks of OPS.

An OPP Situational Awareness bulletin on January 26 for police forces across the province put the available intelligence into stark form.  https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/OPP00001494.pdf?t=1667184363  I

It stated:

“Once in Ottawa, Freedom Convoy 2022 organizers have stated an intent to remain  at Parliament Hill until the Federal government concedes to repeal all COVID-19 public health restrictions and mandates. Organizers have indicated that they are planning to stage disruptions that may gridlock areas around Parliament buildings and parts of Ottawa.  There is no expressed departure date for when participants will disperse or the action will end” [Emphasis added]

A more expansive OPP intelligence report on the same day (https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/OPP00000811.pdf?t=1667184465  included a convoy vehicle count provided by OPP Provincial Liaison team regarding the convoy travelling eastward from the Manitoba border.   It numbered 471 vehicles by 1600 hours. The latest estimate count from the Surete du Quebec suggested a truck convoy coming from Quebec would consist of 400 vehicles.  A detailed breakdown of various rallying points for the Freedom Convoy protest in Ontario was provided.

The Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau continued to keep a close watch through intelligence sources, mostly using open source intelligence, for indications of possible violence, weapons carrying, and extremist rhetoric  by convoy participants.  In the assessment portion of the OPP report it noted that convoy organizers “will almost certainly have minimal influence or control over the behaviour of these individuals.” Weighing the available evidence of warning indicators, the report noted that “Project Hendon has not identified any concrete, specific or credible threat with regard to the Freedom Convoy.”

This brings us chronologically to the first Hendon report that the Ontario Police service’s Deputy Chief responsible for intelligence indicated he read—a situation report for January 27. https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/OPP00001331.pdf?t=1667184559  It included an estimated tally for the Freedom Convoy components as 551 vehicles (471 vehicles from the West), with many unknowns regarding convoys that had not yet departed their staging areas in Ontario.  The Hendon assessment as of this date was that “fringe elements” among the protest may “represent the greatest potential threat to public order and safety” and that such elements were likely beyond the control of convoy organizers. OPP intelligence was also concerned about the implications of heavy machinery in the convoy, noting that “the presence of this equipment in the convoy may indicate that some convoy participants intend to reinforce positions for long-term occupation in Ottawa; to block access to strategic locations; to damage property; to render roadways impassable; or to intimidate the public, government and law enforcement.” In other words, the Freedom Convoy could be weaponized.

The January 27 Hendon report also noted that tractor-trailer combinations in the various convoys descending on Ottawa could contain equipment that could support an extended stay in Ottawa. This was another unknown.  Other previously noted intelligence gaps remained, including convoy protest plans for Ottawa, “plans for any further action should demands not be met;” and “plans for departing Ottawa.”

One last Hendon report was issued prior to the first weekend of Freedom Convoy protest activity in Ottawa. https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/OPP00000815.pdf?t=1667184670  The Hendon situation report of Friday, January 28 continued to include estimates of total convoy protest vehicle numbers, which now amounted to 1352 with some unknowns. Imagery available to the OPP included a picture of a tractor trailer carrying a large boat with the message “JTs Ship is Sunk” alongside Nazi insignia. Also spray-painted on the side was the word “Castreau.”  The OPP report drolly noted “we infer these comments are directed at the Prime Minister.”

In its assessment section, the January 28 Hendon report stated:

“the available information indicates that the protestors plan to remain in Ottawa at least until 2022-02-04 [emphasis added]. We continue to identify indicators to support at least some protestors remaining beyond the weekend of 2022-01-29/30. These indicators include collecting donations of cash, food and water from supports along the route.”

This was the first known Hendon report that attempted to establish a minimum timeline for the Freedom Convoy protest—a minimum of one week, not Deputy Chief Bell’s one weekend.

OPP intelligence also noted the impacts of misinformation and disinformation on the Freedom Convoy, including conspiracy theories around orchestrated false flag operations and law enforcement efforts to impede the convoys, and false information about participation by American truck drivers and alleged broad support from indigenous peoples. OPP intelligence believed that it fed distrust of the government and police and “may result in defiance towards law enforcement in Ottawa or a disregard for the law and public order.”

Previous intelligence gaps remained, including on Freedom Convoy plans for further action if its demands for the repeal of all COVID-19 public health measures were not met; and regarding exit plans.

