It remains to be seen whether this tome will simply sit on the shelf, like so many others before it - particularly since our own political mechanisms are now in turmoil - to our great detriment.
But how ironic that the huge challenges facing Canada, at the moment, have not been at the hands of foreign malefactors but rather our feckless PM and the hands of the purported leader of the "free world".
So, in the face of such real challenges to our sovereignty and prosperity, packing a bus with students to influence a constituency meeting pales in comparison.
Particularly when the Liberal Party itself opened itself so widely to all and sundry.
In any event, I am grateful for your oversight and simplification of the security plumbing and mechanics.
“the Government has paid a significant price in terms of controversy and lowered public trust.”
I’m not so sure about that. The Liberals have stalled and bobbed and weaved over the FI debacle for so many years that the public curiosity in the matter has pretty much flamed out.
Testimony from public and government officials showed a stunning lack of interest in some serious actions of record, and the bused in student debacle in DV was simply shrugged off. Nothing to see there.
And then there was a five week delay in a Ministerial approval that was requested for surveillance purposes. The heavy fog of testimony around that issue is less than satisfactory.
It is easy to imagine that the Liberals will be more than satisfied with the Hogue Commission report. As Mr. Wark says, we thank the Commission for its work but many questions remain and the lack of transparency from the major participants is troubling.
I haven't yet seen much about what could be done to manage FI theats at the level of candidate nomination meetings. I have the impression that election laws and arrangements are solid, with political party nominating processes the weak link in terms of FI.
My article in today’s WFP deals with the somewhat technical issue of how to protect the integrity of Manitoba elections. Hopefully, the fundamental issues come through.
Protecting the integrity of Manitoba elections
MANITOBA Premier Wab Kinew says work is underway on a bill aimed at protecting provincial elections from foreign interference, dis- and misinformation campaigns and other interventions which could undermine the fairness and integrity of the election process. That bill could be introduced as early as the spring session of the legislature.
Some of the potential changes will flow from recommendations contained in the 2023 annual report from Shipra Verma, CEO of Elections Manitoba. That report focused in large part on the 2022 amendments to the Elections Act, which were intended to improve the accessibility, efficiency, security and voter satisfaction with the election process.
Following the October 2023 election, Elections Manitoba conducted an in-depth analysis of how the modernized voting system had operated. Unfortunately, a major storm, a power outage, technical problems with the electronic vote tabulators and human errors in the entry of voting data all contributed to delays in the collection and reporting of results.
This led to criticism — not all of it fair — that Elections Manitoba had not “road-tested” the technology sufficiently or trained its approximately 5,000 (mostly temporary) employees adequately. The CEO presented extensive evidence in her annual report to rebut these criticisms.
Operational efficiencies in the delivery of voting services are important and technological tools can support improvements. For example, artificial intelligence algorithms can be used to determine optimal polling station locations and facial recognition can be used for voter authentication purposes.
However, AI tools can also be used to interfere in the election process by spreading disinformation, creating false images, videos, texts and audio targeted messages intended to mislead low-information voters or to erode confidence in the election process and its outcomes.
The CEO of Elections Manitoba recognized these threats and acknowledged the limits of her existing authority. The Elections Act prohibits the transmission of false or misleading information about candidates and impersonation of election officials. Strengthening these provisions, the CEO wrote, is essential to safeguard democratic processes against the threat of false information. She called for amendments prohibiting communication of false information about voter eligibility, voting locations, the technology used in elections and the actions of election officials. The B.C. legislature has recently amended its election law in this way.
Last October in Ontario, the CEO recommended an even broader approach that would require that all AI generated content be identified as such in any communications, that he should have the authority to order digital media companies to remove false information and that penalties be imposed for failures to comply.
Legislation is just one component of a more comprehensive, integrated approach to the protection of election integrity, which must involve political institutions and actors, as well as media companies and civil society.
As part of election competition, political parties will increasingly be tempted to use AI to generate images and videos (deepfakes) to make emotional connections, raise fears and/or confuse voters.
In Manitoba, a voluntary code of conduct (2000), which relies on self regulation by political parties, calls for the avoidance of misleading and defamatory messages about other parties and candidates. However, there is no explicit ban on the use of deep fakes. This leads to two questions: should such a ban be added and should enforcement be transferred to Elections Manitoba?
