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Thanks to all readers. Mr. Ortis would have gone through their usual process of security checks to gain a Secret clearance when he first joined the RCMP. Later his access was changed to TSSI which would have required additional checks. Studies of the "insider" threat demonstrate that they often develop after a person has joined an entity and may not be detected through periodic security screening. In 2014 the Government, in response to another spy case, (Delisle) introduced a new "Standard on Security Screening," which included the use of polygraphs for TSSI clearances and the introduction of something called "after care," to allow for continuous scruting of personnel security risks between periodic security screening renewals. An internal RCMP study conducted in 2019 indicated that the RCMP had failed to adopt the polygraph test and had not rolled out its own "aftercare" program. Best, Wesley

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Again, Sir, well done!

You note that it is not only Ortis being considered but, clearly, the RCMP and Canada's ability to hold dear secrets is clearly a major consideration for our erstwhile allies. It seems to me that they have largely answered that question when they formed a new security block a few months ago that ignores Canada. I infer from the absence of Canada that our "allies" have voted to reflect Canada's undependability at keeping secrets. After all, we were surprised (we are given to understand) by the formation of the new group and, apparently, we were neither advised in advance of the formation of the new group nor offered an explanation for our absence. And, of course, the very clear penetration of Canada's government, universities and so many other institutions by the mainland Chinese certainly doesn't bode well for our "allies" trusting us in the near future.

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We can keep secrets, sometimes. Mostly. With trustworthy people in the right places, who don't feel the need to leak them to the people they're trying to collect intelligence on. I'm really hoping we don't miss out on intelligence because of this case with our allies, that is incredibly bad news.

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SR, the secrets that are kept most assiduously by our worsers (they sure as Hell aren't our betters) are items that are of interest to the general populace but that those same worsers feel would embarrass them if we became aware of the truth, the reasons, the cost, etc. In other words, the secrets that they work so hard to keep relate to them staying in power but they really don't worry too very much about government security, foreign agents, etc.

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I have heard this, but it's really hard for me to understand. What is the point of leaking a secret knowing that you're not trustworthy to anyone ever again? Do they think that trust is going to be easily restored because of their position in the hierarchy? Their moral compasses must not be working.

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SR, really, all these worsers are interested in is power. Power to run society, the government, etc.; yeah, they want money and wealth generally but it is power that they really want and need. The issue of foreign intelligence secrets, etc. being leaked is simply the same issue. The currency is power and, yeah, money too, but really it is power. As long as they have the power they really aren't worried about Canada and how it is perceived - or even controlled - by foreigners, just as long as they have power in this little pond.

Really, this is a small pond and all they want is to run this small pond. They don't worry about making the pond bigger (e.g. successful economy) as long as they can rule the pond and tell all the rest of us what to do, when to do it, how high to jump, and so forth.

Cynical? Yup. But I have watched the damned politicians for years.

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This is the substack posting I've been waiting for since this case began! I don't understand, if Ortis' claims are true, why his story couldn't have been confirmed by his "unnamed" source when he was arrested and before this was ever made public? If it was true, wouldn't the intel services and the RCMP have had an interest in quietly checking it and keeping it all hush hush?

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The Ortis case is an example of having a civilian performing duties that should have been the responsibility of a sworn officer. I would like to know what background checks were conducted prior to Mr Ortis joining the RCMP.

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Ortis's 'defence' has clearly been carefully constructed in an attempt to avoid the legal traps associated with his actions. But that is not how the system works. If there was a true concern for the security of his immediate superiors, the practice is to contact higher individuals in the chain, even the top, or a trusted superior in another security service or agency. Even those with lower clearances know that. And while I like many in Ottawa have a clearance- not at the rarified level the Mr. Ortis had, I very often have noted the immediate reserve that those with higher clearances manifest whenever a discussion veers in the direction of sensitive matters. His 'defence' evidently has been constructed by someone who has little knowledge of how security regimes work in practice. In my view, without wishing to prejudice his rights, he has no defence at all, no matter how he twists and turns- he is doomed.

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As the Norwegians say, "That's bad fish." There's a ton of bad fish here with Ortis. These actions seem to be the actions of a "mole" and not an intelligence official in the RCMP. I'm concerned they have not established a motive as to why he did this, and why he needs to lie about it. Is it just himself he's covering? Someone else? A group of people? The pay can't be that bad at his pay grade for him to need more of it, unless large debt. Does he need protection from something/someone? This case is just so bizarre.

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Something STINKS.

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