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Good point that Mr. Stanton makes. It would be interesting to know the position of the NSIA and Clerk on these matters as they could and should be representing the wider national security and intelligence community. The National Security Council could also be a new place at Ministerial level to work through the policy issues.

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From my perspective as someone who has been publishing and exposing the cooptation of our political elite globally I see that numerous Canadian politicians and high-level bureaucrats have overstepped boundaries by publicly speaking and acting in ways that protect the interests of a hostile state apparatus, namely the Chinese Communist Party.

Hence I see the whistleblowers leaks to Cooper and Chase much differently.

Wesley advocates for a delicate and nuanced approach that aims to preserve our Westminster traditions and protect tge San tity of our intelligence operations. Agreed, we should not compromise infield operatives but this intelligence and the ongoing attempt to bury the narrative does indeed rise to a potentially treasonous act even though those in power belive they understand the difference between Interferance and Influence and can navigate it. (Not)

These traditions around parliamentary tradition and protocol were well founded however, were not designed to address 21st-century challenges such as influence operations, espionage, and hybrid warfare. I must say that you've entirely missed the point regarding why a CSIS employee would expose the Prime Minister's Office and the Prime Minister based on their political and personal gain objectives.

Like others before him, Han Dong appears to be working for and on behalf of a foreign state entity. As the only Member of Parliament to leave the chamber when voting on the Uyghur resettlement program, I tend to look at the actions to form my opinion and rest the case.

Actions speak louder than words and thanks to the whistleblower, we are finally this long overdue conversation on the CCP’s foreign INTERFERANCE operations in Canada

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I doubt that the Chinese were unaware of what CSIS knew. Their actions were hardly secretive, or even subtle. I suspect they knew (rightly) that the current government in Ottawa wan't going to lose any sleep over actions committed by the CCP that could only benefit the LPC and PM Trudeau. Sorry to be so cynical, but that is the way I see it.

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I think it's entirely appropriate to advocate that there be a policy, and to indicate that the absence of a decisive response motivates further meddling. CSIS shouldn't - and didn't as far as I see - advocate for a particular policy. I'm far more concerned about the feckless response of the PMO and the PM.

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Apr 13·edited Apr 13

Thanks again for these nuanced summaries that go into detail and foreground the complexities of the testimony. It is the kind of useful accounting largely absent from the reporting in G&M by Bob Fife, who seems intent on defending his source / reporting regardless of what is actually said by witnesses at the inquiry.

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Seems to me M. Vigneault did some pretty fancy skating today, also.

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I agree that ‘existential’ is over the top for FI. I would accept ‘has the potential to become existential.' Arguing for 'forceful and active responses by the government' is skating across that red line of policy advocacy, But is anyone else making the suggestions?

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