Canadian variable geometry hits the Arctic road

Or, from summits to action?

This substack is a longer version of an Op Ed originally published by CIGIonline, “Canada’s Variable Geometry Starts in the Arctic” May 28, 2026, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/canadas-variable-geometry-starts-in-the-arctic/

In his now famous, and famously globe-trotting, speech on January 20, 2026, to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, PM Mark Carney introduced a bit of nerdy-sounding jargon to try to explain Canada’s future relations with the world. He talked about the need to practice “variable geometry.” ^[i]

This phrase has a double history, in both aerospace engineering, to describe the ability of an aircraft to alter its wing shape in flight, and in economics to describe flexible trading partnerships, especially used during the development of EU integration. Maybe Carney is a student of the F-14 or the Concorde supersonic jet liner, but I am guessing that his familiarity with the term comes from its economic roots. Now he wants to turn it in to an all-purpose diplomatic and security strategy.

PM Carney described variable geometry at Davos as pursuing “different coalitions for different purposes, based on common values and interests.” ^[ii] He provided examples of what this looked like for Canada: joining the coalition of the willing to support Ukraine; backing Greenland and Denmark in support of their sovereignty in the face of US threats; working with NATO to “further secure the alliance’s northern and western flanks.” He also talked about building bridges between the EU and the Trans-Pacific partnership, a G-7 initiative on critical minerals supply chains, and cooperation with like-minded democracies on AI. Altogether variable geometry in the conduct of international relations meant, for Carney, creating a “third path” for middle powers, beyond subjugation to great powers, or intense competition among themselves in pursuit of a ‘fortress’ mentality. This third path would see middle powers combining their strengths to sustain a rules-based, values-infused global order. It meant ganging up for self-protection and to compete with the rapacious hegemons. Carney offered up Canada’s leadership on “a path wide open to any country willing to take it with us.” ^[iii]

Some of this general message on variable geometry was reiterated in a YouTube video that the PM released to the Canadian public on April 19. This time Carney presented a more deliberate focus on the need for Canada to move away from its close ties to America, because those ties, once sources of strength, have, he said, “become our weaknesses.” He urged the need for Canada to “take back control of our security, our borders and our future.” ^[iv]

Taken together, the Davos speech and the “forward guidance” YouTube message strongly suggest that a core imperative for the application of variable geometry to Canada’s security and foreign policy involves the Arctic. If Canada is to move forward as a sovereign middle power to defend its interests in the Arctic, in keeping with variable geometry, what would this look like? Carney has, in fact, laid it out, at least rhetorically. Work with NATO, especially the Nordics, on collective security across the Arctic region; defend Greenland and Denmark’s sovereignty; move beyond the old security dependency on the United States.

But how is variable geometry actually shaping up? There has been much activity on the diplomatic front since the start of 2026, involving bilateral and multilateral talks between Canada and NATO Nordic countries. Carney has held discussions with the leaders of Denmark, Sweden, Norway and, most recently, Finland.

The meeting with Denmark’s Prime Minister, Mette Fredericksen, kicked things off on January 6. It took place as the Trump administration was ramping up threats to take over Greenland. The discussion set a framework for later engagements, with its emphasis on a shared interest in Arctic security, a declaration of Canada’s support for the sovereignty of Greenland and Denmark, and a desire to deepen bilateral ties in key areas such as critical minerals, quantum technology and energy. ^[v]

Three weeks later, Carney met with the Prime Minister of Sweden, Ulf Kristersson, while attending the World Economic Forum. ^[vi] The meeting underscored a strategic partnership agreement that had been signed by the two leaders in November.^[vii] The partnership promised enhanced economic cooperation and trade, including on critical minerals and energy, research collaboration, stronger defence cooperation, ongoing support for Ukraine and a search for a just peace, efforts to limit Russian aggression, and mutual work on climate action. Both countries shared interest in Arctic security was highlighted. Included in the partnership agreement were such key security issues as improved intelligence exchanges and joint work on hybrid threats.

