The Globe and Mail’s rocket trajectory on Chinese election interference reporting.

Or, Who do you trust?

I previously wrote an extensive analysis for this newsletter of the Globe and Mail’s reporting on Chinese state election interference—stories based on anonymous leaks of classified intelligence (see substack columns on “Forensic examination,” of March 21).

I am going to return to this analysis and refresh it in the light of the report by David Johnston, the independent special rapporteur. Mr. Johnston devotes considerable space in his report to an analysis and critique of some of the media coverage from the Globe and Mail and Global News of allegations of Chinese election interference.  (See pp. 1-2, p. 4, p. 17, and pp. 20-28)

https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/reports/first-report-david-johnston-independent-special-rapporteur-foreign-interference.html

One purpose is to consider the critique of media reporting offered by Mr. Johnston and to draw my own conclusions. A larger objective is to wonder about the pass we have come to with the story of Chinese election interference, and how to get beyond it.

I begin by examining the trajectory in the Globe and Mail’s reporting (fairly long runway, then vertical take-off).  The kind of descriptive language used in the reporting is also worthy of study. It provides clues to the question of whether stories were being hyped. Story titles referenced will be those of the online version, which sometimes differs from the titles in the print version, and are not necessarily chosen by reporters.

I add in Mr. Johnston’s critique of some of the Globe’s narrative, where it was offered in his first public report.

December 21, 2022

“CSIS Briefed Trudeau that China targeted federal candidates in 2019 election, but no evidence of covert funding.”

This is the first story published by the Globe and Mail team of Bob Fife and Steve Chase that drew on anonymous sources with access to classified intelligence.

What the story revealed could be summed up as follows: CSIS was tracking Chinese interference operations during the 2019 federal election and was using various techniques to collect intelligence on the activities of Chinese officials. The Prime Minister was briefed about the Service’s findings years later in 2022, presumably to prepare him for a G20 summit in Indonesia at which he met the Chinese President Xi Jinping and privately complained to him about Chinese interference in Canada’s domestic affairs (a complaint that didn’t stay private and caused a Chinese backlash).

While security sources told the Globe and Mail about the targeting of 11 federal candidates in 2019 (party affiliation described as “a mixture of Liberals and Conservatives”), they indicated that no money was involved, the targets were not witting of any interference, and that the election results were not affected. 

Presumably the Globe thought this report was sufficiently in the public interest to reveal sensitive CSIS sources and methods (the Globe refers specifically to CSIS electronic and agent surveillance of the Toronto consulate). How they made that calculation is not clear.

Presumably the Globe thought the story was sufficiently in its own interest, by establishing that it could more truthfully report the news compared to its competitor, Global News. As the Globe reported, its sources told them that they were not aware of any money transfer to federal candidates having taken place, a direct contradiction of claims made in the Global News story by Sam Cooper published on November 7, which lit the first fire under media reporting on Chinese interference.

Prime Minister Trudeau was also told, according to the Globe and Mail story, about illicit Chinese police stations operating in Canada. The Globe and Mail’s sources told the reporters about RCMP and CSIS efforts to interfere with the operations of these centres and that Global Affairs had summoned the Chinese ambassador to Canada to complain about the matter and instructed him to “close down the offices.”

The December 21, 2022 Globe and Mail story was not commented on in the section of David Johnston’s report that examined media allegations.  It may be included in the more expansive classified annex that Mr. Johnston has prepared.

We jump ahead a month and a half…

February 13, 2023

“CSIS Warned Trudeau about Toronto-area politician’s alleged tied to Chinese diplomats.”

The second Globe and Mail story based on leaked classified information was published many weeks later, on February 13, 2023.  Unlike the Globe and Mail’s December 2021 account, this story was commented on in Mr. Johnston’s first report.

The Globe story focused on CSIS’s reported concerns about the connections between a former Ontario Liberal cabinet minister, Michael Chan, and Chinese diplomats based in the consulate in Toronto who were believed to be involved in Chinese intelligence and security operations. Chan retired from provincial politics in 2018, and is currently serving as deputy mayor of the city of Markham, outside Toronto.