In national politics, party nominations and leadership contests have been identified as vulnerable to potential foreign interference by state and non-state actors. The extent to which a relatively small province like Manitoba is a target for such interference is hard to know.
Party nomination processes are mostly wideopen affairs with only limited rules. Potential foreign influence is somewhat limited by a ban on contribution to parties and candidates from anyone living outside of the province. As for leadership contests, contributions from Manitoba residents are limited to $3,000 and contributions over $250 are reported publicly. More oversight of these processes by Elections Manitoba is required.
Cyberattacks from state and non-state actors on different aspects of the election process are possible. The exposure of Manitoba to such threats is difficult to discern. Clearly Elections Manitoba takes the threat seriously. It works with Communications Security Establishment Canada and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, uses firewall systems, encryption and audits, all activities meant to protect the election infrastructure and sensitive voter information.
Third parties, (such as political action committees or associations of various kinds) can be a source of disruption of the election process. In Manitoba there are some statutory restrictions on activities by such entities. For example, third-party advertising which promotes or opposes a party or candidate is considered to be election communications and is subject to spending limits of $100,000 in the pre-election period and $25,000 in the election period.
Citizens can play a role in protecting the integrity of elections by being shrewd consumers of political messaging. Elections Manitoba conducts educational outreach about the election process. Elections BC goes further with a webpage encouraging citizens to identify fraudulent websites/ social media accounts and false information, and reporting concerns to media companies.
Developing approaches to protect the integrity of the elections should involve a broad range of stakeholders, not just the registered party representatives who serve on advisory committees to Elections Manitoba. Rather than going directly to legislation, it would have been preferable to widen the dialogue by issuing a discussion paper outlining possible actions to ensure fair, free and transparent elections in a rapidly changing digital environment.
Paul G. Thomas is professor emeritus of political studies at the University of Manitoba. From 2014-2019, he was on the advisory board to Elections Canada.
Thanks for this "first cut".
It remains to be seen whether this tome will simply sit on the shelf, like so many others before it - particularly since our own political mechanisms are now in turmoil - to our great detriment.
But how ironic that the huge challenges facing Canada, at the moment, have not been at the hands of foreign malefactors but rather our feckless PM and the hands of the purported leader of the "free world".
So, in the face of such real challenges to our sovereignty and prosperity, packing a bus with students to influence a constituency meeting pales in comparison.
Particularly when the Liberal Party itself opened itself so widely to all and sundry.
In any event, I am grateful for your oversight and simplification of the security plumbing and mechanics.
Commissioner Hogue states:
“the Government has paid a significant price in terms of controversy and lowered public trust.”
I’m not so sure about that. The Liberals have stalled and bobbed and weaved over the FI debacle for so many years that the public curiosity in the matter has pretty much flamed out.
Testimony from public and government officials showed a stunning lack of interest in some serious actions of record, and the bused in student debacle in DV was simply shrugged off. Nothing to see there.
And then there was a five week delay in a Ministerial approval that was requested for surveillance purposes. The heavy fog of testimony around that issue is less than satisfactory.
It is easy to imagine that the Liberals will be more than satisfied with the Hogue Commission report. As Mr. Wark says, we thank the Commission for its work but many questions remain and the lack of transparency from the major participants is troubling.
I haven't yet seen much about what could be done to manage FI theats at the level of candidate nomination meetings. I have the impression that election laws and arrangements are solid, with political party nominating processes the weak link in terms of FI.
I’m out of here! 💥 🔥 ☄️ 🚀🚀🚀 🤯
My article in today’s WFP deals with the somewhat technical issue of how to protect the integrity of Manitoba elections. Hopefully, the fundamental issues come through.
Protecting the integrity of Manitoba elections
MANITOBA Premier Wab Kinew says work is underway on a bill aimed at protecting provincial elections from foreign interference, dis- and misinformation campaigns and other interventions which could undermine the fairness and integrity of the election process. That bill could be introduced as early as the spring session of the legislature.