In March 2026, Carney made a three-day visit to Norway, to visit a major NATO exercise in the country’s north, hold bilateral discussions with the Norwegian PM, Jonas Store, and also meet with the German chancellor, Friedrich Merz. Arctic security was at the top of the agenda, with the Canadian and Norwegian PMs acknowledging that Arctic security was central to national security for both countries. ^[viii] The leaders agreed on the need for ongoing involvement in joint northern training exercises, the establishment of a “bilateral Arctic dialogue,” support for NATO’s Arctic Sentry mission, and the exploration of opportunities to collaborate on secure, satellite-based, military communications in the Arctic. The Canada-Norway talks also extended into economic cooperation, the space economy, sovereign technology and AI, collaboration on critical minerals, energy cooperation, and work on climate change. ^[ix] This aligned with the playbook used earlier for discussions with Denmark and Sweden.

While in Norway, Carney was also able to meet with all the leaders of the Nordic countries. Once again, the official statement of the talks emphasized the collective understanding of the importance of advancing Arctic defence and security cooperation. The promise was to look for ways to collaborate on defence production, defence capabilities, counter measures against hybrid threats, infrastructure protection, and to develop “interoperable, innovative, dual-use technologies.” ^[x]

The closing paragraph of the joint statement read:

“Together, the Nordic countries and Canada constitute a formidable partnership. We commit to deepening this, and to develop our cooperation on the basis of respect, trust and shared values and interests.” ^[xi]

This was, as a declaration, variable geometry in action. It was directly focused on a Canda-Nordic partnership, without broader reference to NATO and with no mention whatsoever of the other Western Arctic nation, the United States. It nested closer security and defence cooperation within enhanced economic ties.

To further cement Canada-Nordic relations, the President of Finland, Alexander Stubb made a state visit to Ottawa on April 14. Of all the Nordic leaders, Stubb has the closest relationship with Donald Trump. As one Finnish official explained to me—“we know how to talk to authoritarians.” So a meeting of minds between Finland and Canada on variable geometry and middle power diplomacy outside of a US sphere, would be an important signal.

The official summary of the talks did underscore the importance of cooperation by like-minded middle powers on security and economic prosperity. Specific bilateral agreements between Canada and Norway will involve work on maritime capabilities and industrial partnerships, on AI and quantum computing, and on resource development, including critical minerals. The two leaders announced the beginning of negotiations on an information sharing agreement to assist with intelligence exchanges and military cooperation. ^[xii]

In an interview with the media while in Ottawa, the Finnish President added some additional thoughts on how the Nordics could work with Canada on military shipbuilding and on Arctic training. ^[xiii]

Arctic training is an area where the Canadian armed forces have a lot of experience. A centre-piece is an annual exercise called Operation NANOOK, which has been run since 2007. Different scenarios have been used in the past for these exercises, some directly military, including the monitoring of submarines or suspicious vessels, others in response to disaster relief, emergency evacuations, oil spills, aircraft crashes, even poaching. Since 2018 Operation NANOOK has been divided into five distinct activities across different northern communities throughout the year. These include different activities involving the high Arctic (Operation Nanook-Nunalivit); a disaster response scenario (Operation Nanook-Tatigiit); a naval sovereignty patrol (Operation Nanook-Tuugaalik); a surveillance exercise along the Northwest Passage (Operation Nanook-Nunakput); and a exercise focused on training and capability development for the Canadian Rangers (Operation-Takuniq). ^[xiv]

International participation in NANOOK has been a consistent feature since its inception in 2007, usually with the US and often with other allied partners. In recent years, Denmark has been a regular participant. But in reviewing the history of Operation NANOOK what is noticeable is the absence of military personnel from the other Arctic/Nordic countries—Norway, Sweden and Finland. ^[xv]

This year’s edition of Operation NANOOK-NUNALIVUT has just concluded.^[xvi] It was a large exercise, which ran from February to April 2026, involving some 1300 CAF members, across multiple regions of the Canadian north. The DND press release described this year’s operation as a contribution to NATO’s Arctic Sentry, yet Arctic Sentry members were mostly noticeable by their absence. Among the Nordics only Denmark sent military observers, 3 in number, who joined the Canadian Rangers at the beginning of a long Ranger patrol across the Arctic. ^[xvii] There were no personnel from Norway, Sweden or Finland. A lone US exchange officer took part, along with 4 navy divers from both Belgium and France, who took to the frigid waters off Cambridge Bay in the central Canadian Arctic. ^[xviii]

Variable geometry with the Nordics has clearly been demonstrated in diplomacy. It hasn’t yet been applied to Arctic training exercises in Canada. Where does it stand in relation to other joint defence activities in the Arctic? Here, the newness, and some of the challenges of the enterprise, show up. Diplomatic boldness and energy may be running up against caution and trepidation on the military front, where variable geometry upsets old ways of thinking, especially about Canada-US military cooperation.

