Following the Breadcrumbs (into the intelligence maze)

Any hairy and horned beasts?

I am going to follow a trail of breadcrumbs into and, hopefully, back out of the secret forest that is Canadian intelligence reporting.  The breadcrumbs are courtesy of the testimony of David Morrison on June 13, 2023, before the Committee on Procedure and House affairs in its study of Chinese election interference.

You can find Mr. Morrison’s testimony on ParlVU TV here (starting at 11:08):

https://parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2?fk=12258297

Why follow?

I am not promising encounters with hairy and horned beasts as we enter the maze. But the trail casts some further light on what the national security and intelligence community knew, and when, about Chinese foreign interference targeting Canadian elections. More importantly, I think it tells us things, good and bad, about how intelligence is viewed by senior officials.

David Morrison, currently the Deputy Minister at Global Affairs Canada, served during the Summer and Fall of 2021 as acting National Security and Intelligence Adviser to the Prime Minister. The acting role ended up stretching to six months, during which time Mr. Morrison was “double-hatted” as the Americans say, as the Foreign and Defence Policy adviser (F&DP) to the Prime Minister.

Let me briefly pause and say two things. There should never be “acting” NSIAs for any period extending beyond a few days. Secondly, the roles of NSIA and F&DP Adviser should never be conflated, as this risks setting intelligence reporting against the pursuit of foreign and defence goals, when they may not align.   That both things happened is a sign of lack of attention by our political leaders to intelligence.

The breadcrumb trail starts in July 2021 and ends nearly two years later (e.g. today). It is a trail that follows an intelligence report, produced by a unit at CSIS known as the Intelligence Assessment branch (IAB), on its very winding path. The IAB produced a high-level overview of the threat of Chinese interference in Canada on July 20, 2021. Mr. Morrison was one of a handful of recipients on a very restricted distribution list. The report didn’t reach him  immediately.

Mr. Morrison was on sick leave when the report arrived at his office. It made its way into one of his voluminous reading packages, three weeks later, on August 17, 2021.  (Note that at this stage, the election writ period had begun, as the federal election was called on August 15, 2021, and the government was in what is called “caretaker” mode.)

Neither members of the public nor Parliamentarians have seen this report. We rely for our knowledge of it mostly on a newsletter account by the Globe and Mail, published on May 1, 2023, based on the paper’s access to a leaked copy of the intelligence assessment. For the record, when I quote from the report, I am assuming that the excerpts published by the Globe and Mail are accurate.

The Globe story is here:

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-china-targets-mps-csis/

The details we can glean from the Globe’s account include the fact that the report carried a heavy-duty title, “People’s Republic of China Foreign Interference in Canada: A Critical National Security Threat,”clearly designed to draw attention—note the use of the word “critical.” It was nine pages in length (that’s long for an intelligence assessment), was marked top secret, and designated for Canadian readers only (in other words not shared, as intelligence reports often would be, with our Five Eyes intelligence partners).  There is more to come, below, on the report’s very restricted distribution list.

One part of the report called attention to the fact that China’s intelligence service, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), “has taken specific actions to target Canadian MPs,” who were involved in a February 2021 parliamentary motion denouncing China’s treatment of its Uyghur minority and declaring that it amounted to a deliberate genocide. The report also indicated CSIS was aware that a MSS officer had sought information on a Canadian MP’s relatives, “who may be located in the PRC for further potential sanctions.”  The purpose of such intelligence gathering, according to the CSIS report, was “almost certainly to make an example of this MP and deter others from taking anti-PRC positions.” That’s intimidation in anyone’s book. CSIS is not a foreign intelligence service, but intimidation of this sort falls squarely into CSIS’s mandate to collect intelligence and advise the government on foreign interference threats to the security of Canada.

The CSIS IAB report did not name the targeted MPs, or specify the identity of the Chinese MSS officer involved in this interference operation. But the Globe and Mail had a source who identified one Canadian MP targeted as Michael Chong (Conservative). MP Chong had sponsored the February 2021 parliamentary motion denouncing the Chinese government’s treatment of Uyghurs.  The source also named for the paper the Chinese MSS officer involved. He was identified as a Chinese official operating under diplomatic cover in Canada named Zhao Wei (who was later to be expelled by Global Affairs Canada, following the Globe story).