Some of the potential changes will flow from recommendations contained in the 2023 annual report from Shipra Verma, CEO of Elections Manitoba. That report focused in large part on the 2022 amendments to the Elections Act, which were intended to improve the accessibility, efficiency, security and voter satisfaction with the election process.
Following the October 2023 election, Elections Manitoba conducted an in-depth analysis of how the modernized voting system had operated. Unfortunately, a major storm, a power outage, technical problems with the electronic vote tabulators and human errors in the entry of voting data all contributed to delays in the collection and reporting of results.
This led to criticism — not all of it fair — that Elections Manitoba had not “road-tested” the technology sufficiently or trained its approximately 5,000 (mostly temporary) employees adequately. The CEO presented extensive evidence in her annual report to rebut these criticisms.
Operational efficiencies in the delivery of voting services are important and technological tools can support improvements. For example, artificial intelligence algorithms can be used to determine optimal polling station locations and facial recognition can be used for voter authentication purposes.
However, AI tools can also be used to interfere in the election process by spreading disinformation, creating false images, videos, texts and audio targeted messages intended to mislead low-information voters or to erode confidence in the election process and its outcomes.
The CEO of Elections Manitoba recognized these threats and acknowledged the limits of her existing authority. The Elections Act prohibits the transmission of false or misleading information about candidates and impersonation of election officials. Strengthening these provisions, the CEO wrote, is essential to safeguard democratic processes against the threat of false information. She called for amendments prohibiting communication of false information about voter eligibility, voting locations, the technology used in elections and the actions of election officials. The B.C. legislature has recently amended its election law in this way.
Last October in Ontario, the CEO recommended an even broader approach that would require that all AI generated content be identified as such in any communications, that he should have the authority to order digital media companies to remove false information and that penalties be imposed for failures to comply.
Legislation is just one component of a more comprehensive, integrated approach to the protection of election integrity, which must involve political institutions and actors, as well as media companies and civil society.
As part of election competition, political parties will increasingly be tempted to use AI to generate images and videos (deepfakes) to make emotional connections, raise fears and/or confuse voters.
In Manitoba, a voluntary code of conduct (2000), which relies on self regulation by political parties, calls for the avoidance of misleading and defamatory messages about other parties and candidates. However, there is no explicit ban on the use of deep fakes. This leads to two questions: should such a ban be added and should enforcement be transferred to Elections Manitoba?
In national politics, party nominations and leadership contests have been identified as vulnerable to potential foreign interference by state and non-state actors. The extent to which a relatively small province like Manitoba is a target for such interference is hard to know.
Party nomination processes are mostly wideopen affairs with only limited rules. Potential foreign influence is somewhat limited by a ban on contribution to parties and candidates from anyone living outside of the province. As for leadership contests, contributions from Manitoba residents are limited to $3,000 and contributions over $250 are reported publicly. More oversight of these processes by Elections Manitoba is required.
Cyberattacks from state and non-state actors on different aspects of the election process are possible. The exposure of Manitoba to such threats is difficult to discern. Clearly Elections Manitoba takes the threat seriously. It works with Communications Security Establishment Canada and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, uses firewall systems, encryption and audits, all activities meant to protect the election infrastructure and sensitive voter information.
Third parties, (such as political action committees or associations of various kinds) can be a source of disruption of the election process. In Manitoba there are some statutory restrictions on activities by such entities. For example, third-party advertising which promotes or opposes a party or candidate is considered to be election communications and is subject to spending limits of $100,000 in the pre-election period and $25,000 in the election period.
Citizens can play a role in protecting the integrity of elections by being shrewd consumers of political messaging. Elections Manitoba conducts educational outreach about the election process. Elections BC goes further with a webpage encouraging citizens to identify fraudulent websites/ social media accounts and false information, and reporting concerns to media companies.
Developing approaches to protect the integrity of the elections should involve a broad range of stakeholders, not just the registered party representatives who serve on advisory committees to Elections Manitoba. Rather than going directly to legislation, it would have been preferable to widen the dialogue by issuing a discussion paper outlining possible actions to ensure fair, free and transparent elections in a rapidly changing digital environment.
Paul G. Thomas is professor emeritus of political studies at the University of Manitoba. From 2014-2019, he was on the advisory board to Elections Canada.
PAUL G. THOMAS