There are important initiatives underway that Canada has not yet decided on a contribution to. These include that NATO’s “Arctic Sentry” mission, created in response to Trump threats over Greenland and designed, overtly, to demonstrate the ability of NATO countries to secure Greenland and adjacent Arctic regions. ^[xix] Unspoken was the intention to deter Trump from any use of force to seize Greenland, an effort that the Danish Prime Minister said would mean the end of NATO. Various NATO countries have made commitments to Arctic Sentry, Denmark of course (F-35s and patrol frigates), but also including the deployment of Swedish fighter jets to Iceland, of German jets and tanker aircraft to Greenland, and of a British carrier group to patrol the North Atlantic. ^[xx] More joint training exercises in the Arctic is another theme. Canada has not yet decided on its commitment, despite the fact that we are the largest of the Arctic states (this side of Russia) and the closest neighbour to Greenland. ^[xxi]

Why no commitment? The reality is that Arctic Sentry, a NATO mission without the US and in certain respects designed to confront the US, rubs uneasily against long-standing Canadian bilateral defence commitments with the United States in NORAD for continental security, including in the Arctic. It may not be a binary choice, but may feel that way for the military brass.

Then there is another Arctic security opportunity that we have approached with some degree of wariness—effectively the continuance of a Canadian stand-offishness for over a decade. Canada was first approached to join in a NATO rapid response effort called the “Joint Expeditionary Force” (JEF) in 2014.^[xxii] Back then we were unsure of the value of it. But the world has changed over the past decade and the relevance of the JEF as an operational subset of the larger NATO alliance, led by a British command at Norfolk, has been heightened by the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, tensions in the Baltic Sea and on NATO’s eastern flank, the accelerating use by Russia of hybrid warfare tactics, including cyber attacks, information operations, drone incursions, sabotage campaigns, GPS jamming and sea-bed cable cutting. JEF has increasingly turned its attention to an Arctic mission and Canada would now be a natural partner as well as a recipient of a lot of hard-won lessons learned about Russian hybrid warfare capabilities and activities. Yet, still, we sit on the sidelines.

Canada’s Minister of National Defence, David McGuinty, has given us an indication of a Canadian, slow-rolling approach. He has said that Canada is considering joining the JEF, but that the first priority is rebuilding the Canadian armed forces. He indicated that the JEF question was for the future and that, “we’ll get there.” ^[xxiii] What this step-wise attitude seems not to recognize is the value of Arctic security cooperation while capabilities are being considered and built, not after they are in place.

Canada may have been nudged closer to joining the JEF as a result of a special invitation from the President of Finland to Mark Carney to take part in a virtual meeting of the leaders of the JEF on March 26. The brief read-out of the meeting indicated that Canada’s Prime Minister discussed Canada’s commitment to Arctic security and recognition of an evolving security environment. Carney “welcomed the JEF’s role” and “looked forward to continued engagement with JEF members.” ^[xxiv] But this clearly fell short of a commitment to join.

As the Carney government enters its second year in office with a majority position in Parliament, there will be many calls to demonstrate the linkages between plans and promises and action. ^[xxv] While rebuilding the Canadian military and re-equipping it for a prominent Arctic security mission is a long-haul enterprise, likely to take a least a decade, the government should act now to link its Nordic middle power diplomacy to a Nordic-centred military commitment, including stepped up multilateral training in Arctic exercises, joining the JEF, committing actual military capabilities to Arctic Sentry, enhancing intelligence sharing, looking to joint military capability development, and creating a strong relationships with Nordic countries in the strengthening of Canada’s defence industrial base, including as an export destination for Canadian manufacture. That would be variable geometry in action.