The Globe and Mail account of the CSIS IAB report sent the government scrambling to conduct an internal forensic investigation to trace the dissemination of the report; further embarrassment was in store for the Government when the Prime Minister mistakenly stated in public that the CSIS IAB report had not been circulated outside the Service.  The leak and the Globe story poured more gasoline on the political fires that had been raging over the Government’s response to Chinese foreign interference. Identification by the paper of the targeting of Mr. Chong led to a revelation that he had never been informed about potential threats directly aimed at him, or sanctions against any family members in China. More demands were sounded that Ottawa should, as Mr. Chong was quoted as saying, “take immediate action.”  

It later became public knowledge that CSIS had delivered a “defensive briefing” to Mr. Chong and another unnamed MP In June 2021, but that the defensive briefing had not included any details of the sensitive intelligence known to CSIS about the interference plans of the Chinese MSS officer.

The CSIS IAB report and its fate had been in the cross-fire of questioning at PROC prior to the appearance of Mr. Morrison, especially driven by opposition party suspicion that someone in the government was simply not telling the truth about the distribution of the report. Some of that fire was directed at the current NSIA, Jody Thomas, who testified at PROC on June 1.

For the NSIA’s testimony, go to:

https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/PROC/meeting-79/evidence

Ms. Thomas confirmed that the Prime Minister had not seen the report at the time and only became aware of it after the Globe and Mail’s report. She also indicated that, to the best of her knowledge, it has not been brought to the attention of any other Cabinet Minister. More head-shaking from the opposition. The NSIA was able to tell the committee, under questioning, which officials had been sent the July 20, 2021 CSIS report.

The list was short and included only a handful of Deputy Ministers.  In addition to the NSIA, the report had gone to three other DMs, those for Public Safety (Rob Stewart at the time); National Defence (Jody Thomas) and Foreign Affairs (Marta Morgan). Ms. Morgan has since retired from the Public Service; Rob Stewart has moved to Global Affairs as DM for International Trade. What about Jody Thomas as DM at DND in July 2021, what did she do with the CSIS report?  

As she testified before PROC, she was on leave when it first came to her office; on her return she was consumed with the chaotic situation in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of US forces, the collapse of the government, and the take-over by the Taliban. She never read the report; and neither did anyone else at DND.  It went into, as she confessed, a “black hole.”

So a black hole at DND. Whether similar black holes existed at GAC and Public Safety, we don’t know. But it seems likely.

So here we are at the edge of the forest with our breadcrumbs. But before going further, it is worth asking a question. Why such a very restricted distribution list? Was it a decision made by CSIS to try to ensure impact? Was it based on a strict interpretation of the ‘need-to-know’ principle and a desire to protect sensitive sources and methods, which included, at the very least the interception of Chinese diplomatic communications. Might the underlying intelligence have included material shared under strict caveats by Five Eyes partners, most likely the US? Another thing we simply don’t know.

This brings us back to Mr. Morrison, in his central role as the acting NSIA at the time of the dissemination of the CSIS IAB report in July 2021. When called to testify to PROC on June 13 (he had previously appeared before the committee on December 13, 2022, and March 2, 2023), he knew he would face tough questions about the Globe and Mail story and his personal role in responding to the CSIS IAB report, and prepared accordingly.  

As acting NSIA, how did Mr. Morrison react to the report once he had read it, weeks after its original distribution?

This is where the story gets truly interesting. Our breadcrumb path divides, just temporarily, into two paths. Don’t worry, they will converge again.   

One path is signposted “Busy, Distracted Readers only ahead.” The other path is marked “Crystal ball factory, beware long hike.” (Facetiousness alert).

Let’s take the first path, for busy, distracted readers.  The CSIS IAB report is read. Its nine pages, what a bore. Its not well structured, let’s imagine, not gripping reading, nothing in particular leaps out. Flip to the end—what? There are no conclusions?  It did not name names, or reveal any underlying intelligence about Chinese election interference. It was, as Mr. Morrison, our busy, distracted reader, told the Parliamentary committee, a report “for awareness.”  He went on to say that it was not a report he would have “rushed” to brief the Prime Minister about.  In fact he told the Committee that in all his time (six months) as Acting NSIA there was only one report that crossed his desk that required urgent action, presumably by political leaders—something on Afghanistan.