The Globe and Mail account was based on information from security sources, but did not involve access to classified documents. Sources told the Globe that the CSIS Director, David Vigneault, had cautioned the government about Liberal MPs’ dealings with Mr. Chan because of his ties to Chinese diplomats. This caution was advanced in the same Fall 2022 briefing that formed the substance of the Globe and Mail’s first story on December 21, 2022. For whatever reason, the Globe held back this story for later publication. The newspaper had previously reported on Mr. Chan in June 2015, which led him to bring a libel action at the time against the Globe and Mail.  Four days after the Globe and Mail story, Global News weighed in with its own account of Mr. Chan’s activities (I will return to the Global news reporting in light of Mr. Johnston’s report in a separate newsletter column).

In Mr. Johnston’s report, he states that he has reviewed the intelligence relating to this allegation and interviewed national security and intelligence officials, the panel of deputy ministers who took part in the election warning mechanism during the 2019 election, and the PM and relevant Ministers. He states that Mr. Chan has “close relationships” with the Chinese consulate in Toronto and notes that Mr. Chan has confirmed this in public remarks. He mentions that Mr. Chan has stated that CSIS has never spoken to him directly about these allegations, presumably a round-about way to confirm this fact without having to divulge anything about CSIS operations. Mr. Johnston does not comment on whether Mr. Chan’s meetings with Chinese officials in 2019, were “clandestine in nature” and “election-related,” as the newspaper was told by a source, referencing an earlier CSIS briefing package from 2020. Mr. Johnston does note that recommendations were made to the PM and other ministers about Mr. Chan but he restricts that part of his analysis to his confidential annex. He does state, “I have seen no evidence that any recommendation has been ignored.” (p. 23)

While it could be argued that the Johnston report in its public version suffers from a lack of detail on what exactly CSIS reported about Mr. Chan, at the same time it does respect important principles around national security confidentiality, and the privacy and due process rights owed to Mr. Chan. He has not been charged with any criminal offence and, it appears, has never been confronted directly by CSIS with any of its allegations.

If the first Globe report of December 21, 2022, could be said to have raised no alarm bells; the second, of February 13, 2023, appeared to be, at least in part, a continuation of previous Globe investigations into Mr. Chan and drew on material previously available to the Globe and Mail which it now doled out.

The trajectory of the Globe and Mail reporting would change dramatically with its third story, based on classified sources, published on February 17, 2023.

Time for vertical take-off!

February 17, 2023

“CSIS documents reveal Chinese strategy to influence Canada’s 2021 election”

There are three new features to the February 17 story.  One is that it was based, for the first time, on Globe and Mail access to highly classified CSIS documents which were “viewed” by the Globe. What “viewed” means has never been clarified by the newspaper. The second is that the focus of reporting shifted from allegations of Chinese election interference in the 2019 federal election to interference in the 2021 election. The third is that the Globe and Mail was now prepared to use more hyperbolic language in its reporting, beginning with a description of Chinese interference operations as amounting to a “sophisticated strategy,” involving an “orchestrated machine,” and suggesting that the newspaper was now, with the help of these classified documents, “laying bare” the “full extent” of the Chinese operation.

That kind of language certainly pins eyeballs.

The essence of the Globe and Mail’s story was that the classified CSIS documents it had been allowed to “view” by anonymous leakers showed that the Chinese government set in motion an interference operation targeting the 2021 election with two “primary aims”—one to “ensure” that a Liberal minority government was returned in 2021; the other to ensure that certain Conservative candidates were defeated. According to the Globe and Mail, “the intelligence reports show that Beijing was determined that the Conservatives did not win.” The Globe went on to describe alleged Chinese tactics including disinformation operations targeting the Chinese diaspora and illicit support to election campaigns. It draws on CSIS documents to reveal statements and boasts made by Chinese consular officials about their plans.  The views of the then leader of the Conservative party, Mr. Erin O’Toole, who has long held that the Conservative party lost seats (though not the election) because of Chinese state interference were referenced, followed by statements from the Prime Minister that election integrity was maintained.

