What is foreign interference anyway?
Or, the Foreign Interference Commission reaches for its dictionary.
The Foreign Interference Commission opened its current round of public hearings on March 27 with a dictionary dive. I suspect Commission lawyers saw this as a helpful exercise in educating the lay public about the meaning of foreign interference. The oral presentation on “Definitions of Key Terms in the Commission’s Terms of Reference,” came with a document posted to the Commission website that consisted of brightly coloured graphics and minimal text. FI 101 for the masses, or something you could send out into deep space for future reading by who knows what. It could have used, perhaps, a few emojis. [1]
But hidden behind the crayon colours, Venn diagram bubbles and easy to grasp symbols, there is a real definitional issue at play. What does the Commission mean by foreign interference and why?
A starting point might be the Commission’s terms of reference, which reflect the twin objectives of the inquiry. [2] One objective has a clear definitional face, involving the potential impact of foreign interference on electoral processes in the general elections in 2019 and 2021. This constitutes the first phase of the Commission’s work, on which the Commission must report by May 3.
Where much greater ambiguity potentially arises is with respect to phase two of the inquiry, which runs until December 2024, and is meant to focus on the Government of Canada’s capacity to respond to:
“any form of foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada’s democratic processes…” [3]
Do these references to “any form of foreign interference” and the targeting of Canada’s “democratic processes” open up a much bigger playing field than election interference? That is the question. Let’s see what the FI Commission offers as an answer.
The overview report begins by canvassing the ways foreign interference is defined by our key national security and intelligence agencies.
There is reference to the CSIS Act section 2, which lists among its threats to the security of Canada:
“foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to the security of Canada.”
There is no similar definition in the CSE act, which governs the activities of Canada’s cryptologic agency (cyber espionage and cyber security), but CSE uses a variation of the CSIS act, with somewhat different wording, highlighting threats to Canada’s “democratic process,” and adding in, probably unnecessarily, that a foreign actor will be pursuing a “strategic objective.”
Then there is a reference to a working definition by Public Safety Canada, the department to which CSIS reports (CSE reports to the Minister of National Defence). Public Safety is meant to serve as a national security policy making hub, so its views matter. Its definition of foreign interference, as presented by the Commission, is a little offside by adding in an economic security dimension, including concerns about the theft of intellectual property and research, and “imposing market conditions to gain an advantage over Canada”—a pretty big basket that could extend to include the weaponization of supply chains and foreign investment practices in Canada.
So, already the definition begins to sprawl and stretch.
Then there is one main national security actor whose definitional approach to foreign interference is curiously missing from the Commission overview—the RCMP. Public statements made by the RCMP that have accompanied the recent laying of charges indicate very clearly that the RCMP considers espionage, including impacts on economic security, a main form of foreign interference.
On November 14, 2022, the RCMP announced charges against an individual employed in a research capacity by Hydro-Quebec for “obtaining trade secrets to benefit the People’s Republic of China, to the detriment of Canada’s economic interests.” The statement goes on to say that: “the RCMP has a mandate to detect and disrupt foreign interference attempts. It investigates activities by and for foreign actors that pose a risk to Canadian institutions and the economy.” [4]
Less than a year later, in July 2023, the RCMP announced charges against a former Mountie, William Majcher, who “allegedly used his knowledge and extensive network of contacts in Canada to obtain intelligence or services of benefit to the People’s Republic of China.” The RCMP statement about foreign interference in this case noted that “the use of these kinds of covert and unofficial operations in Canada by persons mandated by a foreign state is likely to undermine Canada’s democratic and judicial processes and threaten Canada’s sovereignty.” [5]
While the FI Commission report omits altogether any mention of an operational definition of foreign interference used by the Mounties, it only partly captures the views of another key government actor, Global Affairs. Global Affairs hosts the secretariat for the G7 “rapid response mechanism,” (RRM) focused on understanding and coordinating a response to foreign state-sponsored disinformation. In August 2022, in reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a dedicated Eastern European unit was added to the RRM to detect Russian disinformation about the war it had launched.
The RRM disinformation effort is built into Global Affairs’ own definition of foreign interference:
“the attempt to covertly influence, intimidate, manipulate, interfere, corrupt or discredit individuals, organizations and governments. It’s an attempt to further the interests of a foreign country over the views of its citizens. Activities can be carried out by both state and non-state actors. It differs from normal diplomatic conduct because of its deceptive and clandestine nature.” [6]
These key definitions of foreign interference, canvassed (or in the case of RCMP not canvassed) point to a broad understanding of the threats it poses, that range beyond threats to elections: threats to “the interests of Canada” impacting on Canada’s national security (CSIS Act); to economic security (Public Safety); to espionage (RCMP); threats of informational warfare conducted against individuals, organizations and government (GAC).
The FI Commission is not the first to be confronted with a tension between broad and narrow definitions of foreign interference.
