GSRP Dissected
The review by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency drops
The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency launched its study of the Global Security Reporting Program at Global Affairs in 2019, and completed it in December 2020. NSIRA chose the GSRP for its first-ever study of GAC because of the uniqueness of the program and the potential challenges involved in having accredited diplomats collect information relevant to Canada’s intelligence priorities in foreign countries, some authoritarian and repressive. COVID-19 impeded the review’s timing and prevented NSIRA, for example, interviewing Heads of Mission at Canada’s embassies and consulates abroad about the GSRP.
The finished report was provided to then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marc Garneau, in March 2021, but a decision was made at the time not to publish the review. The reasoning behind that decision is partly redacted, but the NSIRA letter to the Minister refers to the “extremely sensitive” nature of the review and the “implications of a foreign state reading this review…” I don’t think it would be a stretch to read between the lines and assume the concern was with China and the ways Chinese authorities might use the report in the context of their hostage diplomacy regarding the detention of the “two Michaels”—Michael Spavor and Michel Kovrig--the latter of whom had served earlier in China as a GSRP officer.
The NSIRA review, previously sequestered, is now out, thanks to a joint effort by NSIRA and Global Affairs to speed along the release of a version in accordance with ATIP requests (presumably from the media).
The first takeaway from the NSIRA review is that there is no ‘smoking gun’ evidence of the GSRP program, established after 9/11, departing from its overt diplomatic information gathering to dabble in the underworld of covert spy tradecraft and intelligence gathering.
If that sinks a media headline or two, the more important reflection is that the NSIRA report does provide valuable insight into some of the shortcomings of the GSRP and makes useful recommendations.
Before we get to this, it is also worthwhile noting that NSIRA does not attempt to weigh or judge the value of the GSRP for Canada or for its allies. NSIRA’s mandate gives it a responsibility for assessing the lawfulness and authority of activities conducted by Canada’s national security and intelligence community. It does what is known in the business as “compliance” review, not review for efficacy. The NSIRA wheelhouse is partly reflected in its current appointed membership. The review agency is chaired by a former Supreme Court Justice, Marie Deschamps. The vice-chair is Craig Forcese, an academic and well-known legal authority on national security law. Other members include a third Canadian lawyer; a tech entrepreneur with a law degree, and two former senior public servants, one of whom, Marie-Lucie Morin, once served as National Security Adviser to the PM.
Some of NSIRA’s concerns about the GSRP reflect a cautious reading of the implications of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), which governs the practice of international diplomacy and the protections accorded to accredited diplomats by host countries. Among other things, the VCDR requires foreign diplomats to “respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state,” and “not interfere in the internal affairs of that state.” As NSIRA rightly notes, what constitutes respect for a host country’s law and avoidance of “interference” is solely determined by the host country, which is not required to provide any explanation for actions it may take to target or expel a foreign diplomat.
This leads NSIRA to one of its findings, a concern for “reputational risk” to Canada owing to a foreign state’s perception of GSRP activities. NSIRA found that “GSRP activities have the potential to cause unnecessary reputational and political harm to the Government of Canada.” The key words here seem to me to be “potential” and “unnecessary.” Absent any attempt to measure the value of the GSRP program in terms of the information it provides to the Canadian government and through it to selected allies, this finding is hard to unpack. The question of whether a putative reputational risk is worth it is nowhere asked or answered. It does need to be emphasised that authoritarian and repressive states with highly developed surveillance systems, such as Russia and China, will perceive the GSRP in accordance with their own sensitivities, not in light of the conduct of GSRP officers. The NSIRA statement in which it emphasizes that “GSRP officers should be wary of placing a receiving state in position to seek remedy [under the Vienna convention] reads oddly. Nor does the NSIRA report document any instances of a GSRP officer being declared persona non grata and expelled by a host country.
This NSIRA review finding was questioned by the then-deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, Marta Morgan, in a letter to the NSIRA Chair in January 2022. Ms. Morgan noted that “All Canadian diplomats mandated to provide diplomatic reporting are equally exposed to possible perceptions by host states that their diplomatic reporting activities interfere with its internal affairs. While diplomats are subject to a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of a host state, a sending state has no control over the subjective characterization of the host state of diplomatic reporting.” I think a useful saw-off here would be a recognition that GSRP officers, as distinct from other diplomats, are likely to be especially subject to such “subjective characterization.” The question is—what to do about this, and that is where concerns about the management of contacts come into play (see bucket three below)
Not all GSRP officers are stationed in repressive and high-security political environments, but the practice of not posting a GSRP diplomat to Russia because of the Russian security environment is probably worth following for China as well. In future both countries should be covered, to the extent possible, by GSRP officers posted to “periphery” states. This is also the current practice for Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea (DPRK).