Without seeing the report, it is hard to judge this response from Mr. Morrison. But there was more he offered. He said that the report was not intended to spur action.  That strikes me as a curious response. Intelligence assessments are, in fact, not “action this day” memos, in the famous Churchillian phrase used to prod his much-harassed officials. But that is not to say that there is no need for some action to follow up. Intelligence assessments, ideally, lead to more questions about a threat, more digging into the holdings and knowledge of an intelligence service. They can and should, in a mature intelligence culture, lead to shared awareness with Ministers, including the Prime Minister, about the nature of threats, and help identify possible policy and response gaps. Intelligence assessments, presuming they are substantive and well-constructed, are not bothersome news, not worthy of troubling Ministers with.  They are supposed to be the life-blood of good decision-making. But maybe not in Canada.

Here is something else our distracted, busy reader said. Mr. Morrison told the Committee that the CSIS assessment was someone else’s to deal with. Not his bailiwick.  In fact, he “safely” assumed (without asking?) that action was being taken elsewhere in the intelligence system. To be fair, while this may sound lacking in curiosity, it also reflects the realities of the role, as currently constructed, of the National Security and Intelligence Adviser.  The NSIA, as a Deputy Minister, is in charge only of his own intelligence assessment shop and the PCO security and intelligence secretariat. He is not in charge of CSIS, with its operational mandate, or the RCMP, with its law enforcement mandate. He has no authority or power to require either agency to do anything. Taking “action” on a CSIS threat assessment, in the siloed world of the Canadian intelligence system, meant, for Mr. Morrison, leaving it to CSIS, no questions asked. But even without the power or authority, questions could have been asked.  Pick up that clumsy secure phone—"hello, can I speak to David Vigneault, please. It’s the NSIA.  Yes, I’ll hold.”

This is where he really got the backs of opposition MPs on PROC up—by arguing that action had been taken, in the form of CSIS “defensive” (and generic)  briefings to two MPs in June 2021 and that the system functioned as it was meant to, according to the “protocols” in place at the time. Quite apart from the apparent insufficiency of that “action,” the claim also elided the fact that no action was taken at the time against the Chinese MSS (Ministry of State Security) official posted in Canada and known by CSIS to be involved in interference plots targeting MP Michael Chong.  The ‘system functioning well’ message got a blistering response from the opposition side (check it out on ParlVU TV).

OK, that didn’t go well. Mr. Morrison sprained his ankle on the path and toppled over into a ditch. But he picked himself up, dusted himself off, gritted his teeth and found the other path, converging ahead. “Crystal ball Factory…” the sign read.

Down the path we go. (I promise I will give this up in a minute as soon as we reach the end of the trail). Mr. Morrison may not have felt the CSIS IAB report required action, but he nevertheless took action. He didn’t rush to brief the PM about it, maybe because he was unconvinced. He told MPs that he was interested in the subject of Chinese election interference and wanted to know more. He didn’t turn to CSIS for more, but decided to ask his own assessment shop, the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat at PCO, to produce an entirely new report.

Why a new report? We don’t know. Bureaucratic rivalry can be healthy. A challenge function within a dispersed intelligence community can be vital. In fact, Mr. Morrison stated that he “challenged a team of analysts—folks that worked directly for me—to help educate me about all the threats I should be worried about…”

But if this decision on Mr. Morrison’s part reflected some lack of faith in CSIS assessments, or some lack of credibility, then we have a problem.

What was this new report? When was it produced? The answer was teased out slowly at the Committee hearings. Mr. Morrison said he recalled seeing a draft in December 2021 before he ceased being the acting NSIA. Then he told a gob-smacked committee that they would know about his follow-up report because it was leaked to Global News. It was a PCO special report dated January 2022.

Breadcrumb destination. Trail end (for now).