Mr. Johnston’s report, based on his review of the classified intelligence relating to the 2021 election and on interviews with officials and Ministers, significantly undercuts the Globe and Mail’s story and denies some of its central assertions and language.  Specifically, Mr. Johnston states:

“There was an unconfirmed indication that a very small number of PRC [People’s Republic of China] diplomats expressed a preference for the LPC to the CPC in the 2021 election…But there was no indication that the PRC had a plan to orchestrate a Liberal minority government in 2021 or were ‘determined’ that the Conservatives not win.” (p. 24)

There were offshoots to the Globe and Mail’s February 17 story which were also taken up by Mr. Johnston.

One concerns claims made in intercepted Chinese communications in which a Chinese consular official based in Vancouver boasted that that the defeat of Kenny Chiu, a Conservative MP who lost his seat in the 2021 federal election, proved that “their strategy and tactics were good and contributed to achieving their goals while still adhering to the local political customs in a clever way.”

Mr. Johnston again used his access to classified intelligence and interviews to investigate this reporting. He noted that there was online misinformation about Mr. Chiu’s proposed “foreign agent” legislation, which became an issue during his campaign, but that this misinformation could not be traced to a state-sponsored source. Mr. Johnston also reports that “it is clear that PRC diplomats did not like Mr. Chiu…It is much less clear that they did anything in particular about it.” (p. 25)

Another strand of the Globe and Mail’s February 17 report concerned allegations of illicit campaign financial contributions, conceived as part of an interference operation.  Mr. Johnston investigated and commented in his first report that, “CSIS is aware of allegations that the PRC engages in this activity.” The alleged activity is prohibited under the Canada Elections Act. Mr. Johnston found that “CSIS has not collected intelligence showing this activity is actually occurring.” (p. 26)

Taken together the investigations conducted by Mr. Johnston into the Globe and Mail’s February 17 report, suggest that its hyperbolic language was unfounded. Morever, the Globe and Mail reporters failed to clarify whether the language they used was drawn from intelligence documents, or was their own stamp on the story.

Mr. Johnston’s findings are worthy of note given the credence granted to the Globe’s more sensational claims by opposition political parties and the fact that they sparked a renewed effort on the part of a House of Commons standing Committee (Procedures and House Affairs) to extend its investigation into Chinese foreign interference.

There is a chain reaction at work here, that links the unknown agenda behind leaks of classified documents, to a sudden moment of sensation-tinged reporting by a major Canadian national newspaper, to a serious deepening of partisan politics in the face of a national security threat and even to a loss of public confidence in the very idea of free and fair elections.  By any measure it is an extraordinary chain reaction.

The Globe and Mail’s February 17 account was by far the most impactful of its stories. More new stories followed in the month after February 17. I covered those up to March 16 in previous substack columns published on March 21.  

Globe and Mail reporting after March 16 on issues related to Chinese foreign interference was voluminous. Stories published in April included coverage of the Trudeau Foundation and its receipt of a donation from some wealthy Chinese benefactors subsequently linked to the Chinese state. This donation was described as a Chinese interference operation, though the description was never very plausible.

Accounts of the targeting by Chinese officials of Canadian MPs and of confusion about the circulation of CSIS warnings dominated coverage in early May.

News stories reacting to the release of Mr. Johnston’s first report and his decision not to recommend a public inquiry took hold after the report’s release on May 23 with the Globe and Mail amplifying the many voices calling for a public/judicial inquiry.

May 1, 2023

“China views Canada as a ‘high priority’ for interference: CSIS report.”

Only one news report from the Globe and Mail published after February 17 was commented on in Mr. Johnston’s report, published on May 23. This was a news story from May 1.

