The Israeli defence forces (IDF) are on the brink of a much-anticipated ground offensive into the Gaza strip. The earliest signs of this offensive, which is likely to be long-running, consisted, according to Israeli sources, of raids by infantry units supported by tanks to target Hamas rocket-launching sites and collect further intelligence on the location of hostages taken by Hamas.
This will be the first ground operation targeting the Gaza strip since 2014, when Israel mounted a 50-day long attack called “Operation Protective Edge.” A more recent assault by Israeli forces, conducted in 2021, “Operation Guardian of the Wall,” involved air strikes only, and was mounted in retaliation for major rocket attacks by Hamas on Israeli cities. It is worth noting that in the 2021 air attack, Israel targeted, in particular, the network of tunnels that Hamas had constructed to facilitate its military operations, destroying, it was reported, some 60 miles of tunnels. Commentators at the time felt that Israel had seriously eroded Hamas’ military strength. See, for example, this podcast featuring experts from Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies:
https://www.inss.org.il/subjects_tags/guardianofthewalls/
The events of the current war suggest that optimism was profoundly misplaced.
Although nearly a decade has elapsed since the last ground offensive by Israel into the Gaza strip, there are some important indicators from Operation Protective Edge that are worth keeping mind, as the current war starts to unfold.
First, a basic description.
Operation Protective Edge consisted of three phases: an initial Israeli air offensive against targets in the Gaza Strip, which lasted for 8 days, from July 8-16, 2014. This was followed by a limited ground incursion by the IDF, for which 75,000 reservists were mobilized and the equivalent of three Israeli divisions (a combination of infantry, armour and paratroop brigades) were deployed. The primary aim of the ground incursion was to destroy Hamas cross-border tunnel infrastructure. The IDF faced some fierce pockets of resistance and suffered some 66 military casualties.
Casualties on the Palestinian side are disputed. The UN estimated that there were 2133 deaths, of whom it believed 1489 were civilians. Israeli figures were 1598 Palestinian fatalities of who it asserted 75% were combatants. The U.N. also calculated that fully a half-million Palestinians were internally displaced in Gaza.
A final phase of the conflict involved temporary ceasefires interrupted by Israeli air strikes and rocket fire by Hamas. The IDF estimated that in total some 4500 rockets were fired into Israel during the conflict. The conflict ended after 50 days in late August 2014 as a result of an Egyptian-brokered truce.
For an excellent summary of the 2014 war see, the RAND brief:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9975.html
There are four observations that can be drawn from the 2014 war that may pertain to the present.
One is the unfolding of a multi-phase conflict, beginning with air strikes, followed by a ground incursion, followed by an eventual brokered peace. This looks set to be the pattern in 2023, although the times lines may be vastly different and the shape of “peace” is difficult to imagine at this stage.
A second is the significance of the Hamas tunnel infrastructure as a military target. There can be no doubt that the Israeli ground incursion into Gaza in 2023 will also focus on tunnels as key nodes for surreptitious movement by Hamas militants, weapons supplies, rocket launch enabling, and command and control of Hamas operations. As in 2014, air strikes alone cannot disable the Hamas tunnel complex.
The third is the fierce resistance that the IDF encountered in some of its incursions into Gaza. There is no reason to think the fighting will be any less fierce in 2023.
A fourth is the international debate over high casualty figures, civilian suffering, and internal displacement in Gaza occasioned by the Israeli air and ground attacks. Expect a repeat, and for pressure to mount on Israel as Palestinian casualty figures and suffering grow.
But what might be different in 2023?
For one thing there is the altered military and political context. While Hamas has long been Israel’s sworn enemy, in previous wars with Hamas Israel sought to target and eliminate Hamas leaders, degrade Hamas military capabilities, and punish it so that it would be deterred from launching future strikes. It did not seek to destroy Hamas, fearing what might emerge in its place.
This time, stung by the unprecedented brutality of the Hamas cross-border attacks, the Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu, now supported by a “war cabinet” including opposition politicians, has vowed the complete elimination of Hamas. The Israelis have also mobilised on a much larger scale, calling up some 360,000 reservists, compared to the 57,000 involved in 2014. The Israel demand that Gazans leave the northern half of the Gaza strip and flee to the south for protection, suggests a far more wide-ranging military incursion than took place in 2014. The Israeli military invasion will not be fixed around rescue of hostages seized by Hamas, but the fate of hostages will play a key role in the unfolding of the war. It will be an important pulse.
There will be four important unknowns as any battle unfolds in the Gazan urban space. One will be how well-stocked and capable Hamas proves in the use of drones, both for attack and for reconnaissance. Drones were not a feature of the 2014 contest so this is a true unknown.
One video compilation, put together by CNN based on Hamas footage, shows the use of armed drones against Israeli tanks at the border during the initial Hamas attack.
https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/08/middleeast/hamas-videos-visual-timeline/index.html
Whether Hamas can blunt an Israeli armoured assault using drones will be a key question.
A second unknown involves the question of how well protected Israeli armour, including its main battle Merkava tanks and armoured personnel carriers, proves to be in the face of inevitable use by Hamas of a full arsenal of anti-tank and anti-armour weapons. The performance of what are called “Advanced Protective systems” (APS) to provide defences for Israeli armour will be severely tested. APS involves a complex system of sensors, tracking radar, soft counter-measures (deflective devices) and hard counter-measure (generally rapid-launch munitions to explode incoming rounds before they can do serious damage). How well Israeli systems will stack up, especially in an urban environment that might blunt some of their capabilities, will be a key battle factor.
A third involves Israeli intelligence. Can it recover from the failure that allowed Hamas to mount a massive surprise attack? Does it have the collection and analytic sources it will need to successfully prosecute a war against Hamas, while trying to rescue hostages? Will it be trusted by hard-pressed IDF units.
A final factor involves combat morale. The 2023 war between Israel and Hamas will see the most intense fighting ever between these two foes. Hamas is fighting for its existence on its home turf. The IDF, its regular force and its reservists, are fighting to avenge the bloody losses incurred by the Hamas assault and know that the very future of Israel may be on the line. At the outset, the morale factor is likely to favour the Israelis. But as the war drags on, that morale edge will be tested.
As John Spencer writes in his analysis for the Modern War Institute at West Point, “war is a contest of wills. That includes the will of individual soldiers to fight, of politicians to continue a military operation, and of populations to support the political decision to continue fighting.”
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/these-are-the-challenges-awaiting-israeli-ground-forces-in-gaza/
A ground war in the Gaza Strip will test the will not just of Israelis and of Hamas; but of the world. It will certainly test the willingness of Gazans and Palestinians living outside Gaza to continue to support the war aims of an unelected regime that has brought hell down on their heads, not for the first time, but perhaps for the last.
The barbarity of Hamas has destroyed any chance for a two state solution anytime soon, perhaps if ever, and put its own suffering people in even more peril. This ground war will kill so many innocent people. On both sides. A repeat of 2014. If Hamas is destroyed, as it probably should be but in a different way, will something else take its place?
This is all just so depressing.
As ye sow, so shall ye reap. Maybe Israel (and Bibi) will take time to reflect upon the monster they helped creat in Hamas, because it couldn't stand the thought of Arafat succeeding in peace talks!