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^[i] PMO, “’Principled and Pragmatic: Canada’s Path.’ Prime Minister Carney addresses the World Economic Forum annual meeting, Davos, Switzerland, January 20, 2026, text at: https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2026/01/20/principled-and-pragmatic-canadas-path-prime-minister-carney-addresses; video stream at:

^[ii] Ibid

^[iii] Ibid

^[iv] PM Carney “Forward Guidance,” YouTube video, April 19, 2026,

^[v] PMO, News release, “Prime Minister Carney meets with Prime Minister of Denmark Mette Frederiksen,” January 6, 2026 (Paris), https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2026/01/06/prime-minister-carney-meets-prime-minister-denmark-mette-frederiksen

^[vi] PMO, News release, “Prime Minister Carney meets with Prime Minister of Sweden Ulf Kristersson,” January 21, 2026 (Davos, Switzerland), https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2026/01/21/prime-minister-carney-meets-prime-minister-sweden-ulf-kristersson

^[vii] Joint statement by Prime Minister Carney and Prime Minister Kristersson, “Northern allies, innovators, and trade partners: Strategic partnership between Canada and Sweden,” November 18, 2025, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/11/18/joint-statement-prime-minister-carney-and-prime-minister-kristersson

^[viii] PMO, “Prime Minster Carney meets with Prime Minister of Norway Jonas Gahr Store,” March 14, 2026, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2026/03/14/prime-minister-carney-meets-prime-minister-norway-jonas-gahr-store

^[ix] “Joint statement on Strategic Cooperation between Canada and the Kingdom of Norway,” March 14, 2026, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2026/03/14/joint-statement-strategic-cooperation-between-canada-and-kingdom-norway

^[x] Joint Statement by the Prime Ministers of the Nordic countries and Canada, March 15, 2026 (Oslo), https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2026/03/15/joint-statement-prime-ministers-nordic-countries-and-canada

^[xi] Ibid

^[xii] PMO, “Prime Minister Carney meets with President of Finland Alexander Stubb,” April 14, 2026, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2026/04/14/prime-minister-carney-meets-president-finland-alexander-stubb

^[xiii] Robert Fife and Steven Chase, The Globe and Mail. “Canada, Nordic countries can work together to defence the Arctic, Finnish President says,” April 14, 2026, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-nato-defence-arctic-finnish-president-stubb/

^[xiv] Operation NANOOK, “The Arctic All-Domain Planning Conference 2025,” https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-nanook.html

^[xv] Ibid

^[xvi] DND, News release, “Operation NANOOK-NUNALIVUT 2026 concludes with strengthened Arctic defence presence,” April 16, 2026, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2026/04/operation-nanook-nunalivut-2026-concludes-with-strengthened-arctic-defence-presence.html

^[xvii] Nadine Yousif, BBC News, “On patrol with Canadian forces securing the Arctic as global threats grow,” April 12, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwyj8jjkl78o

^[xviii] My thanks to the public relations office at Joint Task Force North for providing these numbers.

^[xix] NATO, “Arctic Sentry,” https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/arctic-security

^[xx] NATO, “NATO announces Arctic Sentry,” February 13, 2026, https://ac.nato.int/archive/2026/nato-announces-arctic-sentry-enhancing-natos-presence-in-the-arctic-and-the-high-north#:~:text=German%20Eurofighter%20jets%20and%20Danish,Arctic%20security%20environment%20is%20changing.

^[xxi] Wesley Wark, “When NATO comes calling,” Substack, February 9, 2026, https://wesleywark.substack.com/p/when-nato-comes-calling

^[xxii] Wesley Wark, “JEF: We’re just friends,” Substack, March 28, 2026, https://wesleywark.substack.com/p/jef-were-just-friends; Ed Arnold and B.Gen (ret) Robbie Boyd, “’Oceans 11’: the Case for Canada Joining the Joint Expeditionary Force,” Royal United Services Institute, 28 April 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/oceans-11-case-canada-joining-joint-expeditionary-force

^[xxiii] Bloomberg News/Financial Post, “Canada mulls joining UK-led response force as its military grows,” March 16, 2026, https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/canada-mulls-joining-uk-led-response-force-as-its-military-grows

^[xxiv] PMO, “Prime Minister Carney participates in a virtual meeting of the Joint Expeditionary Force,” March 26, 2026, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2026/03/26/prime-minister-carney-participates-virtual-meeting-joint-expeditionary

^[xxv] Campbell Clark, Opinion column, The Globe and Mail, “Less forward guidance, Mr. Carney, and more accountability,” April 21, 2026, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/opinion/article-less-forward-guidance-mr-carney-and-more-accountability/