In this story, the Globe described “a vast influence network” supporting Chinese state interference operations. Again, we don’t know whether this description was one invented by the Globe reporters or drawn from the wording of intelligence reports. The Globe based its news story on a leaked nine-page report produced by the CSIS Intelligence Assessments Branch (IAB), on July 20, 2021. The intelligence report was a lengthy overview, self-described as a “baseline for understanding the intent, motives and scope” of the Chinese government’s interference in Canada. Among the issues discussed in the story was intelligence reporting on efforts by officials linked to China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) to target Canadian MPs. Although he was not named as such in the report, a source told the Globe and Mail that the MP targeted was the Conservative foreign affairs critic, Michael Chong. The source also named a Chinese consular official, Zhao Wei, who was taking part in this interference operation.  The official was not named in the original IAB report. The Globe story detailed other methods described in the CSIS report to conduct interference operations.

Mr. Johnston confirms aspects of the Globe’s story, but with more qualified and nuanced language. His investigation into the classified intelligence resulted in this finding:

“There are indications that PRC officials contemplated action directed at both Chinese-Canadian MPs and their family members in China, and sought to build profiles on others. This includes Mr. Chong in both cases. There is no intelligence indicating that the PRC took steps to threaten his family. There is intelligence indicating they were looking for information.” (p. 27)

Mr. Johnston then went on to detail missteps in the handling of intelligence related to interference threats to MPs. He quoted Mr. Chong’s testimony before PROC (Procedures and House Affairs committee) on May 16 about a systemic breakdown in the machinery of government and went on to say:

“It is certainly the most prominent, but not the only, example of poor information flow and processing between agencies, the public service, and Ministers.” (p. 28)

The Globe’s May 1 report, like its predecessor on February 17, was highly impactful. In its wake, there was much attention to the mishandling of intelligence.  The Chinese official named in the report, Zhao Wei, was expelled from Canada. China responded by expelling a Canadian consular official of similar rank from our mission in Shanghai.

The Minister of Public Safety issued a new Ministerial directive on May 16 to ensure that CSIS would investigate all allegations of foreign interference targeting and keep the Minister apprised in a timely manner. More news stories have been reported on election interference targeting Erin O’Toole, the former leader of the Conservative Party, and NDP MP Jenny Kwan.

The latest development, as I write, is that Parliament has voted on an NDP motion introduced by Ms. Kwan, and supported by the other opposition parties, calling on David Johnston to relinquish his post as special rapporteur and again demanding that a judicial inquiry be held. (The vote was held on May 31). The motion passed by a vote of 174 to 150, but is non-binding.  Liberal MPs voted against. The Prime Minister has affirmed his faith in Mr. Johnstons’s work and denounced criticism of his role as political posturing.

Mr. Johnston issued a statement saying that he would not step down but would continue the work set out in his mandate.

In that statement, the former governor-general said that while he deeply respected Parliament, he had a mandate from government, and understood from the outset that his work on foreign interference would be controversial. He affirmed that “there is much work yet to be done and a further public process is required to identify specific reforms that are necessary to preserve the integrity of our democratic institutions.”

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/house-passes-motion-david-johnston-step-down-1.6861009

While I suspect that all political parties would agree with the idea of there being much work that needs to be done to improve capabilities to combat foreign interference, that is the waterfront where agreement ends. There is deep disagreement with the idea that David Johnston is the right person to do the work, that public hearings are the right vehicle, or more broadly that the Liberal government can be trusted with any of it.

So, trust is the issue—trust in the person, the process, the government.  But what about truth?

Curiously, when it comes to truth, there appears to be a greater willingness to accept anonymous sources with unknown agendas, and media reporting of Chinese foreign interference based on selective leaks, selectively reported, than there is to accept Mr. Johnston’s analysis based on full access to classified material.  

