Just a response to Tom Deligiannis' question. The GSRP program was designed to reinforce the practice of analytical reporting from missions and embassies abroad, when that practice had frequently been undermined by other diplomatic duties (visits etc). The GSRP program moreover focused on security issues of relevance to Canada and in line with GOC intelligence priorities. But GSRP officers were declared and bound to operate openly, not in the clandestine fashion of intelligence operatives. The case of the two Michaels and, before that, the Garratts and their detention does raise some red flags about possible Chinese intelligence penetration of Canadian diplomatic communications.
Readers might want to have a read of an Op Ed published in the Globe and Mail entitled "When is a Spy not a spy?" by a trio of authors. They argue that "perhaps the biggest question...is whether Canada needs to take the plunge and actually create a clandestine Foreign Intelligence Service."
Bureaucracies complaining about "turf" is nothing new. The problem is usually weak or incompetent managers who don't know or care what is going on, and are only interested in getting the next promotion. The Chinese would have known who Kovrig was when he was designated as a GSRP officer by the Canadian government. My question would be why did Kovtig stay in China after he was no longer part of the diplomatic mission? The Chinese probably had him on their radar, and when they needed to pick up a pair of Canadians to retaliate they had those two already identified.
Tom, I refer you to the Mr. Wark's quotation of former CSIS officials who described the quality of the work as "amateurish." Of course, given the nature of the other "stellar" efforts by this government in literally all areas of governing, such a descriptor is not at all shocking.
GSRP reporting is far superior to what is produced by the Service on similar issues. Yet the criticisms noted above (though dated) are also fair. Context is everything however, and Ellis and Gurski are both guys with massive egos.
I always thought diplomats provided the kinds of reports being described by the GSRP program. So, I have to admit that I’m a bit confused about what’s different in what the GRSP diplomats were doing compared to normal foreign service reporting from overseas?
Yes the Chinese communists have penetrated our Embassy in Beijing and every other office we have in China, not a surprise when you see the number of Chinese we must employ on orders of China and all our guards are the Chinese People's Police.
What I see here is a lack of discipline and focus. If retirees think they can shit on Canada because of a bun fight between CSIS, RCMP or Immigration and CBSA or GAC it tells you that we need to purge the system of these self entitled idiots who are now using leaks to attack Canada.
I agree wholeheartedly with your close statements: "Intelligence is a team sport. GAC has a role, as does CSIS, CSE, DND and other departments and agencies. There is a place for new thinking, even about old chestnuts such as the creation of an independent foreign intelligence service." It's about time that the departments and agencies of the Canadian IC start to act like adults and become a TEAM. (= Together Everyone Achieve More). And perhaps the issue of a foreign intelligence agency will finally get serious consideration for a change.
I am very pleased that you sought to help "outsiders" (those who are not well-informed about Canada's security and intelligence effort) to highlight the sour grapes that former CSIS officials aired in their comments to the Globe and Mail.
I also agree that this series of stories has done little but offer comfort and aid to the Communist Party of China dictatorship, which wasted no time in claiming that the stories "proved" that their kidnappings were "lawful".
That there will be a review of GSRP and of CSIS seems inevitable. That the pols will try and make these things in to political footballs is probably also inevitable.
I have nothing for brickbats for Fife, Chase and the Globe and Mail.
The rationale for GSRP was to develop a reporting stream that had more depth than most diplomats have time to produce. It is often of good quality. Having said that some GSRP officers exceed their remit as diplomats and use and sometimes are encouraged to use techniques that attract the attention of security services everywhere, even if they are neither recruiting sources or running them. Particularly in a country such as China, such activities can put others at risk and do damage to diplomatic relationships. The issue is not jealousy, as described above, but whether the appropriate judgement has been applied by those involved.
Just a response to Tom Deligiannis' question. The GSRP program was designed to reinforce the practice of analytical reporting from missions and embassies abroad, when that practice had frequently been undermined by other diplomatic duties (visits etc). The GSRP program moreover focused on security issues of relevance to Canada and in line with GOC intelligence priorities. But GSRP officers were declared and bound to operate openly, not in the clandestine fashion of intelligence operatives. The case of the two Michaels and, before that, the Garratts and their detention does raise some red flags about possible Chinese intelligence penetration of Canadian diplomatic communications.
Readers might want to have a read of an Op Ed published in the Globe and Mail entitled "When is a Spy not a spy?" by a trio of authors. They argue that "perhaps the biggest question...is whether Canada needs to take the plunge and actually create a clandestine Foreign Intelligence Service."
Thank you for the clarification.
Bureaucracies complaining about "turf" is nothing new. The problem is usually weak or incompetent managers who don't know or care what is going on, and are only interested in getting the next promotion. The Chinese would have known who Kovrig was when he was designated as a GSRP officer by the Canadian government. My question would be why did Kovtig stay in China after he was no longer part of the diplomatic mission? The Chinese probably had him on their radar, and when they needed to pick up a pair of Canadians to retaliate they had those two already identified.
The other issue I wondered about is how the Chinese knew about Kovrig’s reports?
Tom, I refer you to the Mr. Wark's quotation of former CSIS officials who described the quality of the work as "amateurish." Of course, given the nature of the other "stellar" efforts by this government in literally all areas of governing, such a descriptor is not at all shocking.
GSRP reporting is far superior to what is produced by the Service on similar issues. Yet the criticisms noted above (though dated) are also fair. Context is everything however, and Ellis and Gurski are both guys with massive egos.
I always thought diplomats provided the kinds of reports being described by the GSRP program. So, I have to admit that I’m a bit confused about what’s different in what the GRSP diplomats were doing compared to normal foreign service reporting from overseas?
…comments you cite by Andy and Phil are accurate but not sensational. Well said.
Yes the Chinese communists have penetrated our Embassy in Beijing and every other office we have in China, not a surprise when you see the number of Chinese we must employ on orders of China and all our guards are the Chinese People's Police.
What I see here is a lack of discipline and focus. If retirees think they can shit on Canada because of a bun fight between CSIS, RCMP or Immigration and CBSA or GAC it tells you that we need to purge the system of these self entitled idiots who are now using leaks to attack Canada.
I agree wholeheartedly with your close statements: "Intelligence is a team sport. GAC has a role, as does CSIS, CSE, DND and other departments and agencies. There is a place for new thinking, even about old chestnuts such as the creation of an independent foreign intelligence service." It's about time that the departments and agencies of the Canadian IC start to act like adults and become a TEAM. (= Together Everyone Achieve More). And perhaps the issue of a foreign intelligence agency will finally get serious consideration for a change.
I am very pleased that you sought to help "outsiders" (those who are not well-informed about Canada's security and intelligence effort) to highlight the sour grapes that former CSIS officials aired in their comments to the Globe and Mail.
I also agree that this series of stories has done little but offer comfort and aid to the Communist Party of China dictatorship, which wasted no time in claiming that the stories "proved" that their kidnappings were "lawful".
That there will be a review of GSRP and of CSIS seems inevitable. That the pols will try and make these things in to political footballs is probably also inevitable.
I have nothing for brickbats for Fife, Chase and the Globe and Mail.
The rationale for GSRP was to develop a reporting stream that had more depth than most diplomats have time to produce. It is often of good quality. Having said that some GSRP officers exceed their remit as diplomats and use and sometimes are encouraged to use techniques that attract the attention of security services everywhere, even if they are neither recruiting sources or running them. Particularly in a country such as China, such activities can put others at risk and do damage to diplomatic relationships. The issue is not jealousy, as described above, but whether the appropriate judgement has been applied by those involved.
As a very Concerned Canadian Citizen (TM), I'll go scream into the void now.