NSIRA also wants to see more legal guidance for the GSRP, especially around the Vienna Convention obligations. But given the breadth and generality of VCDR strictures it is difficult to know how well such legal guidance, as opposed to policy guidance, would serve the GSRP.
Where the NSIRA review provides strong recommendations on improving the GSRP can be separated into three buckets:
1) Strengthening the management of the program, including policy guidance, departmental oversight, information management, and retention and training.
2) Improving deconfliction with CSIS
3) Ensuring appropriate safeguards are in place for the sources that GSRP officers contact while en poste.
On the first bucket, the NSIRA call for stronger management of the program seems entirely justified, but is nevertheless puzzling given the two-decade old gestation of the program (the GSRP was created in 2002). Surely you would think the management piece would have been sorted long before now. The NSIRA finding does, however, remind us of the value of external, independent, eyes on a program that would otherwise be subject to too little scrutiny. It is noteworthy that GAC promises greater departmental oversight of the program through the creation of an intra-departmental advisory committee, and it seeking to elevate the work of an interdepartmental committee by making it more strategic in orientation.
Bucket two, the relationship between GAC and CSIS. Here NSIRA has uncovered lots of indications of the need for improvement to ensure CSIS and GSRP don’t trip over each other, have good relations at overseas stations, and that their distinctive missions are not misconstrued by host states or indeed foreign allies. Its disheartening to hear, once again, of the weakness of inter-departmental coordination through an established Joint Management Team (JMT), which NSIRA noted “convenes too infrequently to have a lasting or substantive impact.” It is also worrying to read that “NSIRA also observed numerous cases where it did not appear that GSRP officers had adequately productive relationships with CSIS at missions.”
What the NSIRA report does not substantiate are allegations aired in the media by former CSIS officers that GSRP is some amateurish clone of an intelligence operation (or of CSIS). But better deconfliction between GAC and CSIS (minus the bureaucratic bun fighting) is clearly needed.
In some respects, the most interesting findings in the NSIRA report fall into the third bucket, which discusses how GSRP engages with its informational contacts in foreign countries. The report finds that judgements about the protection of contacts is often left to GSRP officers and that they, in turn will often rely on the judgements of those willing to provide information to them. This arrangement may be the best available, but it underscores the importance of something else discussed in the NSIRA review—the assurances offered to contacts about their anonymity and the confidentiality of reporting. It is disconcerting to read that “there was no evidence of a consistent understanding among officers on what assurances could be offered to contacts, or if contacts fully understood what would be done with the information they provided.” This needs a policy fix as a matter of urgency.
The NSIRA review is valuable. Sometimes its characterization of the GSRP seems off or imprecise. It is not clear to me what they mean when they say “GSRP operates in a distinctly grey zone.” This doesn’t seem supported by the evidence. I don’t think it is a great idea to misappropriate a terminology from hybrid warfare and apply it to the GSRP. Quite apart from the conceptual confusion, greyness seems in the eye of the beholder—a suspicious foreign state, a turf battler within the Canadian bureaucracy.
But here is the thing. We have two new (relatively) review bodies—NSIRA and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP). NSICOP deferred to NSIRA to conduct a deep dive into the GSRP. Neither review body answers the question—is GSRP a qualitatively good program, providing valuable information, worth the potential “reputational risk.” For an answer to that question we are left with the assurances of GAC officials, present and past, and, filtered through them, the praise of our allies.
This may be yet another reason why we need a proper and holistic review of Canada’s intelligence capabilities and the extent to which they are fit for purpose in a new world of national and global security threats. The NSIRA review even suggests a “renewed conversation on a dedicated Canadian foreign intelligence agency,” which is it happy to punt to NSICOP.
It’s unlikely that such a conversation will be “renewed” purely from within or that the torch will be carried by a review body. But as the Deputy Minister for GAC, David Morrison, put it in a recent circular to departmental officials, “we aren’t in Kansas anymore.” No shit, Dorothy.
How refreshing to see analysis of a government function that doesn’t turn into a partisan hit job.
I stand by my earlier statement that, regardless of whatever NSIRA “found”, at least one GSRP has previously been PNGed. Re: Mme Morin, useful to note that under PM Harper, Morin was a part-time NSA, the other half of her day was spent leading the CPC government’s public service renewal initiative. When people talk about Canada not having a Nat Sec culture, this example is one that typically springs to mind.