I stand by my earlier statement that, regardless of whatever NSIRA “found”, at least one GSRP has previously been PNGed. Re: Mme Morin, useful to note that under PM Harper, Morin was a part-time NSA, the other half of her day was spent leading the CPC government’s public service renewal initiative. When people talk about Canada not having a Nat Sec culture, this example is one that typically springs to mind.
It sounds to me like the author has qualms (for whatever reason) about the whole GSRP program. Is it possible that there are senior bureaucrats who don't like it and want to see it "axed"? Floating a report that suggests there are potential liabilities is one way to get politicians to get rid of something. I would consider it entirely normal that one of the purposes of any diplomatic mission would be to provide its home nation with up to date, accurate and pertinent information on goings on within the host country. I would assume that off the record conversations occur all the time between members of our diplomatic service and representatives of the governments in the nations in which they are stationed. Wouldn't GSRP be uniquely placed to report on that? I agree with Wesley's suggestion that there needs to be a clear delineation between the roles of CSIS and GSRP. I'm not sure why CSIS would consider it necessary to have any overseas activity, considering their mandate is domestic. Concerning the "third bucket", I would simply state that GSRP should not direct any of their contacts in any way, and make it clear to them that GSRP is not engaged in espionage. However if a contact wants to tell them something, fine. But the contact should understand that GSRP is not in any way taking responsibility for any response that the contact may receive from the host country.
Something else I would like to add. I disagree with you (and agree with NSIRA) that the grey zone is (not) an appropriate way to characterize where the GSRP program lies. So, no one is being paid for info (or extorted) but that is not the only reason sources provide sensitive material to FI agencies who collect. It's not true to say GSRP reporting is just diplomatic reporting that covers different subject matter. It does not look the same, it is not presented in the same way, and it covers different stuff. It is not collected covertly, but sources are protected---not standard practice for dip reporting. On a separate matter, It may be that the Service and GAC need to deconflict, but I highly doubt this will happen given the secrecy on one side and the pride on the other. Ultimately, deconfliction will not be a game changer, however. The quality of the work is what counts---and it is mostly very high.
Don't we need a National Security Strategy first before we do this? "The NSIRA review even suggests a “renewed conversation on a dedicated Canadian foreign intelligence agency." Why would we do this if we have CSIS and the GSRP? It seems a little bit weird to ask for a dedicated Canadian foriegn intelligence agency, when we have zero intelligence culture and zero results from the foriegn interference business yet.
How refreshing to see analysis of a government function that doesn’t turn into a partisan hit job.
I stand by my earlier statement that, regardless of whatever NSIRA “found”, at least one GSRP has previously been PNGed. Re: Mme Morin, useful to note that under PM Harper, Morin was a part-time NSA, the other half of her day was spent leading the CPC government’s public service renewal initiative. When people talk about Canada not having a Nat Sec culture, this example is one that typically springs to mind.
https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/wp-content/uploads/GSRP_EN.pdf
It sounds to me like the author has qualms (for whatever reason) about the whole GSRP program. Is it possible that there are senior bureaucrats who don't like it and want to see it "axed"? Floating a report that suggests there are potential liabilities is one way to get politicians to get rid of something. I would consider it entirely normal that one of the purposes of any diplomatic mission would be to provide its home nation with up to date, accurate and pertinent information on goings on within the host country. I would assume that off the record conversations occur all the time between members of our diplomatic service and representatives of the governments in the nations in which they are stationed. Wouldn't GSRP be uniquely placed to report on that? I agree with Wesley's suggestion that there needs to be a clear delineation between the roles of CSIS and GSRP. I'm not sure why CSIS would consider it necessary to have any overseas activity, considering their mandate is domestic. Concerning the "third bucket", I would simply state that GSRP should not direct any of their contacts in any way, and make it clear to them that GSRP is not engaged in espionage. However if a contact wants to tell them something, fine. But the contact should understand that GSRP is not in any way taking responsibility for any response that the contact may receive from the host country.
Something else I would like to add. I disagree with you (and agree with NSIRA) that the grey zone is (not) an appropriate way to characterize where the GSRP program lies. So, no one is being paid for info (or extorted) but that is not the only reason sources provide sensitive material to FI agencies who collect. It's not true to say GSRP reporting is just diplomatic reporting that covers different subject matter. It does not look the same, it is not presented in the same way, and it covers different stuff. It is not collected covertly, but sources are protected---not standard practice for dip reporting. On a separate matter, It may be that the Service and GAC need to deconflict, but I highly doubt this will happen given the secrecy on one side and the pride on the other. Ultimately, deconfliction will not be a game changer, however. The quality of the work is what counts---and it is mostly very high.
Don't we need a National Security Strategy first before we do this? "The NSIRA review even suggests a “renewed conversation on a dedicated Canadian foreign intelligence agency." Why would we do this if we have CSIS and the GSRP? It seems a little bit weird to ask for a dedicated Canadian foriegn intelligence agency, when we have zero intelligence culture and zero results from the foriegn interference business yet.