So, a PCO report produced six months after Mr. Morrison’s request? Six months?

Over to Global News for some clues. Note this was Global New’s baby. Only Global’s (then) reporter, Sam Cooper, had access to any leaked PCO documents—they didn’t make their way to rival Globe and Mail reporters, suggesting multiple leakers with different access, at the very least, if not leakers working at cross-purposes with different agendas.

Global News stories referenced this PCO January 2022 report on three occasions. The first time was in a story on February 25, 2023, mostly devoted to allegations about a Liberal MP, Han Dong, and his interactions with Chinese consular officials, along with sidebar allegations about the role of a former Ontario Liberal MPP, Michael Chan. This first story mentions a January 2022 PCO “Special Report” only in passing and paraphrases some of its contents, to the effect that (quoting Global) “much of Beijing’s interference in Canada is aimed at blocking any political engagement with Taiwanese officials.”  Not eye-catching, that.

The second reference comes two days later in a story published by Global on February 27, 2023. For the most part this was a piling-on report about Han Dong. It again referenced the PCO January 2022 Special Report suggesting that it was linked to CSIS intelligence stemming from the Service’s investigation  of Han Dong.  One of Global News’ intelligence sources was quoted as saying “Privy Council Office took the CSIS investigations and briefed this to the Prime Minister’s Office.” That would prove to be a short form of the truth and not entirely accurate.

The third, and most consequential, news story by Global that referenced the PCO special report appeared on March 8, 2023, with the headline, “Two high-level memos allege Beijing covertly funded Canadian election candidates.”

You can find it here:

https://globalnews.ca/news/9534893/high-level-memos-beijing-2019-election-candidates/

Global quotes directly from the report that:

“a large clandestine transfer of funds earmarked for the federal election from the PRC consulate  in Toronto was transferred to an elected provincial government official via a staff member of a 2019 federal candidate.”

This essentially repeated initial Global News reporting of November 7, 2022, in which the media organisation first raised the allegation of money flows for election interference in the 2019 federal election, but did not directly name a PCO report source. It would appear that Global News did not have direct access to the PCO January 2022 report at that time, but was only told about it in general terms by anonymous sources.

Now, in March 2023, Global News was informed by its source(s) that the PCO report was, quoting Global, “derived from 100 Canadian Security Intelligence Service reports and was produced by the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat.”

If this is accurate, it would go some way to explaining why PCO IAS took six months to produce its report. Such a deep dive into CSIS reports would also lend weight to a suspicion that in asking for a separate IAS report, Mr. Morrison did not fully trust the findings contained in the original CSIS IAB assessment of July 2021. Global repeated assertions made by a source that the PCO study was, quoting Global,” about intelligence gleaned from an on-going, high-level probe in the Greater Toronto area launched in January 2019.”

There was one last direct quote from the PCO January 2022 report, “We assess that Canada remains highly vulnerable to Chinese foreign interference efforts. We base this judgement on intelligence that highlights deep and persistent Chinese Communist Party interference attempts over more than a decade.”

This is the sum extent of excerpts quoted from the PCO report.  But it is not the sum extent of what we know about it. For that, we turn finally to special rapporteur, David Johnston’s report. Mr. Johnston does not directly address the Global News report of March 8, 2023, but he does reach some findings about the initial reporting by Global from November 2022, which we can now see drew some of its inspiration from sources that described the PCO report, perhaps in selective or very general terms.

Mr. Johnston characterized the November 7, 2022 Global news story as containing “one of the most inflammatory of the allegations” surrounding Chinese election interference. In his investigation, which presumably involved a review of both the July 2021 CSIS IAB report (available only to the Globe and Mail) and the January 2022 PCO Special report (available only to Global News) he found the following:

“It appears from limited intelligence that the PRC intended for funds to be sent to seven Liberal and four Conservative federal candidates through a community organization, political staff and (possibly unwittingly) a Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario MPP.

There is uncertainty about whether there was money, if it actually went to staff or the provincial MPP, and there is no intelligence suggesting any federal candidates received these funds.”

The key words are clearly “limited intelligence,” “intended,” “uncertainty.” Note the suggestion that there may have been an Ontario Conservative MPP involved. Global News had tried to tie in former Ontario Liberal MPP, Michael Chan. Wrong horse.

