The GSRP – a key diplomatic tool in complex times

A Must Read Guest Column on The Global Security Reporting Program

Dear Readers:

I am delighted to be able to offer you this informed column by Artur Wilczynski. I believe it makes an important contribution to an understanding about the nature of the GSRP.

Here is a short bio for Mr. Wilczynski:

After a more than 30 year career in the federal government, Artur retired as an Assistant Deputy Minister from the Communications Security Establishment in 2022, where he also served  as Associate Deputy Chief SIGINT and Director General Intelligence Operations. Prior to joining CSE, he served as Canada’s Ambassador to Norway, Director General Security and Intelligence at GAC, and Director General International Affairs and Border Policy at Public Safety Canada. 

Artur Wilczynski writes:

In 2010, I joined the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade as the new Director General for Security and Intelligence. I came to diplomacy after years in international relations in other departments – notably Public Safety and Canadian Heritage.  When I started at DFAIT – later DFATD and now GAC – I quickly worked with, knew and respected the Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP) team for its professionalism and its valuable diplomatic reporting.

From 2014 until my appointment as Ambassador to Norway in 2018, the GSRP reported to me as Director General. It was part of a division that also prepared mission threat and risk assessments, and distributed reporting by domestic and international partners to consumers across the Department. It was part of a broader Directorate that included divisions responsible for NATO relations, international crime and terrorism, as well as those responsible for mission security.

There has been much written about the GSRP over the past number of weeks. Several elements have been critical, and others positive. Public discussion about our diplomatic and intelligence capabilities is essential yet does not happen often enough. Transparency is a key principle in effective public policy. Canadians deserve and need to know more about what is being done on their behalf. The challenge with the conversation about the GSRP is that some of the comments in the public domain have been inaccurate and misleading. Some of them dangerously so.

What is true is that GSRP reporting is valued by partners and allies – including the Five Eyes. What has been misleading is that partners value this reporting because they see it as a form of “foreign intelligence”. Foreign intelligence is a term of art that refers to a series of processes associated with covert collection and tradecraft. The GSRP does not fit in that category.

GSRP diplomatic reporting is valued precisely because it is not foreign intelligence. The diplomatic nature of the engagement, the range of contacts, the transparency of the work, and the diversity of the themes make GSRP reporting unlike the foreign intelligence Canada and most of our allies and partners already have access to.

For countries like the United States, the United Kingdom and others that have robust foreign human intelligence capabilities, they do not need access to Canadian material that would replicate what they already have access to.  They value what distinguishes GSRP reporting - its diplomatic nature and tone.  The reporting was also valued by colleagues across the Canadian public service – from organizations like CSIS, CSE and Public Safety - to others with an interest in a wide range of security issues.

While I acknowledge it has been almost a decade since I had regular engagement with the GSRP, I remember them as a cohort of experienced diplomats. They were Foreign Service Officers from the political stream who had deep knowledge and experience living in challenging places around the world. When posted in hostile environments, they received appropriate training to support their personal and mission security. They were in regular contact with their management chain to ensure they followed established policy and protocols.  We had a specific duty of care for our team and we implemented it rigorously.

GSRP officers did not manage “sources” the way HUMINT officers do.  There is no intelligence “tradecraft” associated with meeting key contacts on behalf of an embassy.  There was no “tasking” of a source to acquire specific information covertly or clandestinely. To imply that is what they did – as some have – is wrong and dangerous.

GSRP officers held open meetings with academics, journalists, government officials and others whose roles, experiences and perspectives were interesting and would help Canada understand the specific contexts of the countries they were accredited to.  The nature of the work is the standard fare of diplomats and very different from what intelligence officers charged with collecting HUMINT would do.

The fact some in Canada have implied the GSRP are a crude and cheap version of a foreign HUMINT service is dangerous. This implication risks changing the way some perceive these officers. That change in perception makes their engagement more challenging. It provides propaganda cover to the Peoples Republic of China in particular, by post-facto asserting that the work of the GSRP is a form of intelligence collection when it was simple, overt, transparent diplomatic reporting. The implication provides cover to a PRC that recklessly takes hostages as a form of intimidation and harassment to achieve its objectives aggressively and illegally. They do so opportunistically and rationalize it using false claims of spying.

The fact that some former Canadian intelligence officers are willing to provide the PRC with that cover is deeply irresponsible. It demonstrates a lack of understanding of the GSRP specifically and shows a naivete about geopolitics. They have helped hostile state actors rationalize their illegal activities. That is not in Canada’s interest.

From a management perspective, I was often drawn into conversations with Heads of Missions because they would take GSRP officers off their mandated tasks to do general mission work. Ambassadors had to be reminded about the reason the program was created in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks. There was a desperate need for diplomatic reporting on a wide range of security issues. Canada created the program because it needed to close that gap.  The GSRP met Canada’s needs and was welcomed by key friends and allies.

What I don’t recall having to manage are incidents when host governments objected to the work of accredited GSRP officers.  I was never brought to a meeting with foreign Ambassadors or their foreign ministries to be cautioned about the activities of our missions. Our officers were not declared persona non grata.  Their work was always consistent with that of diplomatic officers as outlined in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations – in particular Article 3 on the functions of a diplomatic mission. I also never had meetings with allied foreign ministries and other partners where they warned us that the work of the GSRP was being interpreted as hostile intelligence gathering.

To imply that sophisticated intelligence actors in countries such as China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere could not tell the difference between a diplomat and foreign intelligence officer is laughable.  They know who does what and as diplomats we always need to assume that they do. That assumption and the transparency of the work was essential in managing the risk of the GSRP’s work. 

That said, all work can and must be consistently reviewed and improved. I welcome it. It is an essential component of management.  Oversight and review are fundamental to effectively manage complex programs and their risks.  Organizations such as NSIRA or NSICOP were not in existence when I was the Director General. Having them look at the work of the GSRP and provide informed advice and guidance to help improve various aspects is essential.

Ministers and senior officials – Deputy Ministers, ADMs, DGs – all need to look closely at programs such as the GSRP to ensure that it continually adapts to changing needs and an evolving threat and risk environment. That is key to exercising our duty of care for our officers and for any contacts they meet with.  Discussions we have about programs like the GSRP and other security or intelligence related matters must be rooted in accurate information. For this to happen, we need Global Affairs, PCO, Public Safety agencies such as CSIS, CSE and National Defence to be far more transparent with Canadians.

Transparency helps the security and intelligence enterprise gain confidence and support from the public. Canadians need to know how we work to achieve key objectives in the national interest – whether that is the scope of our diplomatic reporting or the potential need for a separate foreign intelligence HUMINT agency. Without that public scrutiny and debate, we risk stagnating our efforts and undermining the pursuit of our own interests on the global stage.

The GSRP has contributed to Canada understanding the complexity of the global security environment. For me it is an indispensable tool that provided insight and information that was beneficial to advancing Canadian interests.  I hope it continues to perform its functions as it adapts to Canada’s evolving needs and to the complexities of a challenging global environment. I know it will continue to do so in a manner that appropriately manages the risks to our diplomats and to the people they meet around the world. Let us have informed debates about our diplomatic and intelligence tools to make sure we Canada can meet the challenges we face.