This article was published by the Globe and Mail as an Op Ed on November 23, 2023:
One of the most damaging official secrets cases in Canadian history has come to an end. Cameron Ortis, a senior civilian member of the RCMP, who headed an intelligence analysis unit that reported to RCMP top brass, has been found guilty of passing “special operational information,” sensitive intelligence reports, to Canadian organized crime figures. His sentencing hearing will be held in early January and it is likely that the 51-year old Mr. Ortis will face a very lengthy prison sentence.
There was much at stake in the trial, the first ever since the passage of a revised Security of Information Act in 2001, and the first in decades to be decided by a jury. Could a complex case be handled by the Canadian criminal justice system in an expeditious way? Would evidence be withheld from the jury because of secrecy concerns to an extent that could jeopardize a fair trial? Could a lay jury with little knowledge of the secret world of intelligence and national security make sense of the reams of evidence before them? The outcome of the trial suggests that the Canadian judicial system passed this extraordinary test.
For Canada’s intelligence and law enforcement partners, who share national security concerns about transnational organized crime, money laundering and possible terrorism linkages (Iran lurked in the background of this case), the Ortis trial had Canada on trial. Could it successfully prosecute an insider threat who had spilled the secrets of Five Eyes allies? If not, could Canada be trusted as an intelligence and law enforcement partner in the future?
Even with the successful outcome of the trial, that trust relationship will remain fragile, while the RCMP works to improve its internal security. A sweeping review of RCMP security practices conducted after Mr. Ortis’s arrest in September 2019 found a litany of problems and a real absence of a security culture in the Mounties. It even went so far as to suggest that all kinds of warning signs about the threat posed by Mr. Ortis were overlooked or not reported.
The Ortis case has not only exposed internal security problems in the RCMP, it has also done grave damage to efforts to improve the RCMP’s use of intelligence in its policing endeavours, particularly on complex national security threats (serious organized crime, cyber crime, financial crime and terrorism). It has furthered the cultural divide between uniformed and civilian members of the Mounties. Great trust and high expectations were placed by RCMP senior leadership, from the commissioner on down, in the fast-rising Cameron Ortis. Future civilian talent and high-flyers may be dogged by the Ortis saga.
The Ortis case may give impetus to a decision looming over the Mounties. Should its federal policing mandate (including national security threats) be separated out entirely from contract policing in Canada’s provinces and territories, duties that form the bulk of the RCMP’s current mission? A recent report from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians has urged the Minister of Public Safety, Dominic LeBlanc, to give this possibility serious consideration. It would be a huge shake-up, for which the federal government, in its current embattled state, may not have the appetite or attention span for.
One thing the trial outcome has not resolved, is why Mr. Ortis did it? Why leak sensitive intelligence to organized crime figures and enable them to evade law enforcement? No money changed hands at the time and his effort, which he called “Project Nudge,” wound down in months from its inception in 2015. But allegations presented at his bail hearing in October 2019 and previously covered by a publication ban, now lifted, suggested that Mr. Ortis was not done with damaging plans to leak secrets and “was on the cusp,” at the time of his arrest in September 2019, of turning to a foreign state. These allegations were not tested at Mr. Ortis’ trial, and a decision was taken to drop charges referring to them because of the sensitivity of the intelligence involved.
The why matters, as the RCMP tries to fix its internal security problems and be better postured to deal with so-called “insider threats.” The study of the Ortis case will have to continue even after he is behind bars.
At a personal level, the Ortis case can be seen as pure tragedy, as a colleague of mine who knew him well has suggested. There is no question that Cameron Ortis was the kind of talent that the RCMP needs to pursue its complex national security mission. He understood the value of intelligence reporting. He won the trust and praise of his superiors. Smart, hard-working, innovative. Now that has been thrown away and the path will be harder for future generations of national security crime-fighters.
A very sad story, indeed. I wonder if his motivation will ever be fully understood. What a waste of an obviously brilliant and talented mind. Great reporting on this, Wesley.
Prof Wark, as always, highlights a number of salient points.
The structural conflicts between the practice and cultures of intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination (CSIS) and federal policing (RCMP) remain complex. Why our British allies have succeeded in this regard with Special Branch working hand in hand with the Security Service (MI-5) and we have often failed in our framework alludes me.
And if one adds GAC’s apparently failed return to the intelligence domain after losing the bulk of their assets to the PCO’s IAS decades ago and we have what appears to be a perpetual comedy of errors. How sad for a G7, 5 eyes (still), NATO (barely) nation!