The CSIS Director spent a little over an hour testifying to the FI commission, in a special session on the morning of Friday, April 12, about a set of briefing notes prepared for high-level meetings in 2022 and 2023. No pants were set alight, but hockey skates became a surprise theme. [1]
One of the briefings was delivered to the PM and PMO on October 27, 2022. We now learn this briefing happened at the request of the Clerk of the Privy Council. The other was delivered to senior staff of the PMO, at their request, on February 23, 2023.
The CSIS Director explained how such briefing notes are put together. The process involves work by his professional staff and a senior-level sign-off, by his Deputy Director for Policy, before transmittal to him. So, adults in the room. David Vigneault recounted that when preparation time permits, briefing notes will try to cover the waterfront of issues. As for his own practice, the Director said he would read the prepared notes, and take his own notes in order to focus in on key facts. This led some counsel to wonder whether these notes were available to the Commission.
Mr. Vigneault told the Commission that the October 2022 briefing in practice was focused on specific cases of foreign interference and that he would not have used some of the more general points raised in the prepared notes. He couldn’t talk about the specific cases, but if the briefing note is any general guide, it involved China and India as principal threat actors. The Director did say that the discussion was not related to election interference.
The second briefing, on February 23, 2023, involved a presentation to senior officials in the PMO only. The briefing notes were finalised two days earlier, on February 21. They contained some of the same language as the October 2022 briefing notes and, again, the Director indicated that he did not raise some of the points made in the briefing notes, and that the discussion dived into one specific issue.
That issue involved a media report, in fact the Globe and Mail’s big reveal, published on February 17. The gist of the report, based on leaked classified intelligence, was that the PRC had operated a “sophisticated strategy” to try to ensure that a minority Liberal government was elected in 2021, and to defeat Conservative candidates the PRC didn’t like. China was depicted as working through proxies and influence in the social media space to press home this alleged strategy. There were allegations of undeclared cash donations to campaigns, and the use of Chinese international students as volunteers. The Globe report clearly drew, via its sources, on intercepted communications by Chinese diplomatic officials, caught boasting about their successes.
In parenthesis, it should be noted that the Globe did not seem to care whether or not its reporting was damaging Canadian intelligence collection capabilities—headlines trump all, I guess.
Not surprisingly, PMO senior officials wanted to hear the CSIS view on this media report. PMO officials have testified to the Commission on this matter that they didn’t buy the intelligence that the PRC wanted to see a Liberal minority government and emphasized, in response to the Globe report’s citation of intercepted Chinese consular communications, that there is a big difference between “bragging” and “action.”
The very first point made in the Director’s briefing notes for the February 2023 meeting was that “CSIS takes these leaks extremely seriously. They present a direct threat to the integrity of our operations. “ What CSIS was doing about the leaks is redacted in its entirety.
In testimony the CSIS Director said that the Service analysis of election interference in 2021 did not contradict the findings of the SITE task force, which contributed its combined intelligence reporting to support the Panel of Five decision that election interference had not threatened the integrity of the election or the ability of Canadians to have a “free and fair” election. Apparently there is no space between the CSIS assessment and the government position on this issue.
It was at this point in the testimony that David Vigneault interjected his comment on having to “bring his hockey skates” to these briefings— he had to be agile in responding to whatever his audience of senior officials wanted to ask about, briefing binder or not. Good play—go to where the puck should be, as the Great One always said.
In cross-examination, which was brief, the most important question put to the CSIS Director came from counsel representing Michael Chong, the Conservative party foreign affairs critic. Mr. Vigneault was asked whether the statements in the briefing notes, whether explicitly delivered in briefings or nor, reflected the outlook of the Service. This was the moment I was waiting for. David Vigneault did not hesitate to say yes--they reflected the view of the Service and, for good measure, his personal view of the threats posed by foreign interference.
It wasn’t played as a gotcha moment, but it was significant. In essence it means that the Director backs some punchy statements in the briefing notes, including an assessment of the foreign interference threat as “existential” in magnitude and that foreign interference is a “low-risk, high-reward” effort for foreign threats actors because of weak Canadian preventative or response measures. David Vigneault also committed to wording that not only criticizes government policy but offers advice for new policies. This is captured in the similar conclusions to the October 2022 and February 2023 briefing notes, where it states:
“Better protecting Canadian democratic institutions against FI will require a shift in the Government’s perspective and a willingness to take decisive action and impose consequences on perpetrators.”
And
“Until FI is viewed as an existential threat to Canadian democracy and governments forcefully and actively respond, these threats will persist.”
Punchy, OK. Anything wrong here?
First, CSIS has to be free to assess the nature of a national security threat, on the basis of the intelligence available to it, as it sees fit. But it also has to be careful, as I indicated in my previous post, not to exaggerate the threat. “Existential” should not be thrown around to get attention.
It is also entirely proper for CSIS to argue that it needs new tools to counter the threat, whether through more resources or new legislated powers. There is mention in the briefing note for October 2022 of the kinds of toolkit that might be needed, and there is some reference to modernizing the CSIS Act, but the relevant section is mostly redacted.
It is appropriate for CSIS to warn about the inadequacy of existing approaches. But it should not, in my view, cross a red-line into policy advocacy. That is not the job of an intelligence service. Warning is fair game, but warnings of inadequate government approaches can easily turn into policy advocacy and undermine the very ability to warn.
David Vigneault described the wording in the conclusions to the October 2022 and February 2023 briefing as “tombstone” statements. That sounds chilling. Hopefully, there is no skating on anyone’s grave.
[1] The three documents in question can be found on the FI Commission website. Their reference numbers are: CAN015842, CAN004079_R01, and CAN004495. See https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/documents/exhibits-and-presentations
Good point that Mr. Stanton makes. It would be interesting to know the position of the NSIA and Clerk on these matters as they could and should be representing the wider national security and intelligence community. The National Security Council could also be a new place at Ministerial level to work through the policy issues.
From my perspective as someone who has been publishing and exposing the cooptation of our political elite globally I see that numerous Canadian politicians and high-level bureaucrats have overstepped boundaries by publicly speaking and acting in ways that protect the interests of a hostile state apparatus, namely the Chinese Communist Party.
Hence I see the whistleblowers leaks to Cooper and Chase much differently.
Wesley advocates for a delicate and nuanced approach that aims to preserve our Westminster traditions and protect tge San tity of our intelligence operations. Agreed, we should not compromise infield operatives but this intelligence and the ongoing attempt to bury the narrative does indeed rise to a potentially treasonous act even though those in power belive they understand the difference between Interferance and Influence and can navigate it. (Not)
These traditions around parliamentary tradition and protocol were well founded however, were not designed to address 21st-century challenges such as influence operations, espionage, and hybrid warfare. I must say that you've entirely missed the point regarding why a CSIS employee would expose the Prime Minister's Office and the Prime Minister based on their political and personal gain objectives.
Like others before him, Han Dong appears to be working for and on behalf of a foreign state entity. As the only Member of Parliament to leave the chamber when voting on the Uyghur resettlement program, I tend to look at the actions to form my opinion and rest the case.
Actions speak louder than words and thanks to the whistleblower, we are finally this long overdue conversation on the CCP’s foreign INTERFERANCE operations in Canada