Agents of influence in our political class

Or, what is to be done?

The foreign interference report from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians still has me in its grip. ^[1]

I am shocked (but not in the faux Casablanca--the movie—sense), by indications in the report that political actors, including elected MPs, were willing servants of a foreign state. I think this deserves more contemplation all around, not just what to make of it, and how to put it in perspective, but also what to do about it.

First of all, we need to understand how intelligence about these activities is generated and who within government pays attention. We do not, of course, have the full picture in the public domain but much of the relevant intelligence is collected by CSIS through various means, that can operate on a spectrum from the use of open-source methods through to use of informants and intrusive and high-tech surveillance.

There are cautions about collecting intelligence against political actors, part of CSIS’s long-standing approach to ‘sensitive sectors’ (or ‘fundamental societal institutions’) in Canadian society (in addition to political actors, sensitive sectors include religious entities, academia, the media, and trade unions). As the Security and Intelligence Review Committee reported in 2010, whenever an investigation touching on a sensitive sector threatens to become controversial, higher-level approvals from HQ are required. ^[2] Sensitive sector policy is not, however, meant to inhibit or stop such investigations, only to ensure that they are necessary and are appropriately conducted.

Consumers of CSIS intelligence in government will bring their own sensibilities to bear, both in terms of their perception of the validity of CSIS reports, but also in reaching judgements about whether intelligence has turned up an illicit foreign interference activity (one marked by clandestinity and deception on the part of those involved), or instead a more legitimate (e.g. open) foreign influence operation to sway thinking and action on behalf of a foreign state, minus the secretive element.  Compounding the problem is that these are not clear-cut polarities—inevitably there are grey zones where the illegitimate and legitimate can be fused.

The NSICOP report has noted the general mindset challenge in distinguishing what is a foreign interference operation from its more legitimate twin, a foreign influence campaign.  Canadian diplomats abroad will conduct the latter in efforts to promote Canadian interests. The Committee repeats findings from its previous study of foreign interference conducted in 2019 that the lack of a uniform understanding of the threat across government departments and common thresholds for action are major problems.

To illustrate the issue, NSICOP gives us a case study (also contained in the NSIRA report from last week) about the fate of a CSIS paper on PRC interference, which also drew on CSE material, and came to be known as the “targeting paper. ” It was so named because its focus was on the methodologies used by Chinese government officials to conduct interference operations focused on Canadian federal parliamentarians, both those who might be pro-PRC and those opposed to PRC policies. CSIS was proud of the paper; despite this it drifted around inside government and  was eventually cast into limbo.  The timelines looks like this: CSIS paper drafted June 2021;  paper formally issued February 13, 2023; deputy ministers’ decision, February 24, 2023, that a condensed version should be provided to the PM; condensed version approved by CSIS Director March 9, 2023; paper not given to PM by PCO; paper in limbo as of February 2024.

The reason? The National Security and Intelligence Adviser believed that “the activity indicated in the report did not qualify as foreign interference, but was rather part of regular diplomatic practice.” So nothing worth the Prime Minister’s attention.

There can be no independent adjudication of this dispute. We don’t have the CSIS report in the public domain or any indication of what led the NSIA to her conclusion (the NSIA was Jody Thomas, who retired at the end of 2023).  NSICOP does not offer its judgement on the matter. We are left with a puzzle that is used as a striking illustration of divided views among senior officials on what constituted foreign interference, but no call as to who was right.

What the NSICOP report does tell us, based largely on the CSIS intelligence the Committee had access to, is that PRC foreign interference used both carrots (rewards) and sticks (various forms of punishment) as it sought out federal political actors of Chinese origin. Included in the PRC effort were attempts to collect compromising information.

But what drew political actors into the Chinese foreign interference net? What made such people “witting” accomplices of the PRC? The question extends not just to federal MPs and Senators but to “proxies” (middle-men in foreign interference campaigns) as well. Proxies can include political staffers. And China is not the only actor in this space—the NSICOP report names India and even Pakistan. India may be a coming player, ranked by NSICIOP as #2, but China is the most formidable foreign interference net thrower, the number one gladiator in the ring.