Here is what Mr. Johnston concludes from his analysis:

“when the intelligence is reviewed and considered in the context of all relevant intelligence, the specific instances raised are less concerning than some media reporting has suggested, and in some cases tell a different story from what has been reported to date.” (p. 2)

In the interview conducted on CBC’s “Power and Politics” by David Cochrane with Bob Fife and Steve Chase, the two Globe and Mail reporters basically suggested that Canadians should trust their reporting over that of Mr. Johnston.  The stunning notion that their leaker or sources knew better than Mr. Johnston simply because he (gender announced by Bob Fife) had been working longer on intelligence issues than had Mr. Johnston, completely ignored the criticism that the Globe reporting lacked context, may have cherry-picked stories, and had access only to a limited range of classified material.  Their defence of the reporting in the Globe and Mail is that it was based on documents they had been allowed to see by the leaker and that the leaker is a very honourable person, untouched by any “malice.” They noted they had been “guided” in their reading of these selected documents by their sources.  That strikes a very worrying note to me.

Fife and Chase also expressed themselves as unwilling to accept statements made by the Prime Minister and other Ministers that they had not seen certain intelligence reports.  This unwillingness does not appear to have been matched by any degree of knowledge they held about how intelligence is actually circulated within the government system.

Judge this interview for yourselves, but I was left unpersuaded by all of it.

The alarming truth is this. We have come to a very dangerous pass in our democracy, in which it may not be the truth, or the search for it, that really matters. It may be much more about what kind of story has juice, advances suspicions, confirms beliefs, deepens set convictions, and assists political agendas.

The truth quotient of anonymous leakers, of media reporting, of Mr. Johnston’s work, of politicians across the political spectrum, of the government, all deserves critical and objective scrutiny. None gets an easy or automatic pass.

Here’s what would help.

1.     Anonymous leakers could come forward. (You could put a bag over your head, like Igor Gouzenko, when appearing for interviews)

2.     Those media outlets with access to classified documents could publish them (in a responsible manner) to allow for public scrutiny. (Recall that the Snowden documents with Canadian content were published by the CBC.) Bob Fife suggested the government publish them, as he felt they would do no real harm, which deepens the mystery of why the Globe doesn’t do that itself.

3.     Media reporting could take greater care to avoid sensational language assertions and unnuanced stories.

4.     Politicians of all stripes could take more seriously the need to educate themselves about national security and intelligence issues, eschew evidence-free assertions, and tone down partisan attacks.

5.     Mr. Johnston could accelerate his public hearings and give Canadians more opportunities to form their own views.

6.     Mr. Johnston could press the government and the national security system to allow for greater public disclosure of classified information.

7.     The government could get to work on a rapid declassification project to allow for the public release of key intelligence records relating to foreign interference, especially those that have informed major newspaper accounts. This could be done under the guidance of an independent advisory panel. Keep this governing principle in mind: ‘higher walls around fewer secrets.’ (from a CIA source)

8.     The two review bodies, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, could commit to releasing to Parliament their analysis of Mr. Johnston’s findings on a set timetable and as a matter of urgency. (Say within one month).

9.     The NDP leader, Mr. Singh, the only opposition leader to have accepted the invitation to be security cleared to read the classified annex to Mr. Johnston’s report, could get to it and deliver to Canadians his own response based on that reading.  If that involves a climb down from his party’s call for a judicial inquiry, well he has a rationale; if it reinforces his party’s call, based on the evidence he sees (not the media reporting) he also has a rationale which he can advance.  What the Chinese like to call, “win-win.”

10.  Everybody should park conspiracy theories.

You will see the emerging themes here—declassification and transparency—and maybe staying calm.

I think all of the above suggestions are possible, indeed necessary, to get us out of the current morass, where the only winners (in no particular order) are public confusion, political discord, authoritarian governments with adverse intention s towards Canada, and time wasting.

The real loser is an opportunity to move at speed, and with new levels of transparency, to improve our intelligence system to counter threats, and to enhance public understanding of the national security environment we all live in.  

Incidentally, the more we keep this up the more our intelligence allies are going to start to wonder about heat stroke in Ottawa.