In conducting its first-ever study of foreign interference in 2019, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians had to make a choice. In making that choice, unlike the FI Commission, it had the freedom to determine its own terms of reference. NSICOP acknowledged the variety of threats posed by foreign interference, including espionage, hostile economy activity and cyber aggression but “elected to focus the scope of its inquiry on traditional foreign interference.” [7] Unfortunately, NSICOP did not define what it meant by “traditional” foreign interference. By inference, its understanding of “traditional” was bounded by hostile foreign state efforts to gain political influence; to influence media reporting; to “in some cases…affect the outcome of elections;” and “coerce or induce diaspora communities to advance foreign interests in Canada.” It added a concern about foreign state activities targeting Canadian academic institutions. Its recommendations, largely ignored by the government at the time, included a plea that it should “examine and address the full range of institutional vulnerabilities targeted by hostile foreign states, including areas expressly omitted in the Committee’s review.”
Like the FI Commission, the Independent Special Rapporteur (ISR) also had a mandate and terms of reference to operate within. David Johnston, the appointed ISR, had a more focused and singular mandate than the FI Commission. His task was clearly directed at understanding the threat of foreign interference to Canada’s “electoral process” and reviewing the responses of the Federal Government to the threat posed by foreign interference to the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. [8] Johnston’s mandate was essentially repeated for phase one of the Foreign Interference commission’s work.
So where does all this leave us in understanding the approach the FI Commission will take to foreign interference, as it moves beyond its phase one study of potential impacts on the 2019 and 2021 general elections and engages with its examination of “any form of foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada’s democratic processes…”?
In the presentation by commission counsel on March 27, no reference is made to any tension between broad and narrow definitions of foreign interference, nor to any analysis of different statements on the foreign interference threat advanced by federal government agencies and departments. Nor is there any direct reference to the concept of a “traditional” understanding of the threat as advanced by NSICOP. No effort is made to think critically about what the scope of threats to “democratic processes” might entail. Instead there is simply a blithe assurance that the reference to threats to “democratic processes” in the terms of reference is “interchangeable” with threats to “democratic institutions.”
By this process, the FI Commission is choosing the narrow road of a repeat focus on threats to Canadian elections and to political parties and politicians as key actors. Attention will also be paid, as was the plan for the Independent Special Rapporteur, on threats to diaspora communities.
In many respects this is an understandable and predictable outcome. The FI Commission, after all, was the product of intense opposition pressure, of political bargaining between all the federal political parties to come up with an agreed terms of reference, of critical and sometimes sensational media reporting, all focused on potential electoral interference. Nowhere in its creation was there attention to the broad-based nature of threats posed by foreign interference.
A narrow approach is not only in its DNA at birth, it is also dictated by the very tight time-lines imposed on the Commission. Even with a greater willingness to interpret its terms of reference more creatively, the FI Commission would be able to make very little headway in the time available to it to explore in any depth such topics as espionage, threats to economic security, cyber attacks, and disinformation campaigns.
What the Commission must at least acknowledge is that foreign interference poses a range of dangers to Canada beyond a focus on intrusions into democratic electoral practices. It might even acknowledge that the dangers presented by aggressive espionage campaigns, intellectual property theft, efforts to undermine economic security, cyber attacks, and disinformation might, one and all, outstrip in seriousness that posed by foreign interference targeting our electoral processes. It could insist, in its own final report, that the full range of foreign interference threats be studied and reported on in detail.
Best case--light that torch, and pass it on.
[1] Foreign Interference Commission, Overview Report, “Definitions of Key Terms in the Commission’s Terms of Reference,” COM0000331, https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/foreign_interference_commission/Documents/Exhibits_and_Presentations/Presentations/1_-_Key_Terms_and_Definitions_Definitions_de_termes_cles.pdf
[2] Government of Canada, Order in Council, PC Number 2023-0882, https://orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=44169&lang=en
[3] FI Commission terms of reference, (i)(C), ibid
[4] RCMP, “Hydro-Quebec employee charged with espionage,” November 14, 2022, https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/news/2022/hydro-quebec-employee-charged-espionage
[5] RCMP, “Retired RCMP officer charged with foreign interference,” July 21, 2023, https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/news/2023/retired-rcmp-officer-charged-foreign-interference
[6] Global Affairs Canada, Rapid Response Mechanism, “Foreign Interference,” https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/rapid-response-mechanism-mecanisme-reponse-rapide/index.aspx?lang=eng
[7] National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, Annual Report 2019 [tabled March 2020], Chapter 2, “The Government Response to Foreign Interference,” paragraph 116, https://nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2020-03-12-ar/annual_report_2019_public_en.pdf
[8] Government of Canada, Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference—Terms of Reference, https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/independent-special-rapporteur/terms-conditions.html
When Russia interfered in the US election, people were named, indicted, prosecuted, convicted and jailed. In Canada, we have a Public Inquiry that will mostly not be in public and will probably not lead to any productive changes. No one will be named, charged, prosecuted or jailed.
When you layout all the different agencies looking at this issue, it sounds like we are able to see and report on FI. There seems to be no action on all this intelligence that we are not allowed to see. I guess we go with “Best case--light that torch, and pass it on.”
That is the bar of success now. Thanks for revealing all the info to date.