A Chinese state campaign of rewards can draw a political actor into a Chinese orbit where favours are traded for favours in what can be an escalating cycle, difficult to escape; compromise (an old Soviet espionage tactic) might also do so, but is probably much rarer.  The use of sticks is meant to keep political actors away from voicing anti-PRC regime ideas and policies.

But there is always a red line to be crossed, drawn on the field of divided loyalties. Chinese state officials will pursue political actors of Chinese origin because they believe divided loyalties could be at play and something they can exploit. From the distinctive Chinese official perspective, people of Chinese origin living abroad, whatever their foreign status and newly acquired citizenship, remain Chinese, with ties and duties to the state. This gives the PRC a powerful incentive and tool.  

But apart from the over-reaching Chinese state perspective, divided loyalties are an inevitability for many. They reflect simple facts of life--on-going family ties with kin still living in the homeland, cultural ties, memories, language ties, the difficult experience of forms of ‘exile.’ Divided loyalties can be fueled by reliance on Chinese language social media and apps, such as WeChat.

In a democracy like that of Canada, there is nothing inherently wrong with divided loyalties, so long as they are kept in balance. They have to be considered part of the fabric of a country like Canada, multi-cultural and built on immigration. You could even say that divided loyalties should be protected, that they enrich, that they are a birthright.

Nothing wrong with divided loyalties until they are weaponized, until they cease to be divided and tilt, for whatever reason, in favour of the homeland state. This crossing of a red line might be forced, through compromise. It might be a product of corruption, and self-inflicted. It might involve ideological conviction.  It might even involve the chasing of risks, thrill-seeking.  This mix of potential motives has long been a formula of counter-espionage profiling, familiar from the Cold War.

During the Cold War, Canada had only one known (and convicted) ‘red-line’ crosser from among the ranks of federal MPs. This was Fred Rose, a committed communist who represented a riding in Montreal and who was involved in a Soviet wartime spy ring run out of the embassy in Ottawa, before being exposed by Igor Gouzenko. Rose had been born in a part of Poland then included in the Russian empire. After his release from prison he returned to what was then Soviet-occupied Poland. The Canadian government stripped him of his Canadian citizenship and relieved him of one of his loyalties. Rose tried to fight back and was ultimately successful.

There might have been only one Fred Rose, but his story, alongside revelations of high level penetration by Soviet intelligence into the UK, US and Australian governments,  inculcated a fear of others, of “agents of influence” penetrating Canadian politics. Innocents got caught up in these fears, most famously the Canadian diplomat, E.H. Norman, who ended up committing suicide after facing renewed claims that he was a pro-Communist agent, while serving as Canadian ambassador to Egypt.

Oh, how the wheel of history has turned.  We are once again facing fears of agents of influence, while needing to recall cautionary tales about innocence being trampled on in their pursuit.

What can be done to responsibly deter and prevent political actors from becoming agents of influence, from leaving behind legitimate divided loyalties, including Canadian loyalties, to fully embrace illegitimate and illicit homeland loyalties?

A foreign influence transparency registry (FITR) might introduce an element of deterrence, or it may prove to be largely security theatre. It may act as a forceful stop sign on the passage to the acting out of homeland loyalties for some, but probably not for all.  A FITR is coming down the tracks in legislation tabled in the House (Bill C-70) and currently being studied by a Parliamentary committee. Some years down the road we may have a better idea of its efficacy.

Criminal convictions of persons involved in foreign interference activities, whether federal MPs, political staffers, proxies, or even foreign intelligence service officers, would be a stronger deterrent and may be aided by revisions to the Security of Information Act provisions on foreign interference, also being considered in Bill C-70.

Here it is important to pause and note that NSICOP is pessimistic about the prospect of convictions.  Its argument is that the “intelligence to evidence” problem poses a huge roadblock.  I am not convinced. The intelligence to evidence problem has been around for 40 years and was created at the birth of CSIS as a distinct civilian agency separate from the RCMP. Bifurcation between a civilian security intelligence service and RCMP responsibilities for national security investigations and law enforcement, a bifurcation between intelligence and evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions, is at the heart a system we created. What this means in practice is that while CSIS can inform the RCMP about intelligence it has gathered on foreign interference, the RCMP cannot use CSIS intelligence in court. CSIS intelligence sources and methods have to be protected from public release, and so the RCMP must generate its own investigations and produce its own evidence, to be shared through disclosure with the accused.  