Mr. Johnston also stated that “the Prime Minister pointed out that he is not briefed on matters that are not supported by reliable intelligence. No recommendations were made to any Minister or the Prime Minister about this allegation [of PRC financial funding of election candidates in the 2019 election], and therefore no recommendations were ignored.”

This is where our breadcrumb trail into the intelligence maze has led us.

In conclusion, we have a CSIS IAB report of July 2021 which is given highly restrictive distribution, for reasons unknown, and at most of its Deputy Minister destinations gets chucked into a departmental black hole.

But Mr. Morrison was the sole senior official to read it. We can’t really read his response. We know he didn’t “rush” to brief the PM and left action on the report’s findings to others. But what he did next was curious.  He commissioned a new report from his own staff. That took six months to produce, perhaps largely because it involved such an intensive study of CSIS intelligence holdings that informed the original July 2021 assessment.

What happened to the PCO Special report once it was circulated in January 2022? No idea.  Who was it circulated to? Don’t know. Was it read by Ministers? Don’t know. We do know it arrived on the desk of a new NSIA, Jody Thomas, just as the Freedom Convoy protests erupted. More black holes? Get to work PROC!

If ever there is a case study in ineffective dissemination of intelligence reports, this has to be it, and it deserved more attention in Mr. Johnsgton’s report. Maybe it got that deserved attention in his classified annex, which the Bloc and Conserative leaders refuse to read (“trap”) and about which Mr. Singh, for the NDP is dithering.

It also serves as an illumination of broader problems in a government intelligence culture. It really is important to review the intelligence system and make some fixes following a comprehensive review—and not limited ones, either. The response cannot end with some tinkering with Deputy Minister committees or gentle encouragement to actually read intelligence reports.

But note, the real kicker in the David Johnston report is the suggestion of just how insubstantial the intelligence base on Chinese election interference allegations—especially with regard to the 2019 federal election--actually was.

To know more on that front we may have to wait until the two review bodies, NSIRA (National Security and Intelligence Review Agency) and NSICOP, (National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians) produce their promised reports, based on their studies of the intelligence holdings. Maybe we should have waited for that all along?

I want to end this column, and its (possibly tiresome) Greek mythology mash up, with some comments in fairness about important things that Mr. Morrison acknowledged about shortcomings in the intelligence system.  Two things stood out for me.  One was that he said he thought Canada was really still operating a legacy system that was attuned  (“optimized”) to dealing with terrorism threats, and had not adapted fully to a radically altered threat environment based on major geopolitical changes. Too true, sir!  Second, he said, following very much in Jody Thomas’s footsteps, that he felt there needed to be better triaging of intelligence reports in the system, given their volume, and  a process for “flagging” the most important intelligence.  Flag away. Helpful, but it doesn’t solve an intelligence culture problem.

I am left not quite sure whether Mr. Morrison loves intelligence. He told the committee during his June 13 testimony that he views intelligence reporting as just one stream of information. At Global Affairs, where is now sits as Deputy Minister, he reminded the committee that he also relies on diplomatic reporting (there is a true GAC-er!).  

He has expressed his views on intelligence in prior testimony, especially that which he gave before PROC on March 2, 2023.

See that testimony here (starting at 12:23):

https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/PROC/meeting-56/evidence

On that occasion, he was at pains to remind the committee that intelligence was often incomplete, and could be based on “rumour.” Intelligence can be plain wrong, he said, pointing to the example of US (and British and Australian and Israeli) intelligence assessments of Iraq’s supposed WMD program in 2003. I had to check where Mr. Morrison was working in the annus horribilis of 2003. Well, he was president of a US-based charitable organisation focused on development aid and global philanthropy, perhaps best remembered for its rock-star rock concerts (NetAid, no longer in existence). So maybe he didn’t have a full picture of the Iraq intelligence assessment problem in 2003. He seems big into questions of the reliability of intelligence.  Fair enough. 

I just didn’t hear the word “love” or even anything that really hinted at the importance of intelligence, warts and all, to decision-making.