In the totality of OPP intelligence reporting prior to the first weekend of the Freedom Convoy’s occupation of downtown Ottawa there is not a single mention of any information suggesting the convoy would only be present in Ottawa for a weekend. Questions around what the Freedom Convoy protest would do if its demands were not met and when it might exit Ottawa were repeatedly cited as intelligence gaps.

On the same day as the Hendon report of January 28, the OPS “Security Intelligence Section” produced its one and only intelligence assessment on the Freedom Convoy prior to its arrival in full force in Ottawa. https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/OPS00004039.pdf?t=1667184970  That the OPS intelligence section struggled to put together even this single report is indicated by the fact that it went through three previous draft versions before it was published. I have discussed this intelligence assessment in a previous newsletter (see “To Be or Not to be Intelligence-Led,” October 26). I won’t repeat my comments here except to say that I found the report unprofessional, poorly written, lacking in substance, and alarmingly politicised, with clear indications that the writer was sympathetic towards the Freedom Convoy. Passages openly critical of the government for “strenuously ignoring the event; ”  media excerpts solely drawn from right wing commentators; and a description of the Freedom Convoy protests as “a truly organic grass roots movement that is gathering momentum largely from the widespread population,” are examples of a heavily politicised writing hand. The conclusions section of the report is completely redacted, which strikes me as suspicious and unwarranted.   Deputy Chief Bell described the report as a “very accurate assessment” (testimony transcript p. 25, https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/documents/Transcripts/POEC-Public-Hearings-Volume-8-October-24-2022.pdf )

The OPS report made no direct mention of any of the previous Hendon reports though it appeared to draw on Hendon reporting including in the statement that: “Convoy members appear to be stocking up on food and supplies which could indicate that they have long term plans to stay in Ottawa. “ This is the only mention in the report of any timeline  for the occupation.

In a section of the assessment titled “What this means for event planners,” the OPS report noted that the event is “likely going to be bigger in crowd size than any demo in recent history, possibly on part with Canada Day events but more disruptive.” It also suggested what it called “significant popular support…on a scale not seen in recent years,” with resulting disorganization and confusion in the protest ranks.

The bottom line is that even the OPS’s own intelligence unit made no prediction that the Freedom Convoy would only occupy Ottawa for a single weekend. For OPS intelligence, like its OPP counterpart, this was an intelligence gap.

An express statement on the absence of any intelligence on the duration  of the Freedom Convoy protest made its way into the OPS’s initial “Special Event Operational Plan, dated Friday, January 28.  https://publicorderemergencycommission.ca/files/exhibits/OPP00004262.pdf?t=1667185098

It stated that:

“Current intelligence is not clear on the duration of the event.  The plan will address the first two days of operation and is adaptable so that it can continue into additional dates.” (p. 11)

The OPS Security Intelligence Section assessment findings were replicated in the Operational plan, stressing the anticipated “vast number of vehicles,”  the ability of the Freedom Convoy to “stop and effectively shut down movement if they desire,” and its alleged “truly grass roots” nature. (pp. 7-8)

When the OPS Operational Plan met its “enemy,” it was quickly rendered ineffective and futile. The supposed “adaptability” of the plan was not scaled to the actual protest and its activities and the result was that OPS was quickly overwhelmed on the first weekend of the Freedom Convoy occupation.  The Ottawa Police Service suffered what would have been considered in a military context as a ”surprise attack.”

It was a surprise predicated on a failure of intelligence, notably a failure to recognize the likely longevity and disruptive impacts of the Freedom Convoy, masked by an OPS belief  that this was both an unprecedented “grass-roots” movement and one that would behave according to an experiential pattern exhibited by previous large demonstrations—e.g. that it would arrive, demonstrate peacefully, and leave quickly. There was simply no intelligence to support the notion that the duration of the Freedom Convoy would last only for a weekend and lots of intelligence reporting that strongly and ominously suggested the opposite.

The OPS leadership simply did not want to believe and, instead, embraced a “best case” scenario.

Ultimately the Rouleau Commission will write the first draft of the history of the Freedom Convoy. Its findings cannot be anticipated. But if we are keeping a scorecard to date, it would indicate that while OPP intelligence contained many useful warning indicators about the Freedom Convoy, the Ottawa Police were badly served by a very poor intelligence effort, which for reasons unknown was unable or unwilling to take full advantage of the OPP’s Hendon reports.

But there is much still to learn. How did the federal government’s national security and intelligence apparatus view the threat posed by the Freedom Convoy? How did its reporting influence the decision by the government to invoke the Emergencies Act? On those questions we await the testimony of federal officials and Ministers in the weeks to come.