The Foreign Interference Commission Reports

Or, a first cut

The Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference (PIFI) released its final report on the morning of January 28 to a packed room full of journalists at the Library and Archives building in downtown Ottawa. It was a bitterly cold morning, but professional journalists (of which I am not one) are a cheerful and stoical lot. There was a lot of conversation and some chuckling in the room. These characterstics will stand them in good stead over the next four years

There was no coffee. I guess the Commission budget had finally flatlined.

The report was, as anticipated, a door stopper. Something short of the compete Charles Dickens, but still 7 volumes, a whopping 858 pages in total.

Fortunately, Volume 1 is the Report summary, a mere 121 pages and I will focus my initial observations on this overview.

No surprise, it is a professional and detailed piece of work. Commissioner Hogue and her team advance 51 recommendations. Interestingly she has prioritized some of these and even indicated that she thinks some should be implemented “promptly.” But any that involve changes to legislation (especially changes to the Canada Elections Act) will, of course, take time. That work is unlikely to begin before the Fall of 2025.

Before we get to the recommendations there is one important headline. The Commissioner promised to undertake a further critical examination of the June 2024 report on foreign interference (FI) produced by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. While the report was wide-ranging, and its recommendations solid, what seized the public attention was the indication that a small group of Parliamentarians had been “witting” or “semi-witting” accomplices in foreign interference schemes. Quel Horreur! In fact one of the allegations in the NSICOP report looked particularly bad, verging on the criminal code definition of treason-namely that a former Parliamentarian had been engaged with a foreign intelligence agency and had passed protected information. Looked like the espionage game.

Commissioner Hogue has thrown a bucketload of cold water on these allegations. She indicated in her final report that the classified version of the NSICOP report in fact does not name names. She commented on the “fragility” of intelligence and the “great care” that needed to be taken in allegations of misconduct. She outright stated:

“I did not see evidence of parliamentarians conspiring with foreign states against Canada…I did not see evidence of traitors in Parliament.”

This ultimately vindicates Elizabeth May’s own reading of the classified version of the NSICOP report and casts further doubt on the ways that Jagmeet Singh responded and tried to throw political gas on the flames.

As a first cut, I will pick and choose among the 51 recommendations for those I think are most significant to improving the ability of a future government to “detect, deter and counter FI.”

First off, the Commission recommends that the Government finally produce a public Foreign Interference strategy (one has been in the works since 2018). This recommendation (#8) is aligned with significant criticisms of the government for its failure to be more transparent about the foreign interference threat and to communicate with the public (p. 4; 58). Commissioner Hogue notes that in the absence of better transparency and public statements, the Government has paid a significant price in terms of controversy and lowered public trust.

The Commission also recognizes that the Government needs new tools and methods to deal with foreign interference and, in particular, suggests the creation of a new Open Source (OSINT) intelligence agency with an appropriate legal mandate, a capacity to track disinformation, and a better ability to communicate about threats at low levels of classification. I hope this gives some impetus to internal discussions on OSINT capabilities, that appear to have stalled.

There are plenty of recommendations that focus on ensuring that Parliament is better informed in future about FI threats both in general and in particular instances where they might target MPs (see #20,21, 22, 23, 24, 27) . All to the good. All sides, government security and intelligence agencies, Parliamentary administration, MPs and their staffs, have to be part of the equation. I particularly liked the ideas of a guide for MPs and dedicated training on FI threats. By the way the Commissioner encourages all political party leaders to obtain TS security clearances to have access to classified briefings. This is really essential and should be put above partisan politics.

The RCMP comes in for some attention (recommendations #36-38) in terms of its need for more resources, training and recruitment of skilled staff, in order to better deal with the law enforcement end of FI threats. In the meantime we await a more systematic approach to reform of the RCMP and improvements to its capacity to deal with federal policing of a broad range of national security threats.

It is also commendable that the Commission understands the need to tackle the impact of technological change on the information environment, especially when it comes to the application of AI and the problem of dealing with “deep fakes.” This will ultimately come down to working with social media platforms to ensure that content is properly verified and regulated, and any altered content flagged. Current developments in the US information space, with the return to power of Donald Trump, alas do not hold out a lot of promise here.

The Commission does urge the creation of some kind of “public tool” to help Canadians verify digital content. Public education is a key need when it comes to dealing with disinformation.

If one was seeking for a way to understand the scale of the FI threat to elections and related democratic processes in Canada over the past six years covered by the Commission (2018-2024) , perhaps the best and most factual way to do this is to understand that the FI Commission unearthed a total of six suspected “major” instances of FI over a six year period. Two are discussed briefly in the public report; more information is apparently contained in the classified version (hint—better get your TS clearance, Mr. Poilievre). The statistic may help us put the scale of the problem in better proportion without denying its insidious nature or its possible future manifestations. The Commissioner herself, was at pains to say that FI attempts had not had any significant impact on Canadian elections and democratic processes.

Sooner or later the public discussion will need to shift to other, much more significant forms of foreign interference--espionage, cyber threats, disinformation campaigns, transnational repression. That’s the work ahead. It wasn’t in the Commission’s politically-baked terms of reference. But we all owe a vote of thanks to Commissioner Hogue and her team.

More to come… including links to the Report (the Commission’’s website was overloaded, hopefully by legitimate readers)