This is intel to evidence 101 and my more knowing legal colleagues would have much to add about its intricacies. Yes, intelligence to evidence creates challenges. Yes, defence counsel will pounce on cracks in the system to open up what the government does not wish opened. But it should not be considered an insurmountable obstacle to prosecution.  In my view there are other big problems to be considered, including prosecutorial will within the Department of Justice and, perhaps most importantly of all, the capacity of the RCMP to investigate.  The NSICOP report has some alarming things to say about RCMP capacity, or lack thereof, as I discussed in my previous substack. ^[3]

Greater willingness to use all the tools in the diplomatic tool box, including expulsions of offending diplomats, would be an important step up in dealing with foreign interference. The excruciating twists and turns that government officials went through before finally deciding on the expulsion of a Chinese diplomat, Zhao Wei, long known for his foreign interference activities, is well documented in the NSICOP report. Expulsions cannot and must not be driven by media exposes and political embarrassment. They need to be calculated and timely.

But ultimately there are two kinds of participants in the democratic process that have out-sized roles. One is political parties, who must get better at policing themselves, including during nomination contents. They must get better at understanding the dynamics of foreign interference. NSICOP’s strongly argued position that all MPs and Senators should be regularly briefed on national security threats is something that the government should act on.

On this front, Minister Freeland has stated that there will be an internal review of the NSICOP report’s findings about politicians who became witting accomplices in foreign interference schemes (this could extend beyond a China focus to include India). If such an internal review does take place it would be a good first step. Other political parties may be hamstrung in taking similar action by lack of access to the classified intelligence, but that could be overcome through sharing with security-cleared members of opposition party caucuses and with the leaders of opposition parties.

However it is done, Augean stables will need to be cleaned, while ensuring respect for the rights of any individuals accused of acting wittingly. Be careful, I would say, about naming and shaming. Be careful about pillorying in the public square, whatever the political temptations.

Then, there is the electorate. We are perhaps starting to accept a picture of the electorate as victims of foreign interference, which of course it can be.  But voters have votes against foreign interference. They can exercise a responsibility to know their candidates both during election contests and while in office. Aware voters push back and put those inclined to embrace homeland loyalties on notice. To be aware, voters need to be better served with information about foreign interference, and indeed other threats to national security. The NSICOP report cites dismaying evidence of the production of strategic papers on foreign interference meant for public education, by the RCMP and Public Safety, that ended up sitting on shelves. Public Safety apparently found itself struggling to find an opening for such a strategy paper in the midst of all the media reporting on foreign interference in 2022 and 2023.  Hard to parse that one out. Its entirely unclear why the RCMP sat on its own paper.

Let’s have a foreign influence transparency registry, even if it ends up mostly catching good guys. Let’s get rolling on convictions, however hard they may be. Let’s kick some ass in the form of expulsions of foreign intelligence officers when intelligence warrants such a move.

But political parties genuinely able and willing to self-police and efforts to ensure there can be aware individual electors are the keys to democratic resilience. Countering foreign interference, as government officials like to say, is a team sport. True, some of it is on their team.  Much of it (with help from their team) is on us and those we choose to put in office.  

Can democratic practices beat authoritarian foreign interference, as Minister Freeland posits the problem?

Answer: Yes, every time. Yes, using democratic means.

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^[1] National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, “Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions,” published June 3, 2024, https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2024-06-03/special-report-foreign-interference.pdf

^[2] Security Intelligence Review Committee, Study 2009-03, “CSIS’s Activities Involving Fundamental Societal Institutions, “ http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/opbapb/lsrlse/2009/2009-03-eng.pdf

^[3] “NSICOP, the little engine that could,” https://wesleywark.substack.com/p/nsicop-the-little-engine-that-could